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The primary objective of this study is to examine the quality of earnings reported by UK 
markets and explore whether firms manipulate reported earnings figures to hit specific targets. 
The analysis commenced by detecting earnings management using accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation. On the one hand, this study has aimed to 
investigate whether firms manage reported earnings by utilising accrual-based and real earnings 
management that just meet or beat important earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and 
last year’s earnings. On the other hand, this study purposed to examine the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and their earnings management as to whether firm directors gain an 
excessive level of remuneration through managing reported earnings.   
Using accounting and financial data from firms in the FTSE All-share between 2009 and 2015, 
the first part of this thesis revealed that UK firms are more likely to engage in real activities 
manipulation through reducing discretionary expenses and overproducing to manage earnings 
upwards when just meeting the zero level of earnings benchmark. Moreover, it has been 
established that firms in the UK market are not engaging in managing earnings upwards by 
utilising real activities manipulation via sales-based manipulation and overproduction, but are 
involved more in real activities manipulation by reducing or cutting discretionary expenses 
when just meeting the previous year’s earnings benchmark. In addition, this study undertook 
an additional analysis ascertain that UK firms with negative earnings have incentives to use 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation through managing 
discretionary expenses and manipulating production costs to manage earnings downward.      
The second part of this thesis built a new model to measure abnormal directors’ remuneration 
and to indicate the degree of an excessive level of compensation gained by directors. Evidence 
was found that, UK directors report a decline in performance by using sales-based manipulation 
to manage earnings downward in order to receive additional rewards, whilst directors use 
production costs-based manipulation to boost earnings. The results also reveal that UK directors 
engage more in accrual-based earnings management to manipulate earnings downward to 
achieve abnormally high compensation themselves. Therefore, these results show that firms 
engage in accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation to manage 
earnings upwards or downwards to hit different specific targets.  
The thesis presented a more comprehensive understanding of earnings management for the UK 
market, and offered forward some practical implications for researchers, policy makers, 
standard setters, and other practitioners. For example, it implies that there is higher demand for 
increased scrutiny or constraints regarding accounting discretions to eliminate earnings 
management and to ensure firms disclose good quality earnings information to the public; it 
draws the attention of regulators or standard-setters to the limitations of accounting regulations 
and standards and encourages them to implement improvements; the necessity for a closer 
scrutiny by auditors and regulators is suggested whilst, this thesis may motivate the Board to 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Earnings management, as an accounting choice, functions in some firms or organisations for 
their own private gain and to misrepresent or disguise their true economic performance. It has 
been the focus of many papers (i.e., Dechow, et al., 1995, 2010a; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010b; Zhang, 2012; Enomoto, et al., 2015; Kothari, et al., 2016; Cohen, et al., 
2019). Exploring the issue of earnings management has a significant meaning, both for 
accounting researchers and practitioners. In accounting, earnings management is the firm’s or 
organisation’s capacity to intentionally affect the process of financial reporting in order to 
achieve specific targets. This comprises the alteration of financial reports to mislead 
stakeholders about the firm’s underlying performance, or to change contractual results, 
dependant on reported accounting figures. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p368) reviewed earnings 
management research relevant to standard setters’ shaping the definition of earnings 
management1 as follows:   
‘Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
firm or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.’  
Many studies present evidence of the belief that earnings management is pervasive. Akenrs et 
al. (1990) in a report on earnings management situations declared that short-term earnings are 
being managed in many, if not all firms. Levitt (1998), the chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) declared in a speech, that earnings management is a widespread, 
 
1 Schipper (1989) also provided an overview of the earnings management literature, although she avoided the 
perspective of standard setters. Her review provided an analysis of implications and trade-off among research 
design choices in earnings management research. As defined by Schipper (1998), earnings management as ‘a 
purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gains 
(as opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process), …, a minor extension of this definition 
would encompass real earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions to alter 
reported earnings or some subset of it.’ (p92).   
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but too little-challenged custom. Ball (2013) pointed out that there appears to be a widely held 
belief amongst accounting researchers that earnings management is rife, and personally agreed 
with the argument that earnings management takes place. He did not believe that accounting 
research reliably documents earnings management, however held that earnings management 
has a negative effect on earnings quality2, and could undermine the credibility of financial 
reporting. Beyer, et al. (2019) studied a dynamic model of earnings management and quality, 
consistent with the findings of some prior studies (Dechow, et al., 2010b; Dichev, et al.,2013), 
they suggested that the reporting bias through earnings management contributes significantly 
to investor uncertainty about firm values, and that ignoring the presence of misrepresenting may 
lead to inferences that significantly underestimate the persistence of earnings. Although it is 
widespread, the complexity of accounting rules may make it difficult for individual investors 
to detect earnings management. Levitt (1998) on behalf of SEC, also declared in his report that 
earnings management has adverse consequences on financial reporting and that it masks the 
true consequences of management’s decisions. SEC repeatedly called on standard-setters to 
make changes to accounting rules and standards to improve the transparency of financial reports. 
SEC also called for greater oversight of financial reporting procedures (Munter, 1999), and also 
issued several statements relating to the fact that they have filed charges against the 
management of firms involved in fraudulent earnings management (SEC, 2005 and 2009).             
Firms or organisations are motivated to engage in earnings management which involves the 
opportunistic manipulation of their earnings towards a pre-determined target. This specific 
target can mainly be driven by a preference for more stable returns, in which care management 
is used for carrying out income smoothing, as opportunistic income smoothing can, in turn, 
signal a lower level of risk and increase a firm’s market value. As evidenced by accountings 
researchers, there are several other possible factors which motivate firms using the earnings 
management method to manipulate their reported earnings, such as the need to maintain the 
level of certain according ratios resulting from debt covenants (i.e., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994; Daniel, et al., 2008; Atieh and Hussain, 2012), the need to avoid negative earnings (i.e., 
Burgstahler and Dichew, 1997b; Gunny, 2010 ), the ability to decrease earnings and comparison 
of analysts’ forecasts in order to maintain a longer level of overvaluation (i.e., Badertscher, 
2011). In addition, earnings management may involve the exploitation of opportunities to make 
accounting decisions which alter the earnings amount reported in the financial statements, this 
 
2 Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) defined following earnings quality as higher quality earnings provide more 
information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a 
specific decision-maker.   
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is due to the fact that accounting decisions can, in turn, affect the timing of transactions and the 
estimates used in financial reporting to influence the reported earnings. For instance, Weil 
(2009) found that a comparatively small change in the estimates for uncollectible accounts can 
have a significant effect on net income, and a firm using last-in, first-out accounting for 
inventories can increase net income in times of rising prices by delaying purchases to future 
periods.  
In spite of accounting researchers proposing several methods to measure earnings management 
(Price III, Sharp, and Wood, 2011), it may be difficult for individual stakeholder to detect 
whether firms manage reported earnings, due to the complexity of accounting regulations, rules, 
standards, and policies. Research studies have established that firms with high accruals and 
weak governance structure have more incentive to participate in earnings management 
(Dechow, and Skinner, 2000; Prawitt, Smith, and Wood, 2009; Buchholze, et al. 2019). 
Different methods have been adopted by firms in order to manage earnings. One type of 
earnings management, referred to as ‘accrual-based’ earnings management, is achieved by 
changing the accrual method of accounting or estimates used when presenting a given 
transaction in the financial statements. This type of earnings management has no direct cash 
flow consequence, and has been extensively studied by researchers of earnings management 
(e.g. Jones, 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Fields et al., 2001; 
Dechow, et al. 2010a; Alhada and Clacher, 2018; Jackson, 2018). It includes provisions for bad 
debt expenses, delaying asset write-offs and changing the depreciation method for fixed assets. 
In addition, a variety of models including the Jones (1991) model and the Dechow (1995) model, 
have been widely used to detect abnormal accruals. The second kind of earnings management 
is referred to as ‘real activities manipulation’ or ‘real earnings management’ which involves 
seeking to alter the execution of a real transaction which takes place during the financial year. 
It affects underlying activities and therefore has cash flow consequences and is achieved by, for 
instance, reductions in expenditure on research and development, changing the time or 
restructuring an operation and investing or financing activities. Real earnings management has 
not been widely researched but has become increasingly popular in recent years (e.g. Cohen et 
al., 2008; Eldeberg et al., 2011; Kim and Park, 2014; Cheng, et al. 2016; Li, 2019). Graham et 
al. conducted a study in 2005 and produced evidence that earnings management is mostly 
achieved by real actions with 80% of surveyed CFOs declaring they would employ real 
transactions to manipulate earnings, such as the use of decreasing R&D, advertising costs and 
maintenance expenditure and postponement of new projects. A third type of earnings 
management also exists which is under-researched and is referred to as ‘classification shifting’. 
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This is undertaken by the deliberate mis-classification of items within the income statement 
without changing the bottom line earnings. The idea that firms engage in earnings management 
using classification shifting is supported by McVay (2006), who investigated the classification 
of items within an income statement as an earnings management tool and found evidence that 
managers overstate ‘core’ earnings with no change of bottom-line earnings by means of 
opportunistically taking expenses from core expenses (cost of goods sold and selling, general, 
and administrative expenses) and moving them to that of special items.   
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the quality of earnings reported by UK markets 
and explore whether firms manipulate reported earnings figures to achieve specific targets. 
Analysis of this research commences by detecting earnings management using accrual-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation which both act within Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and as the most common two categories of earnings 
management, have been relatively widely used in literature compared with classification 
shifting. Accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation change the 
bottom-line earnings of GAAP in income statements whilst classification shifting simply moves 
expenses from core expenses to special items to manipulate core earnings without any change 
of bottom-line GAAP earnings. Prior literature in earnings management documentation shows 
that firms aim to meet or just beat different earnings benchmark when they manipulate reported 
earnings as a motivation for engaging in earnings management activities (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; Mindak, 
et al. 2016). Thus, the first purpose of thesis is to investigate whether firms manage reported 
earnings by using accrual-based and real earnings management which just meets or beats 
important earnings benchmarks (zero level of earnings, last year’s earnings). In addition, 
research in the field of directors’ compensation presents evidence that the level of directors’ 
pay is positively related to a firm’s performance as directors tend to maximise their 
compensation by improving the firm’s performance as they act in the best interests of the 
shareholders (McGuire, et al., 1962; Ciscel, 1974; Rosen, 1990; Main, 1996, Ali and Zhang, 
2015). Combined with earnings management studies, a degree of research shows that 
maximising directors’ compensation may lead to incentives for engaging in earnings 
management (Healy, 1985; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Dutta and Fan, 2014; Hou et al., 2015). 
The objective of the second part of this thesis, is to examine the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and earnings management.            
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear introduction to the thesis. Section 1.2 
specifically presents an overview of the first study including research objectives, background, 
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motivation, research questions, estimation methods, and main findings. Section 1.3, as with 
section 1.2, introduces the second part of this study; section 1.4 discusses contributions; section 
1.5 briefly summarises this chapter and clearly outlines the structure of the whole thesis.   
1.2 Part I: Earnings Management and Earnings Benchmarks 
1.2.1 Research Background  
According to prior literature in the field of earnings management, there are three different types 
of earnings management which can be used to manipulate firms’ reported earnings: accrual-
based earnings management (𝐴𝑀) (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Fields et al., 2001; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Dechow, et al. 2010a; Jackson, 2018), real activities manipulation (𝑅𝐴𝑀) 
(e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2019), and classification shifting 
(e.g., McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010; Haw, et al., 2011; Zalata and Roberts, 2016). Accruals-
based earnings management occurs when firms, change the accounting choices or estimated use 
by adjusting revenue or expenses accrual to alter the presenting of a given transaction in the 
financial reports. Accrual-based earnings management involves accounting choices within 
GAAP which seek to ‘obscure’ or ‘mask’ true economic performance (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000; Gunny, 2010), and have no cash flow consequences. This is more likely to be used to 
destroy a firm’s value in the short-term. Examples of accrual-based earnings management 
include providing for bad debt expenses, delaying asset write-off, and changing the depreciation 
methods for fixed assets so that changing accounting choices leads to biased financial reported 
earnings in a particular direction without changing the underlying operational activities. 
Managers may have incentives to manipulate reported earnings by using accrual-based earnings 
management in two directions: increase or decrease. On the one hand, accrual-based earnings 
management can be adopted to boost reported earnings when estimated change or expected 
earnings fall below the pre-determined earnings target, to ensure that the desired threshold is 
just met, or even slightly exceeded. It is also referred to as income-increasing accrual earnings 
management. On the other hand, managers may have incentives for manipulating earnings 
which decrease in a current period by utilising accrual-based earnings management to create a 
reserve that helps them report a larger improvement in earnings in the future, thus making 
subsequent earnings targets more easily achievable. This is also referred to as income-
decreasing accrual-based earnings management (Levit, 1998; DeGeorge et al., 1999; Baton and 
Simko, 2002; Nelson et al., 2002). Levitt (1998), the chairman of SEC reported that income-
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decreasing accounting gimmicks are pervasive, including ‘Big Bath3’ and ‘Cookie Jar reserves4’ 
which attracted the attention of accounting researchers and market practitioners. ‘Big bath’ is 
an earnings management technique which is described as ‘taking a bath’ by Healy5 (1985), in 
that managers have incentives to further reduce reported earnings in a current period by 
deferring revenue or accelerating write-offs if earnings are too low so that no matter which 
accounting procedures are used, target earnings will not be met.   
Prior literature has extensively researched accrual-based earnings management and offers 
evidence that managers widely use accruals-based earnings management methods to 
manipulate reported earnings. Literature on earnings management, following evidence from a 
survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), turned its attention to the study of real activities 
manipulation. According to the Graham et al.’ (2005) survey, 80% of their executive sample 
admitted that, in order to hit the earnings target, they are more reluctant to engage in accrual-
based earnings management, rather they prefer to manage earnings by means of real economic 
actions such as delaying maintenance or advertising expenditure, even withdrawing from 
positive net present value (NPV) projects. Roychowdhury (2006) concurring with the 
conclusions in Graham et al. (2005), provided a comprehensive overview of real activities 
manipulation and developed empirical methods for real activities manipulation. Roychowdhury 
(2006, p336) defines real activities manipulation as ‘management actions that deviate from 
normal business practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders 
into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of 
operations’. He focused on three real activities manipulation methods to manage earnings 
upwards, including accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating more unsustainable sales 
by means of increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms, reduction of discretionary 
expenditures and overproduction or increasing production to report lower costs of goods sold 
(COGS). Real activities manipulation as an earnings management tool has been a prevalent 
topic in the field of earnings management study in recent years (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Baderscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Kim and Park, 2014; Cohen et al., 2016; Kothari et al., 2016).  
 
3 ‘Big Bath’ can be explained as a firm’s management team knowingly manipulating its income statement to make 
poor results look even worse in order to make future results appear better, is often implemented in a relatively bad 
year so that a firm can enhance the next year’s earnings in an artificial manner. 
4 ‘Cookie Jar Reserves’ is an accounting practice in which a firm takes a quantity of large reserves from an 
economically successful year and incurs them against losses from less successful years. Through this process, 
firms can mislead investors into believing that their losses are less than the actual value. 
5 Healy (1985) argued that a strategy known as ‘taking a bath’, which means if earnings are so low that no matter 
which accounting procedures are selected target earnings will not be met, managers have incentives to further 
reduce current earnings by deferring revenues or accelerating write-offs. This strategy does not affect current bonus 
awards and increases the probability of meeting future earnings’ target.  
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The issue of earnings benchmarks has also been investigated by accounting researchers in the 
field of earnings management. Prior literature suggests that firms engage in manipulation of 
reported earnings by employment of different earnings management methods, to meet or beat 
certain earnings benchmarks (Dechow et al., 1995; Burgstahler and Divhev, 1997; Dechow et 
al., 2003; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2009; Gunny, 2010; Mindak, et al., 2016). The 
important earnings benchmarks can be measured within three thresholds: managers manipulate 
earnings to meet or just beat zero level of earnings to avoid negative earnings, to meet or beat 
last year’s earnings to avoid earnings decreasing and maintaining the level of a firms’ 
performance to meet the analysts’ earnings forecast consensus. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
provided evidence that firms manage reported earnings upwards through accrual accounting 
and cash flows from operations to avoid earnings losses and decreases. Roychowdhury (2006) 
adopted three measures to detect real activities manipulation to show that firms manage 
earnings to avoid losses. Some recent studies looked at accrual-based earnings management 
and real activities manipulation together and found that accrual-based and real earnings 
management act as substitutes and there is a trade-off relationship between them when meeting 
or beating earnings benchmarks (Gunny, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2016). 
1.2.2 Research Motivations 
The focus of this study is to detect earnings management using accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation, and identify specific earnings targets of earnings 
manipulation. It is motivated by several important factors. Firstly, a large number of accounting 
researchers have focused their studies on examining earnings management, however the results 
are unreliable. With regard to accrual-based earnings management, a variety of models have 
been developed and widely used to detect abnormal accruals, including the Jones (1991) model, 
the Dechow et al. (1995) model, the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, etc. There still remains 
the inherent limitation of their failure to validate the accuracy of their assessments. It cannot be 
verified whether estimates of discretionary accruals reflect exact expectations of management’s 
opportunistic results, or are possibly simply an artefact for the adopted particular model. The 
validity problem also applies to real activities manipulation, whereby it is unclear whether the 
proxies actually measure the underlying theoretical constructs which the model is intended to 
measure. Roychowdhury (2006) was the first person to present a comprehensive overview of 
managers who use real activities manipulation to avoid losses and to offer an empirical method 
to detect real activities manipulation. A large number of subsequent research studies have 
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followed Roychowdhury’s model seeking to detect real activities manipulation. Siriviriyakul 
(2013), however, failed to establish evidence that it is possible to use real earnings management 
to avoid losses in Roychowdhury’s setting. The validity problem is thus one of the important 
motivations for this research in terms of detecting earnings management using accrual-based 
and real earnings management, based on the UK market. 
Secondly, although the vast body of research has focused on accrual-based earnings 
management or the relatively under-researched real activities manipulation which has become 
popular in the past few years, little evidence is available until now which confirms the validity 
of each earnings management tool or their main results as previously discussed. As Fields et al. 
(2001) stated, it is not possible to explain the overall effect of earnings management at one time 
if a researcher only concentrates on one type of earnings management. Zang (2012), established 
a substitution relationship between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings 
management. Sohn (2016) provided the supporting evidence that managers’ real earnings 
management increases whereas their accrual-based earnings management decreases with the 
degree of their firms’ accounting comparability with other firms. These indicated that it is 
difficult to conclude a definitive result of earnings management if either type of earnings 
management, which exists in a relationship with each other, is separately investigated. The 
exploration of a potential relationship between the two common types of earnings management 
for UK firms is another motivation for the research. 
Third, from an accounting perspective, earnings benchmarks play an important role in earnings 
management in that managers who try to reduce fluctuation may employ accrual earnings 
management or real activities manipulation to increase or decrease current period reported 
earnings figures to match pre-managed earnings targets to maintain income at an even level. 
Earnings benchmarks are used as target levels to be achieved by managers engaged in earnings 
management behaviour, because achieving earnings targets helps firms to sustain or enhance 
their credibility and reputation with stakeholders and managers .The purpose of management 
incentives is generally based on the assumption that wealth-maximisers realise that their wealth 
can be adversely impacted when their firms’ reported earnings fail to meet earnings benchmarks. 
The choice of earnings benchmarks is motivating this research with regard to detecting accrual-
based and real earnings management because a change in the earnings benchmark may offer 
different evidence and assists in enriching the literature by offering evidence regarding whether 
firms focusing on the UK market use different earnings management methods to meet important 
earnings benchmarks.     
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1.2.3 Research Aims, Questions, and Hypotheses  
The first part of the thesis aims to examine whether firms manage reported earnings by using 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation that just meet or beat 
important earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings, last year’s earnings). On the one hand, 
the objective of this study is to detect earnings management by using accrual-based and real 
earnings management, as both common methods of earnings management involve GAAP and 
have been relatively extensively examined in literature compared with classification shifting. 
Accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulate change in the bottom-line 
GAAP of the income statement, while classification shifting simply shifts expenses from core 
expenses to special items to manipulate core earnings without any change of bottom-line GAAP 
earnings. On the other hand, this study explores whether firms engage in earnings management 
which just meets or beats core earnings benchmarks, such as avoiding loss, avoiding earnings 
decrease, as prior research shows that firms aim to meet or just beat different earnings 
benchmarks when they manipulate earnings as a motivation for adopting earnings management 
activities.  
Specifically, the first part of the thesis focuses on the following questions relating to the defined 
aim: 
• Do firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last 
years’ earnings) manage earnings upwards by engaging in real activities manipulation? 
• Do firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last 
year’s earnings) manage earnings upwards through the use of sales-based manipulation? 
• Do firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks ((‘zero’ level of earnings and last 
year’s earnings) manage earnings upwards by cutting or reducing discretionary 
expenses? 
• Do firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks ((‘zero’ level of earnings and last 
year’s earnings) manage earnings upwards through overproduction?   
• Do firms engage in accrual-based earnings management which just meet/beat the 
earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings)? 
Therefore, these research questions are addressed by formally testing the following hypotheses, 
respectively: H1. Firms that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings 
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and last year’s earnings) are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation; H1a. Firms 
which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings) 
exhibit unusually low cash flows from operations; H1b. Firms which just meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings) exhibit unusually low 
discretionary expenses; H1c. Firms which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level 
of earnings and last year’s earnings) exhibit unusually high production costs; H2. Firms that 
just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings) are 
more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management. 
1.2.4 Research Methodology and Findings 
The investigation sample consisted of 2,513 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2015 of 11 
main industries and 359 individual legal firms listed on FTSE All shares, after excluding firms 
from financial, bank, real estate, and insurance industries. All accounting and financial data was 
collected from the FAME Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (FAME) database. Estimation 
models of both accrual-based and real earnings management were run by linear regressions for 
each industry and year.    
Abnormal discretionary accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) were adopted to measure the degree of 
accrual-based earnings management, and estimate the residuals from the model of the normal 
level of discretionary accruals which follows the modified Jones’ (1991) model developed by 
Dechow et al. (1995). Similar to Rochowdhury’s (2006) study, this study used abnormal cash 
from operations ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ), abnormal discretionary expenses ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ), abnormal 
production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷), and an aggregate measure (𝑅𝐴𝑀) to indicate the extent of real 
activities manipulation. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010), and Zang 
(2012), the Fama-MacBeth approach was used to examine whether suspect firm-years were 
more likely to engage in different earnings management activities.  
Univariate and multivariate analyses were used to present the empirical results of this study. 
Firstly, this empirical study finds that UK suspect firm-years are more likely to engage in real 
activities manipulation to boost earnings by cutting discretionary expenses and producing more 
goods when just beating/meeting the earnings benchmark around the ‘zero’ level, and they seek 
simultaneously to make earnings upwards through reduction in discretionary expenses and 
overproduction. However, it could not find evidence that suspect firm-years use sales-based 
manipulation and accrual-based earnings management to beat/meet the ‘zero’ level of earnings 
management. Secondly, evidence was provided that UK suspect firm-years have unusually 
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lower discretionary expenses, suggesting they are likely to engage more in real activities 
manipulation only through reducing/cutting discretionary expenses to boost earnings when just 
beating or meeting last year’s earnings benchmark. It was also determined that suspect firm-
years do not engage in managing earnings upwards by using sales-based manipulation, 
overproduction and accrual-based earnings management when comparing this year’s earnings 
with that of last year. In addition, this study offers new evidence that UK firms with negative 
earnings have an incentive to further decrease their earnings or shift positive earnings to 
negative earnings through accrual-based earnings management, manipulating discretionary 
expenses, or manipulating production costs, in order to report better future performances. In 
short, the findings of this study contribute to literature on earnings management, suggesting that 
firms would like to engage in accrual-based and real earnings management to achieve their 
targets, with some engaging in earnings management activities to manage earnings upwards, 
whilst others are likely to use the earnings management method to make earnings downwards.    
1.3 Part II: Earnings Management and Directors’ Remuneration 
1.3.1 Research Background 
Directors’ remuneration has always been a popular topic, which attracts considerable attention 
from researchers, regulators, policy makers, market participators and the public as it as an 
important corporate governance approach which helps to mitigate the interest-conflicts of 
directors and shareholders mainly caused by the separation of ownership and control. 
According to Firms Act 2006 regulations, the disclosure of directors’ remuneration has become 
more developed and transparent in UK market practices. Directors in this study mainly refer to 
the executive directors, who are the senior officers or managers of a firm or organisation, their 
role being related to the formation of the firm’s strategic and operational decisions which could 
have long-term consequences. They are responsible for everything that happens in the firm, 
such as strategic planning, working with the Board of Directors, and operating within a budget, 
and they report directly to the board and carry out the board’s decisions. Remuneration is the 
main incentive for directors, which can be defined as a combination of the financial payment 
and other-financial compensation received for service or employment from the firm, and the 
remuneration package includes the basic salary, performance-related elements of remuneration 
such as stock/share options, any bonuses, and pension contributions, plus any other economic 
benefits. Directors’ compensation is determined by the remuneration committee, whose 
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delegated responsibilities may include setting the policy for the remuneration of the executive 
management, determining targets for performance-related pay or share schemes and 
determining the total individual remuneration package of each director including, where 
appropriate, salary, bonuses, pensions, incentive payments and share schemes. Directors’ 
remuneration, in accordance with the work of the remuneration committee, is essentially 
designed to ensure that the directors have a stake in performing well for the job to maximise 
shareholder benefits and the directors’ compensation package provided by the firm should be 
designed to attract, retain and motivate the quality requirement of directors without paying more 
than necessary, although the remuneration package is determined by many factors, such as the 
paying should connect with relative firm performance, be aware of industry average rate and 
know what the other competitors are paying, understand where the position of the remuneration 
package should be if it in other firms, and especially should take account of pay and 
employment conditions elsewhere in the firm when determining annual salary increases. Each 
component of the compensation package is also designed to ensure that the director maintains 
a high level of concentration on the firm’s behalf and provides motivation to improve the firm’s 
performance as both firm and shareholders want directors to be compensated in a way that 
reflects the directors’ performance in delivering the firm’s strategy. 
Directors’ remuneration is set by the remuneration committee, however, the determination of 
remuneration can be affected by many factors, such as firm performance, firm size, and 
shareholder interest. The principal-agent theory (also referred to as ‘agency theory’), is the 
predominant theory in the field of directors’ compensation literature, and predicts a positive 
relationship between directors’ pay and firm performance. It suggests that directors’ 
remuneration be tied to firm performance to provide directors’ financial incentives as it aims 
an alignment of interests between directors and their shareholders and alleviates a conflict of 
interest. The principal-agent theory suggests that managerial compensation is associated with 
performance measures. The rank order tournament theory, a simplified form of agency theory, 
offers a supplementary explanation. It considers the non-economic factor that position 
hierarchy plays a role in determining directors’ compensation so that it is similar to a type of 
employment structure within a firm, whereby the tournament system may motivate employees 
through competition and promotion. However, the managerial power theory provides an 
opposite view that directors’ remuneration may be part of the agency problem itself and 
directors are able to acquire favourable additional gains through their power to influence the 
determination of their compensation plans. The managerial power theory explains the directors’ 
remuneration in a very different perspective and challenges the view of principal-agent theory, 
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Bechuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argued that compensation practice could not be completely 
explained by either approach and should be explained by both the principal-agent approach and 
the managerial power theory. In short, these three important theories, the principal-agent theory, 
rank order tournament theory, and managerial power theory can be viewed as complementary 
theories in literature on directors’ compensation.   
Most prior literature investigated the relationship between directors’ compensation and firm 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Cosh and Hugn, 1997; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Meo, et al., 2017), based on the principal-agent theory that 
determination of directors’ remuneration is essential to ensure that the directors always act in 
the best interest of their shareholders to align the interests of directors with those of shareholders, 
and alleviate the conflict of interest between shareholders (the principals) and executive 
directors (the agent). Early studies suggested that directors behave or act in the best interests of 
shareholders and their pay is positively related to firm performance when performance is 
measured by accounting-based profitability such as profit and sales revenue (e.g., Baumol, 1959; 
McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing, 1962; Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; Ciscel, 1974; Meeks and 
Wittington, 1975; Rosen, 1990). However further research suggests that studies into the 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and performance should take note of the stock 
market factor as, on the one hand, equity-based compensation has become more prevalent in 
recent years and is an important component of remuneration plans whilst on the other hand, 
firm performance measured by accounting-based profitability may lead to measure errors, 
biased and misleading pay-performance relationship results (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). 
Therefore, after adding stock options, stock ownership, and other stock market-based 
compensation, there is evidence that the remuneration-performance link becomes relatively 
stronger and directors’ remuneration tends to be more related to stock market-based firm 
performance (Jensen, and Murphy, 1990; Main, Bruce and Buck, 1996; Hall and Liebman, 1998; 
Murphy, 1999; Cheng, et al., 2016; Almadi and Lazic, 2016; Cheng, et al., 2016).   
Consequently, in order to achieve a better performance regardless of accounting-based 
profitability, stock-market-based performance and the financial position, executive directors 
have strong incentives to engage in earnings management through accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation. Prior literature sought to investigate a positive 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and earnings management, and offer evidence that 
directors are motivated by their remuneration to manage earnings upwards by using different 
types of earnings management (Healy, 1985; Balsam, 1998; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Nwaeze, Yang and Yin, 2006; Cornett et al., 2008; Hou et al., 2015). Several recent studies into 
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the relationship between directors’ remuneration and their earnings management found that the 
relationship between them tends to be negative. For instance, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
offered evidence that the post-SEO operating performance decline is driven not only by accrual 
reversal (accrual-based earnings management), but also reflects the real consequences of 
operational decisions (real activities manipulation) undertaken to manage earnings at the time 
of the SEO. Kothari et al. (2016) also noted a decline in performance in that earnings 
management is most closely and predictably linked with post-SEO stock market under-
performance when it is driven by real activities manipulation. Therefore, executive directors 
motivated by their compensation have incentives to manage earnings not only upwards but also 
downwards by means of accrual-based and real earnings management. Tahir, et al. (2019) 
examined the relationship between earnings management, through accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation, and the choice of performance measures in 
directors’ bonus compensation contracts, evidence that a negative association between earnings 
management through discretionary accruals and expenses, and directors’ performance-based 
compensation.     
1.3.2 Research Motivations 
The second part of this thesis commences by exploring whether the directors incentive to take 
manipulative actions on reported earnings in UK market by increasing the link between 
directors’ remunerations and performance is motivated by the following reasons. Firstly, a large 
number of previous studies have explored the positive relationship between directors’ 
compensation and earnings management. Directors frequently have a position on the board of 
a firm whereby the main responsibilities include developing and implementing high-level 
strategies, making major corporate decisions, managing the overall operation and resources of 
a firm, and acting as the main point of communication between the board of directors and the 
corporate operations. However, some research studies have found a negative relationship 
between directors’ pay and their performance, and evidence that directors have incentives for 
using accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation to manage reported 
earnings decrease to present a decline in firm performance (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari 
et al., 2016; Tahir, et al., 2019). These ideas motivated this study to investigate whether 
directors tend to engage in different earnings management activities to manipulate earnings 
downwards for the purpose of maximising their personal gains as, on account of the interest-
conflicts resulting from the separation of ownership and control, directors may not act in the 
best interests of their shareholders and work to acquire additional rewards for themselves.  
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Secondly, directors are responsible for managing the business of the firm and may exercise all 
the powers of the firm, subject to the provisions of relevant statutes, given by special resolution 
to any directors and to the firm’s articles. Firms offer a performance-based incentives scheme 
linked to the directors’ compensation, therefore in order to gain more remuneration, directors 
may engage in manipulation of a firm’s earnings (i.e., Almadi and Lazic, 2016; Buchholze, et 
al., 2019). In addition, a better understanding of the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and earnings management is of great interest to both empirical and theoretical 
researchers and regulators, as prior literature presented evidence that such a governance-related 
factor plays a role in determining earning quality. However, literature on the relationship 
between directors’ remuneration and earnings management performance is relatively limited 
and, until now, little evidence is available which confirms the validity of models to estimate the 
relationship between earnings management and directors’ pay, or their principal results. These 
reasons motivated the carrying out of this study, which helps to enrich the available literature 
by providing evidence regarding whether directors adopt earnings management to manage 
earnings to maximise their personal gain.   
1.3.3 Research Aims, Questions, and Hypotheses  
Directors’ remuneration is determined by the remuneration committee, but is affected by many 
factors. The principal-agent theory as a dominant theory in compensation study, predicts that 
performance tied to directors’ compensation provides financial incentives for directors to 
alleviate the interest-conflicts as it aligns the relationship between executive directors’ interests 
and those of their shareholders. Prior literature in earnings management suggests that directors 
have incentives to engage in earnings management by using accrual-based and real earnings 
management for the purpose of achieving a better performance, whilst some studies found that 
directors where there is a decline in performance, use earnings management to manage earnings 
to achieve their personal interests (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016; Meo, et al., 
2017; Tahir, et al., 2019). This study aims to investigate whether and how the relationship 
between earnings management and directors’ remuneration varies with the degree of earnings 
management, the method of earnings management, and the level of directors’ remuneration. 
Specifically, the second part of the thesis focuses on the following research question: 
• Whether there is a relationship between firms which engage in accrual-based or real 
earnings management and directors’ remuneration?    
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Therefore, this research question is addressed by formally testing the following hypothesis: H3. 
Directors’ remuneration is negatively associated with their earnings management.   
1.3.4 Research Methodology and Findings 
The selected investigation sample data is that of the first study and is discussed in section 1.2.4. 
Directors’ remuneration includes the financial payment and non-financial compensation which 
is the sum of the basic salary, pension contributions, equity-based compensation and other 
benefits, in order to capture the total effects of compensation. Abnormal directors’ remuneration 
( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵 ) is used to measure whether directors have received any excessive level of 
compensation by adopting accounting choices. This study built a new regression model to 
measure the degree of abnormal directors’ remuneration, where the variables included sales 
revenue, profit margins, the z_score, and the number of employees used to estimate the normal 
level of directors’ remuneration. 
The findings complement the existing literature on earnings management in the following ways. 
Firstly, abnormal directors’ remuneration is found to be positive correlated to abnormal cash 
flows from operations. There is evidence that directors use sales-based manipulation through 
temporarily delaying the realisation of sales to decrease earnings and to report a poor profit 
performance in order to create a large increase in earnings in the future. Moreover, it provides 
evidence that directors, in order to present a major improvement of performance move previous 
earnings to the current period by using production costs-based manipulation as the magnitudes 
of real activities manipulation through overproduction are low when directors receive 
abnormally high remuneration. In addition, it suggests that directors utilise accrual-based 
earnings management to present earnings flowing downward so that it looks worse than it is in 
order to show a better future earnings performance to pursue additional rewards for themselves, 
there is supporting evidence that directors in negative earnings firms have the incentive to 
manage discretionary accruals to report income-decreasing earnings as they want to present a 
greater growth of earnings in future. Besides, this study takes the consideration of ‘highest paid 
director’ and ‘other emoluments’ to conduct additional analysis to extend the results of whether 
directors have achieved any abnormal level of remuneration by using earnings management, 
and the results are consistent with the results reported in main analysis that directors are more 
likely to report a decline in performance through engaging in earnings management to 
manipulate earnings downwards to gain an excessive level of payment themselves.   
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1.4 Contributions  
This study makes a contribution to earnings management literature compared with prior studies. 
First, analysis of this study commences by detecting earnings management by means of use of 
two major tools, accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation, thus the 
results will add to previous literature which has been carried out into the quality of reported 
earnings. Existing literature includes empirical studies in earnings management and earnings 
quality which examine multiple incentives, such as financial performance, financial reporting, 
tax and regulatory objectives for financial institutions. However, these studies typically 
undertook research by means of a single accounting choice. The literature includes empirical 
studies which examine multiple accounting choices to achieve a specific target via accrual-
based earnings management and real activities manipulation, but are relatively limited. This 
study extends beyond the existing literature to provide a greater understanding for detecting 
earnings management by using accrual-based earnings management and real activities 
manipulation in the UK market.       
Second, the current study contributes to the extant empirical research on the examination of 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation (i.e., Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; Sohn, 2016, etc.).  A large amount of 
prior literature has focused on their studies on accrual-based earnings management or real 
activities manipulation, whilst it still difficult to confirm that each earnings management 
method or its results is reliable. On the one hand it cannot be verified whether measures of 
discretionary accruals reflect proper expectations of management’s opportunistic results as a 
variety of estimation models have been developed and may produce different results. On the 
other hand, it is unclear whether the three proxies of real activities manipulation actually 
measure the underlying theoretical constructs which the models are intended to measure. This 
study follows the Roychowdhury (2006) model, and provides supporting evidence that firms 
are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation to avoid loss, therefore it enriches the 
literature on detecting real earnings management, and confirms the validity of estimation 
models to some extent.  
Third, the research detects earnings management using a different earnings benchmark (zero 
level of earnings, last year’s earnings), as adoption of the earnings benchmark has a different 
impact on the ability to detect earnings management. A considerable amount of literature on 
the subject of accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation selects ‘zero’ 
level of earnings or previous earnings as an important earnings benchmark in order to meet 
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targets of avoiding losses or avoiding an earnings decrease. It is, thus, advisable for subsequent 
research studies not to focus too much on one single earnings benchmark in order to measure 
earnings management, as the different earnings levels may produce different conclusions as 
regards earnings management detection. This study enhances the literature with regard to 
examining earnings management that meet or beat different earnings benchmarks.  
Fourth, the majority of prior research into earnings management investigates whether firms use 
accrual-based earnings management or real activities manipulation to manage earnings upwards 
and whether firms utilise earnings management tools to manipulate earnings downwards. The 
first set of this thesis employs a sample of firms with negative earnings to examine whether 
firms engage in earnings management, and finds new evidence that UK firms with negative 
earnings have more incentive to decrease their earnings or shift positive earnings to a negative 
level through accrual-based earnings management, manipulating discretionary expenses, or 
manipulating production costs, in order to report future better performance. This finding 
complements the existing literature that firms employ accrual-based earnings management and 
real activities manipulation not only to manage their earnings upwards but also downwards in 
the UK market.  
Fifth, although earnings management has received considerable attention in the accounting 
literature, less attention is given to the earnings management incentives arising from directors’ 
remuneration. Directors behave or act to improve firm performance in the best interests of 
shareholders as suggested by principal-agent theory, leading to a number of prior studies finding 
that directors’ remuneration motivates directors to manage earnings upwards by using earnings 
management. However, the second part of the thesis evidences a negative relationship between 
directors’ earnings management and their remuneration, There is a decline in firms’ 
performance when directors adopt accrual-based or real earnings management to manipulate 
earnings downwards, therefore, these findings shed an insight into UK firm directors having 
incentives to gain personal benefits from managing earnings decreases through earnings 
management, It also enhances the literature which is relevant to earnings management and 
directors’ remuneration.  
Finally, the investigation into whether directors receive an excessive level of remuneration 
through utilising earnings management methods, builds a new model for measuring the amount 
of abnormal directors’ remuneration, which takes account of profitability (sales revenue), firm 
performance (profit margin), financial risks (z-score), and firm size (number of employees). 
The abnormal level of directors’ compensation indicates the extent to which directors engage 
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in earnings management to gain additional rewards and links it with abnormal levels of earnings 
management to produce evidence of how a relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
earnings management varies with the degree of earnings management, type of earnings 
management and the level of directors’ remuneration. Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first study into earnings management and directors’ remuneration that presents a 
creative model to estimate the relationship between them and achieve the empirical results. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
This chapter starts with a brief introduction of this thesis. It presents the overview of the first 
and second study parts respectively, followed by an explanation of the research background and 
motivation, an outline of the research aims and questions, a summary of the methodology and 
the findings. This chapter then defines the research contributions. The remainder of the thesis 
is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 reviews prior literature in the field of earnings management. In particular, it identifies 
the philosophy of earnings management and outlines the definition of different types of earnings 
management (accrual-based earnings management, real activities, classification shifting), the 
estimation models development used to test the hypotheses, and the models’ limitations. It then 
reviews the prior research relating to earnings management and the association between 
earnings management and other practice issues. It explores the research within three important 
earnings benchmarks: zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and analysts’ forecast consensus, 
developing hypotheses of the first part of this thesis. It also provides a full understanding of 
directors’ remuneration determination with regard to the second part of the thesis. Specifically, 
it describes the directors’ remuneration, the remuneration committee, remuneration strategies, 
the components of the remuneration package and other issues; reviews three important theories 
in directors’ compensation literature, namely the principal-agent theory, the tournament theory 
and the managerial power theory; then presents the empirical literature on the relationship 
between directors’ pay and firm performance; more important, it exposits the relationship 
between the directors’ compensation and earnings management, which is used to develop the 
hypotheses of the second part of the thesis, is then examined.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the research methodology and hypotheses in this research. It starts with 
the development of hypotheses as found in the reviewed literature: 1. Firms which just meet or 
beat important earnings benchmarks are more likely to engage in earnings management: 2. 
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Directors have financial incentives to use earnings management methods to manipulate reported 
earnings. An overview of the data used in the estimation models is then provided. This describes 
the data sources, identifies sample selection criteria and clarifies the definitions of variables. 
Next, it explains the estimation models used to test earnings management and abnormal 
accruals-based earnings and abnormal real activities manipulation are clarified. Further, the 
chapter explains the research methods utilised as to how to test hypotheses.    
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings of the first part regarding whether firms 
manage reported earnings by using accrual-based earnings management and real activities 
manipulation which just meet or beat important earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings, 
last year’s earnings). It commences with the descriptive statistics for accrual-based and real 
earnings management of the full sample. Next, it presents an estimation of the normal level of 
discretionary accruals, cash flow from operations, discretionary expenses and production costs. 
It then shows the summary statistics of abnormal levels of one accrual-based earnings 
management activity and three real activities manipulation activities. This chapter then explains 
the correlation coefficients between different types of earnings management. In addition, it 
presents the tests and analysis of whether firms use earnings management to meet/beat different 
earnings benchmarks. Finally, this chapter produces an additional analysis regarding firms with 
negative earnings.  
Chapter 5 devotes the empirical results of the second study regarding the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and earnings management. Firstly, this chapter describes the basic 
statistics of directors’ remunerations for the full sample. Next, it presents descriptive statistics 
and correlation coefficients amongst variables, and estimates the normal level of directors’ 
remuneration. It then presents the summary statistics of the normal level of directors’ pay, 
accrual-based earnings management, and real activities manipulation and also analyses the 
correlation coefficients between these abnormal levels. In addition, the chapter explains the test 
results of the association between abnormal directors’ remuneration and abnormal earnings 
management.  
The thesis ends with the conclusion, Chapter 6. This chapter presents again the research 
background, research questions, and contributions to this research. It also briefly summarises 
the research hypotheses, methodology and empirical results which have been presented in the 
previous chapters. Based on these results, this chapter offers some academic and practical 
implications which may potentially enrich research and the practice of accrual-based earnings 
management, real activities manipulation, and directors’ remuneration for the benefit of 
21 
 
researchers, regulators, policy makers, standard setters, the board of directors, and other 
practitioners. Finally, it highlights limitations in current research and provides 


















































Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Earnings management, in accounting, is the act of intentionally processing financial reporting 
to obtain some private gains. It involves the alteration of financial reports to mislead 
stakeholders about the organisation’s underlying performance, or to influence contractual 
outcomes which depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Earnings 
management has a negative effect on earnings quality and may reduce the credibility of 
financial reporting. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Levitt 
stated in a 1998 speech, that earnings management is widespread and pervasive, whilst the 
complexity of accounting rules and regulations can make earnings management difficult for 
individual investors to detect, however accounting researchers have proposed several methods 
to detect earnings management. The primary objective of this study is to examine whether any 
earnings management activities adopted by firms hit their specific target, therefore this chapter 
aims to provide the theoretical and empirical literature in the field of earnings management to 
help conduct hypotheses development, research methodology design, and empirical results 
analysis in the following chapters. This chapter mainly introduces three types of earnings 
management, namely accrual-based earnings management, real activities manipulation, and 
classification shifting earnings management. It outlines the definition of different types of 
earnings management, the estimation models development of them and the limitation of models. 
This chapter also investigates the issue of earnings benchmarks (zero earnings level, last year’s 
earnings, analysts’ forecasts), as it is closely linked in the context of earnings management. The 
directors may have incentives to use the earnings management method to achieve their more 
personal gains, this chapter thus reviews prior literature in this area. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 identifies the philosophy of earnings management; 
section 2.3 introduces accrual-based earnings management including accruals models and the 
limitations of estimation; section 2.3 describes the development of real activities manipulation; 
section 2.4 introduces the classification shifting earnings management; section 2.5 concerns 
additional research into earnings management; section 2.6 explores the research into earnings 
benchmarks; section 2.7 considers the relationship between directors’ compensation and 
earnings management; section 2.8 presents the conclusion of this chapter.              
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2.2 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is a significant accounting issue for both researchers and regulators. It 
has received significant attention in the study of earnings quality in recent decades (Dechow, et 
al., 2010b; Dichev, et al., 2013; Beyer, et al., 2019). One factor which drives research on the 
subject of earnings management is that there is widespread earnings management amongst 
public firms, and managers seek to meet capital market expectations by routinely engaging in 
opportunistic earnings management (e.g. Levit, 1998). This has encouraged researchers to study 
managers’ responses to incentives provided by earnings targets (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2008; Christensen, et al., 2008; Kross, et al., 2011; Alissa, et al., 2013; Lo, et 
al., 2017). The highly critical assertion of the auditing profession that managers seek to deceive 
the public, has acted as a spur for researchers to carry out research into the impact of earnings 
management on auditors’ incentives. As a result, a number of researchers have investigated the 
relationship between auditing/regulating and earnings management (reviewed by Becker et al., 
1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Beneish, et al., 2005; Cohen, et al., 2008; Kim and 
Park, 2014; Alhadab and Clacher, 2018). 
The ability to understand the extent to which earnings are manipulated by managers has 
significant implications for analysts, regulators, researchers, and other professionals (Beneish, 
1999). With regard to analysts and investors, comprehension of the extent to which managers 
manipulate discretion in earnings offers support to the concept of examination of earnings 
quality. It is important and helpful for regulators, policy makers or standard-setters, to 
understand whether firms engage in earnings management and how they undertake this, as the 
impact of earnings management draws regulators or standard-setters attention to the limitations 
of accounting regulations and standards, and encourages them to implement improvements. 
In order to detect earnings management in each case, a reliable measurement tool is essential. 
The introduction of the abnormal accruals model in Jones (1991) has helped fuel the growth of 
earnings management research. As a result, extensive earnings management literature largely 
focuses on accrual-based earnings management (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Fields et 
al., 2001; and Dechow, 1998, 2002, 2010a), and a variety of models, including the Jones (1991) 
model, and the Dechow et al. (1995) model, which are widely used to detect abnormal accruals. 
Latterly, two other relatively under-researched types of earnings management, real activities 
manipulation (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen, at el., 2008; Kim and Park, 2014, Cohen, et 
al., 2019) and classification shifting manipulation (e.g. McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010) have 
entered the field of earnings management studies, and their test models have become more 
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popular as researchers have realised that accrual-based models are insufficient for earnings 
management detection.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2.3 Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
2.3.1 Accrual Models 
The use of proxies to measure abnormal accruals is one of the most dramatic improvements in 
earnings management research. As shown by Dechow, at el. (2010b), abnormal accruals proxy 
is the most popular measurement method and is widely used in research to examine earnings 
management. It was the first measure adopted by Healy’s (1985) investigation to test earnings 
management and in recent years a variety of accrual models have been adopted with continual 
innovations. Most measures which have been used to date in literature consist primarily of 
modified versions of the Jones (1991) model. Researchers who have based their research on the 
limitations of the Jones model response in order to develop modified models, have generally 
improved comprehension of the extent to which earnings are manipulated (e.g. DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Hribar and Collins, 2002; 
Kothari et al., 2005).  
Abnormal accrual models have usually commenced with an estimation of discretionary accruals 
as total accruals, however later models have enabled total accruals to be divided into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components. In most of these models, the nondiscretionary 
or normal accruals are measured by a linear regression of change in revenues and property, 
plant, and equipment on account of the parameters required for estimation of the industry and 
estimation period (e.g. year). The earliest study of earnings management which employed 
abnormal accruals as a proxy for measurement was that of the Healy (1985) Model. Healy (1985) 
divided his sample into three groups in accordance with partitioning variables, and compared 
the mean total accruals with the earnings management partitioning variable to examine whether 
managers exercise discretion in earnings. In the Healy model, the mean total accruals from the 
estimation period represent the measure of nondiscretionary accruals. A special version of the 
Healy model was developed by DeAngelo (1986), who adopted the previous total accruals to 
measure nondiscretionary accruals. The DeAngelo (1986) model examined earnings 
management by means of computing first differences in total accruals, and assumed the first 
differences to be that of the level of zero under the null hypothesis of no earnings management. 
Both the Healy (1985) model and the DeAngelo (1986) models were characterised by 
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employing total accruals in the estimation period as the proxy of expected nondiscretionary 
accruals. This characteristic is limited as the two models only work if accruals remain constant 
from period to period and there is a zero mean of discretionary accruals from the estimation 
period. Both models can prove inaccurate if nondiscretionary accruals keep changing over time. 
It is not possible, however, to assume nondiscretionary accruals remain constant as evidenced 
by Kaplan (1985) as the nature of the accrual accounting process dictates that the level of 
nondiscretionary accruals should change with the changes in economic circumstances. 
Jones (1991) proposed a model to attempt to control the impact of nondiscretionary accruals 
which vary with economic circumstances, and reduction of the limitations of assuming constant 
nondiscretionary accruals. In the Jones model, nondiscretionary accruals were estimated as a 
linear function of a change in revenues, property, plant, and equipment. This model is currently 
applied to more broadly capture both intentional and unintentional factors which affect earnings 
quality, however, Jones (1991) also realised that assumption of revenues being nondiscretionary 
could cause her measuring earnings management model to be biased towards zero. Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) developed a more powerful test, known as the ‘modified Jones 
model’, and sought to reduce the conjectured error limiting tendency of the Jones model to 
make mistakes in measuring discretionary accruals when earnings management is exercised 
over revenues. The modified model (Dechow et al. 1995) tests earnings management by 
adopting a change in cash revenues rather than changing total revenues as some credit sales 
may be discretionary. Compared with the original Jones (1991) model, this modified model 
adjusts the change in revenues to that of a change in receivables in the estimation periods. In 
accordance with the relationship between earnings and cash flows, Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
suggested a new measure of accruals quality including that of the quality of cash flows. This 
model focused on working capital accruals which are more tractable due to realizations of the 
cash flow which are relevant to the working capital which occurs within the same year. 
However, Dechow and Dechev (2002) also recognised that their approach lacked insight into 
the proper timing of the accruals with respect to cash flows, thus it cannot be used to decide 
whether to extend or capitalize R&D. A more recent study by Kothari et al. (2005), investigated 
the specification and power of tests based on performance-matched discretionary accruals 
(indicated by the performance of  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡) compared with tests which used 
the Jones (1991) model and modified models (e.g. Dechow and Dechiv (1995) model). This 
study suggested that the performance-matched discretionary accruals model is a viable 
alternative to the existing abnormal accruals model for application in earnings management 
research. Francis et al. (2005) conducted their own model to examine investors price accruals 
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quality in two ways. One method, as suggested by McNichols (2002), was that of measuring 
accruals quality through added growth in revenues to reflect performance and by adding PPE 
to broaden the measure; the other was to modify and extend the Dechow and Dechiv (2002) 
model to measure accruals quality as the standard deviation of residuals from regressions which 
relate current accruals to cash flows. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the accrual models 
including Jones (1991) model, modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) approach, performance matched (Kothari et al., 2005), and  discretionary 
estimation errors (Francis et al., 2005),  which are widely used in literature.      
2.3.2 Limitations of Accrual Models 
The introduction of abnormal accrual models sheds light on earnings management measurement. 
Several studies have drawn attention to limitations of the discretionary accruals measure in 
terms of providing noisy and biased estimation (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Guay, 1996; 
McNichols, 2002; Dechow et al., 2010b). Dechow et al. (1995) argued that all models which 
relate to the Jones model result in mis-specified tests when samples of firm-year meet extreme 
financial performance, as in, for instance, if the earnings management partitioning variable 
correlates with the performance of a firm,  and the power of these models is relatively low for 
economically plausible earnings management. Guay et al. (1996) determined that the high 
correlation between discretionary and nondiscretionary accrual components results in 
considerable imprecision and/or misspecification of the assumed earnings process, market 
efficiency, or managerial discretion. Dechow et al. (2010b) emphasized that firm-level 
estimation assumes time-invariant parameter estimates and typically imposes sample 
survivorship biases, though all of the accruals models can be estimated at firm level, which 
allows for variation across firms in the determinants of normal accruals. As a result, every 
model of abnormal accruals, such as the Jones (1991) model, the Dechow and Dechiv (2002) 
model, the performance-matched model (Kothari et al., 2005), and the Francis et al. model, is 












Table 2.1: Widely used accrual models 
Accrual model Main idea Notes 
Jones (1991) model 
  
𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝚫𝑺𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒕 
Accruals are a function of 
revenue growth and depreciation 
is a function of PPE. All variables 
are scaled by total assets. 
Correlation or error with firm 
performance can bias tests. 𝑅2 
around 12%. Residual is 
correlated with accruals, earnings 
and cash flow. 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al., 1995) 
  
𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝚫𝑺𝒕 − ∆𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒕)
+ 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕 
Adjusts Jones model to exclude 
growth in credit sales in years 
identified as manipulation years 
Provide some improvement in 
power in certain settings (when 
revenue is manipulated) 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
approach 
  
∆𝑾𝑪 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜺𝒕 
Accruals are modelled as a 
function of past, present, and 
future cash flows given their 
purpose to alter the timing of cash 
flow recognition in earnings. 
𝜎(𝜀𝑡)  or absolute 𝜀𝑡 proxies for 
accrual quality as an unsigned 
measure of extent of accrual 
‘errors’. Focuses on short-term 
accruals does not address errors 
in long-term accruals. 




− 𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎′𝒔𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒕6 
 
Matches firm-year observation 
with another from the same 
industry and year with the closest 
ROA. Discretionary accruals are 
from the Jones model (or 
Modified Jones model). 
Reduce power of test. Apply only 
when performance is an issue. 
Discretionary estimation errors 
(Francis et al., 2005) 
  
𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕−𝟏 +
𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒∆𝑺𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕, 
 
𝝈(𝜺𝒕)
= 𝜶 + 𝝀𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒕 + 𝝀𝟐𝝈(𝑪𝑭𝑶)𝒕
+ 𝝀𝟑𝝈(𝑺)𝒕 + 𝝀𝟒𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆)𝒕
+ 𝝀𝟓𝑵𝒆𝒈𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒕 + 𝒗𝒕 
Decomposes the standard 
deviation of the residual from the 
accruals model into an innate 
component that reflects the firm’s 
operating environment and a 
discretionary component (𝑣𝜀𝑡) 
that reflects managerial choice. 
Innate estimation errors are the 
predicted component from 𝜎(𝜀)𝑡 
regression.  
Note to Table 2.1: This table displays the development of the models of estimated accruals at 
normal level, and they are the most widely used in literature. Abnormal accruals are measured 
by ‘Residuals’ from the models. Please see Appendix A for all variables descriptions. 
 













𝜋3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1. 
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2.3.3 Challenges for Accrual Models 
The accrual models have resulted in important advances in the literature for measuring earnings 
management, but there remain many challenges, the main challenge being that the inherent 
limitation suffered by all of the abnormal accrual models may be unable to validate the accuracy 
of the models’ estimations. A researcher cannot be sure that the estimates of discretionary 
accruals result from the management’s opportunistic accounting choices, or are simply an 
artefact. This is referred to as the construct validity problem, which means that there is doubt 
whether the proxies really measure the underlying theoretical constructs the model is intended 
to measure. The inferences relating to earnings management affect the researcher as to whether 
he or she is able to validate the accurately estimated discretionary accruals. As a result, the 
weak strength of accrual models estimating, leads to the results in such studies which use 
accrual models being debatable, as they often produce different results. Dechow et al. (2003) 
focused on investigating whether earnings management is a complete or a partial explanation 
of the kink as it lacks the ability to provide the evidence which confirms that boosting 
discretionary accruals is the key driver of this. Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) findings, for 
instance, produced mixed results as to whether the kink is driven by earnings management.    
2.3.4 Special Accruals 
The aggregate discretionary accrual models, like the Jones (1991) model and the Dechow and 
Dechiv (2002) model, lack information about the components of earnings management, and do 
not consider the discretionary variation in earnings as a result of revenues or expenses. 
McNichols (2002) declared that one direction of earnings management research is to focus on 
specific accruals rather than aggregate accruals, and that special accruals provide a more 
complete insight into the relationship between accruals and cash flows, thus potentially 
resulting in a better understanding of the role played by estimation error. Whilst both studies 
by Miller and Skinner (1998) and Schrand and Wong (2003) examined earnings management 
using the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets, the former study did not find much 
evidence of use of the residual from its aggregated model, whilst the latter established 
supporting evidence of use of the model with specifically designed accruals. Modelling specific 
accruals to study earnings management, is ideal for consideration in specific industries, 
discretion, and most earnings discretion which is available to firms, such as revenues, 
restructuring reserves, warranty liabilities, and loan loss reserves. Stubben (2010) employed 
discretionary revenues as a measure of earnings management, and the results indicated that 
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revenue models are less biased and better specified than commonly used accrual models and 
are more likely than accruals models to detect a combination of revenue and expense 
manipulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
2.4 Real Activities Manipulation 
2.4.1 Development of Real Activities Manipulation 
‘Real activities’ manipulation, real earnings management or ‘transaction’ management, as a 
strategy of earnings management, appears to be relatively under-researched in academic 
accounting literature compared to research which investigates accrual-based earnings 
management. It has, however attracted greater interest in recent years due to increasing numbers 
of researchers turning their attention from accrual-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation. Several studies have investigated the possibility that managers manipulate 
earnings not only through accounting estimates and methods but also via real transactions7. 
Several studies have investigated whether firms achieve earnings targets to manipulate R&D 
expenditure discretionary spending. Baber et al. (1991) produced evidence that firms choose to 
cut R&D expenditure when it jeopardizes the ability to report positive or increasing incomes. 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) provided evidence showing that CEOs in their final year of office 
report relatively less R&D spending to improve short-term earnings performance. Bens el al. 
(2002) declared that managers reduce R&D and capital expenditures during ESO exercises in 
order to repurchase stocks. Cheng (2004) also reported that compensation committees mitigate 
effective opportunistic reductions in R&D spending. The timing of asset sales provides an 
opportunity for real activities manipulation, as the gains of asset sales are reported in the 
financial report at the time the transaction occurs. Bartov’s findings (1993) are consistent with 
the timing of asset sales by managers in that the recognized accounting income from these sales 
smooth intertemporal earnings changes, and mitigate accounting-based restrictions in debt 
covenants. Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas (2003) undertook research into the Japanese market 
and found evidence of managers’ use of income from the sale of assets to manage earnings. 
Sales manipulation is another method of achieving real activities manipulation due to some 
 
7 Healy and Wahlen (1999) argued that earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the firm or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting practices. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), Healy and Wahlen (1999), and Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
posit that managers use acceleration of sales, alterations in shipment schedules, and delaying of research and 
development and maintenance expenditures as earnings management methods.   
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managers wishing to sacrifice long-term benefit in order to increase reported earnings in the 
current year by means of increasing sales. The sales can be increased by reducing prices near 
the end of the year from the next financial year to the current year (e.g. Jackson and Wilcox, 
2000), and by manipulating cost of good sales (COGS). The manipulation of COGS is mainly 
the result of overproduction, as a larger number of products produced can spread fixed 
overheads, thus resulting in a reduction in the per unit cost. Thomas and Zhang (2002) pointed 
out that earnings management can be linked to a variation in production levels altering COGS 
by means of affecting the amount of fixed manufacturing overheads absorbed in each unit 
produced.      
Real activities manipulation was not commonly known earlier and no one has presented a 
systematic overview of it. Graham et al. (2005) offered fundamental important evidence in real 
activities manipulation literature. They surveyed and interviewed more than 400 executives and 
concluded that the majority of earnings management results from manipulating real operating 
activities. According to Graham et al.’s survey, 78% of their sample executives admitted that, 
in order to hit the earnings benchmark, they are more reluctant to engage in within-GAAP 
accounting discretion (e.g. accrual earnings management), rather prefer to manage earnings via 
real economic actions such as delaying maintenance or advertising expenditure, or even by 
withdrawing from positive NPV projects. Concurring with the conclusions in Graham et al. 
(2005), Rochowdhury8 (2006) investigated a large sample from 1987-2001, and developed an 
empirical method. Rochowdhury (2006) determined that managers manipulate real operating 
activities to avoid reporting annual losses or achieve annual analyst forecasts by temporarily 
increasing sales and engaging in overproduction to report lower costs of goods sold and a 
reduction in discretionary expenditure. This was the first study to introduce a more 
comprehensive measure of real activities manipulation, now evident in later literature (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2005; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; Kim and Park, 2014; Cohen, et al., 2019).  
 
8 To detect real activities manipulation to avoid losses, Roychowdhury (2006) investigated patterns in CFO, 
discretionary expenses, and production costs for firms close to the zero earnings benchmark. CFO represents cash 
flow from operations as reported in the statement of cash flows. Discretionary expenses are defined as the sum of 
advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses. Production costs are the 
sum of COGS and change in inventory during the period. Roychowdhury (2006) used the model in Dechow et al. 
(1998) to derive normal levels of CFO, discretionary expenses and production costs for every firm-year. He focus 
on three manipulation methods and their effects on the abnormal levels of the three variables as followed: sales 
manipulation, that is, accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating additional unsustainable sales through 
increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms; reduction/cutting of discretionary expenses; overproduction, 
or increasing production to report lower COGS.  
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2.4.2 Subsequent Research into Real Activities Manipulation 
More researchers in recent years have paid attention to real activities manipulation as an 
earnings management tool and have considered the consequences of it. Gunny (2010) showed 
that after controlling size, performance, and market-to-book, using real activities manipulation 
just met the earnings benchmarks (e.g. zero level earnings, prior year’s earnings). This is 
positively associated with future performance compared with firms which do not adopt real 
activities manipulation. Eldenburg et al. (2011) documented a sample of 432 non-profit 
hospitals based on their real activities in order to provide evidence that managers in non-profit 
hospital settings also have more incentives to engage in earnings management because non-
profit hospitals with pre-managed earnings slightly below zero appear to manage expenditure 
downwards in non-operating activities (e.g. curtailing spending to maintain or refurbish office 
space rented to physicians) and asset management. Kim and Park (2014) examined the 
relationship between auditors’ client-retention decisions and real activities manipulation, and 
established that, with the exception of real activities manipulation through overproduction, 
clients’ opportunistic operating decisions are positively associated with the likelihood of auditor 
resignations, especially in the event of meeting or hitting earnings benchmarks in auditors’ 
client-retention decisions. Cheng, et al. (2016) explore how the internal governance affects the 
extent of real earnings management, and evidence that real earnings management was 
constrained by a strong internal governance. Li (2019) focused the study of real earnings 
management on the abnormal reduction in discretionary expenses, and found a negative 
relationship between real earnings management and firms’ future performance.  
On the other hand, a smaller number of research studies have focused on the development of 
real activities manipulation measures. Cohen et al. (2010a) focused on the special activities 
measure,  created a unique database of monthly media advertising spending, and found strong 
evidence that firms engage in real activities management by reducing their advertising spending 
to meet two of their financial reporting objectives: avoidance of loss and decrease in earnings. 
A more recent study by Cohen et al. (2019), considered the limitations of traditional measures 
(i.e. Roychowdhury, 2006) used in real activities manipulation, and analysed alternative real 
activities manipulation measures based on performance matching. They eventually determined 
that, whilst performance-matched RAM measures are not well-specified in each and every 
setting (no RAM measure is), the weight of the evidence suggests that they will provide better-
specified tests than the traditional real activities manipulation measures across a wide variety 
of settings.   
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A large body of previous literature on earnings management only focused on one earnings 
management strategy in settings where earnings manipulation is likely to be detected (Jones, 
1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Roychowdhury, 2006; Stubben, 2010.). It is possible that firms use 
multiple strategies of earnings management simultaneously, and considerable research studies 
have investigated how managers use the different earnings management tools to achieve their 
objectives (for example, earnings management both through accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation). Cohen et al. (2008) documented both accrual-
based and real changes in earnings management over the sample period of 1987-2005. They 
revealed that, whilst the level of accrual-based earnings management declined, the level of real 
earnings management activities increased significantly after the passage of SOX, and suggested 
that firms changed from using accrual-based management to that of real earnings management 
after SOX. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) presented important evidence that post-SEO operating 
underperformance is driven not just by accrual reversals, but also real activities manipulation 
decisions and suggested that firms’ choices of real versus accrual-based earnings management 
activities around SEOs vary predictably with regard to a firm’s ability to use accrual 
management and the costs of so doing. Badertscher (2011) suggested that the degree and 
duration of overvaluation affects managers’ choice of alternative methods of managing earnings 
because managers engage in accruals management in the early stages of overvaluation before 
changing to real transactions management, in order to sustain their overvalued equity. A more 
recent significant study, Zang (2012) offered large-scale evidence that there is a substitution 
relationship between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management and 
that their trade-off depends on their relative costs and managers adjusting the level of accrual-
based earnings management according to the level of real activities manipulation realized. Sohn 
(2016) examined whether and how firms engage in opportunistic earnings management 
activities are affected by the degree of firms’ accounting comparability with other firms, found 
that managers acted opportunistic behaviour to ‘escape’ from accrual-based earnings 
management from real activities manipulation.                
2.4.3 Limitations of Real Activities Manipulation 
In spite of the prevalence of real activities manipulation, the paucity of research in this area 
means that there is a lack of evidence showing how or whether, real activities manipulation 
impacts on the quality of earnings. On the one hand, real activities manipulation possibly results 
in a different conclusion. For example, as mentioned by DeFond (2010), real activities 
manipulation may likely result in sub-optimal investment decisions which harm shareholders. 
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However, Graham et al. (2005) suggested that real earnings management has the possibility to 
actually benefit shareholders, stating that ‘… given the reality of severe market (over-) reactions 
to earnings misses, the executives might be making the optimal choice in the existing 
equilibrium (by manipulating real activities).’  
On the other hand, it is necessary to note that a large number of subsequent research studies 
have relied heavily on the validity of real activities manipulation proxies, especially 
Rochowdhury’s (2006) model, in order to detect real earnings management. However, no study 
has been carried out to date to ensure the validity of either model or their main findings. 
Moreover, some subsequent researchers have built their evidence around the use of real 
activities manipulation to meet the earnings benchmark and have conducted additional analysis, 
drawing the results directly from the original study, the validity of which critically depends on 
the original results. For example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010b) examined both real and accrual-
based earnings management activities in terms of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) based on 
the results of Cohen et al. (2008). In addition, Siriviriyakul (2013) analysed the uncertain 
validity of real earnings management proxies, re-examined the tests of real activities 
manipulation to avoid losses developed in Roychowdhury (2006) and failed to find consistent 
conclusions.  
2.5 Classification Shifting  
2.5.1 Motivation   
A third and relatively new method of earnings management is called classification shifting, and 
was identified by McVay (2006) as ‘the deliberate misclassification of items within the income 
statement’. Managers using classification shifting to maximise reported performance simply 
move certain revenues, expenses, gains, or losses to different items on the income statement 
without actually altering net income. Classification shifting is different from accrual-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation in several ways. First, whilst all three 
strategies of earnings management aim to raise expectations of future performance, or to hit 
specific targets, classification shifting misclassifies items on the income statement, such as 
moving recurring expenses to nonrecurring, in order to simply change the core earnings and 
make no change in bottom line earnings, in order that there is no impact on future earnings. By 
contrast, the two other methods of earnings management reduce earnings in future periods if 
they are manipulated to increase current earnings. Secondly, there is no ‘setting up’ 
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consideration with regard to classification shifting as it does not change bottom line earnings, 
which indicates that using classification shifting greatly reduces the cost and therefore has a 
relatively low cost compared with the other two earnings management tools.  In addition, no 
impact on net income indicates that classification shifting is potentially subject to limiting 
scrutiny by auditors and regulators (Nelson, et al., 2002). From the investors perspective, 
managers have greater incentives to engage in earnings management using classification 
shifting due to considerable evidence indicating that core earnings may be more attractive to 
market participants (Kinney and Trezevant, 1997; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Gu and Chen, 
2004), and that they receive higher valuation multiples than non-core earnings (Lipe, 1986; 
Hayn, 1995). 
According to prior research, classification shifting is a valid tool in earnings management. On 
the one hand, managers are motived to engage in manipulating presentation or the ‘pro forma’ 
of the income statement with the intention of influencing the trend of a financial performance 
without initially misclassifying items in the income statement. Kinney and Trezevant (1997) 
determined that special items are used by managers to influence the trend in reported earnings 
and to influence investor and analyst perceptions. They also offered evidence that income-
decreasing special items are more likely to be presented as line items in income statements to 
emphasize their transitory nature with regard to income-increasing special items. Davis (2002) 
documented a sample of Internet firms and revealed that it is common for certain sectors of 
sample firms to engage in grossed-up and bartered revenue to achieve a higher return.  
On the other hand, classification is informative about differences in the underlying economic 
events which offer the possibility of conducting manipulation actions. Fairfield et al. (1996) 
confirmed that disaggregation on the income statement is useful for forecasting future 
profitability and that these forecasting improvements extend beyond separating extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations from other earnings components. Dye (2002) presented a 
model, in which firms are motivated to engage in ‘classification manipulation’ in their attempts 
to secure the preferred accounting classification of both real transactions (such as operating 
versus capital leases) and income statement classifications (such as classifying transitory gains 
as ordinary income). Givoly (1999) examined the relationship between the measurement error 
information content of segment reporting and the results suggested that managers attempt to 
maximise expected firm value by means of moving income to the highest P/E segments. Weiss 
(2001) investigated the treatment of transitory earnings shocks associated with the 1993 
increase in corporate tax rates, consistent with Kinney and Trezevant (1997), and found that 
managers are more likely to highlight the income-decreasing effects and offset current 
35 
 
transitory gains with income-decreasing special items in an attempt to maximize future core 
earnings. Gu and Chen (2004) declared that non-recurring items which analysts include in street 
earnings are more persistent and have higher valuation multiples than those items which they 
exclude from street earnings. In addition, supported by special items evidence, Elliott and 
Hanna (1996), concordant with claims made in the business press, established that management 
may be using special items (e.g. write-offs) to accomplish strategic earnings management 
objectives. Burgstahler et al. (2002) argued that special items are prominent in financial analysis 
and are assumed to have relatively straightforward implications for future earnings as special 
items are assumed to be largely transitory. 
2.5.2 Development of Classification Shifting  
Most previous studies have focused on earnings management using accrual-based or real 
activity management, whilst the relatively new tool of earnings management classification has 
been largely ignored to date. A few earlier studies simply offered a preliminary insight into 
earnings management using classification shifting, whereby managers have an incentive to 
misclassify operating expenses as non-recurring expenses to increase recurring income (i.e. 
core earnings) subtotals. Ronen and Sadan (1975) declared that managers have an incentive to 
engage in classification shifting if the smoothing object is any income subtotal other than the 
bottom line net income and managers use extraordinary items to smooth earnings before 
extraordinary items. Lipe (1986) showed that investors understand the future expected earnings 
implications of the different earnings components as reported in the income statement. 
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) provided evidence of ‘street earnings’ (e.g. modified-GAAP 
earnings with noncash and non-recurring items excluded) replacing GAAP earnings as one of 
the primary determinants of stock price. Choi et al. (2007) presented evidence that incremental 
value and forecasting relevance tests suggest that the majority of management-specific 
adjustments reflect appropriate classification of earnings components by insiders.   
McVay (2006) was one of the first to explicitly present a third potential type of earnings 
management, that of the deliberate misclassification of items in the income statement (as 
referred to in classification shifting), which develops a model of core earnings, examines the 
classification shifting between core expense (cost of goods and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses) and special items. She documented a sample of 76,901 firm-year 
observations from 1989 to 2003, and used an expectation model to separate core earnings, 
defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization, into expected and 
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unexpected components. She established that unexpected core earnings show an increase in 
special items in the year of the special item, and this unexpectedly high performance reverses 
in the following year, which is consistent with managers opportunistically shifting expenses 
from core expenses to special items (e.g. larger charges, such as those linked to restructuring or 
mergers, offering considerable latitude and camouflage). McVay (2006) also found 
classification shifting to be more pervasive when it allows managers to meet the analyst, as 
special items tend to be excluded from this earnings benchmark. As a result, McVay’s findings 
show an insight into earnings management literature as classification shifting is a very attractive 
method of manipulating earnings. One drawback to the core earnings expectation model used 
by McVay (2006) is that of the use of accruals, including accruals linked to special items as a 
control of firm performance. The inclusion of special item accruals in the expectation model 
creates a potential bias in favour of her hypotheses. She acknowledged that reliance on an 
imperfect model is a limitation of her study. 
Most subsequent research has adopted McVay’s (2006) model of core earnings in order to study 
classification shifting in various settings. For instance, Fan et al. (2010) extended McVay’s 
(2006) model and eliminated potential bias by using a core earnings expectations model which 
is not dependent on actual special items. They provided broad support evidence for McVay’s 
(2006) conclusion, showed that classification shifting is more likely in the fourth quarter than 
in interim quarters, and found further evidence of classification shifting whereby the ability of 
managers to manipulate accruals appears to be constrained in meeting a range of earnings 
benchmarks. Barua et al. (2010) used a methodology similar to that employed by McVay (2006), 
and found there is a positive association between unexpected core earnings and discontinued 
operations in firms with losses from discontinued operations. Consistent with McVay’s 
evidence, they also determined that firms who report income-decreasing discontinued 
operations use classification shifting to meet or overcome analyst forecasts. Athanasakou et al. 
(2011) adopted McVay’s (2006) core earnings expectation model, and found that in the UK 
market that there is no reward for firms which meet analysts’ forecasts through the use of 
classification shifting.  
2.5.3 Limitations of Classification Shifting 
Most subsequent research has followed McVay’s (2006) approach and adopted her newly 
developed model of core earnings for investigating classification shifting (e.g. Fan et al., 2010; 
Barua et al., 2010; Athanasakou et al., 2011). Similar to real activities manipulation, these 
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studies relied heavily on the validity of the core earnings expectation model, whilst there is no 
confirmation of the validity of the model or the major results. McVay’s (2006) model of core 
earnings was the first step towards document classification shifting and relies on the imperfect 
model. As she said, ‘future research might also further explore the negative abnormal returns 
documented herein by perhaps focusing on incentives to shift or by examining whether these 
returns vary cross-sectional, for example with the sophistication of investors.     
2.5.4 Estimation Models of Classification Shifting 
Unlike accrual-based earnings management or real activities manipulation, classification 
shifting is performed by the deliberate misclassification of items within the income statement 
without changing bottom-line earnings and is not reversed in future periods or invites the same 
level of scrutiny by auditors and regulators. McVay (2006) developed a proxy to detect earnings 
management using classification shifting, and modelled it on the level of core earnings and 
anticipated unexpected core earnings (reported core earnings less predicted core earnings) in 
year 𝑡 which are expected to increase with special items in year 𝑡, if firms employ classification 
shifting. The core earnings of each sample firm are expected to be overstated in the year the 
special item is recognized.  
In order to investigate whether directors shift core expenses to special items, it is understood 
that core earnings can be unexpectedly high when a considerable increase in the discontinued 
operations or some other real economic events takes place. McVay (2006) also developed a 
model of the change in core earning to examine whether the improvement associated with 
special items in year 𝑡 reverses in year 𝑡 + 1, and to confirm whether the great boosting of 
unexpected core earnings is caused by real economic changes or firms’ opportunistic behaviour. 
Thus, the results of the investigation have been expected to show an unexpected change in 
earnings from year 𝑡 to year 𝑡 + 1 to decline in special items in year 𝑡.  
Following McVay (2006), the metrics to estimate the level of expected core earnings, and 
change in core earnings adopted by this research were computed as follows:  
𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
∆𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙2Δ𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙3Δ𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +




𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = is core earnings (i.e. net incomes before special items and depreciation) deflated by 
lagged sales in firm 𝑖 for year 𝑡, calculated by (sales – cost of goods sales – general, and 
administrative expenses) / Sales;   
Δ𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 = is the change in core earnings in firm 𝑖 for year 𝑡 measured as   𝐶𝐸𝑡+1− 𝐶𝐸𝑡 ; Δ𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
is percent change in sales in firm 𝑖 for year, calculated by (𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)/𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1;  
𝑁𝐸𝐺_Δ𝑆𝑖,𝑡  = is percent changes in sales (Δ𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ), if Δ𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is operating accruals important for firms with increasing large income special 
items in firm 𝑖 for year 𝑡 as these firms are more likely to change their operating strategies, 
calculated as (net income before extraordinary items – cash flow from operations)/sales; 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 
= is asset turnover ratio, defined as sales / average net operating assets, where net operating 
assets is the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities and is included to 
control the inverse relationship between asset turnover and profit margin;  
Δ𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = is change in asset turnover in firm 𝑖 for year 𝑡, and measure as  𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 – 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1; 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is market-to-Book ratio, calculated as market value divided by book value in firm 𝑖 for 
year 𝑡. 
2.6 Other Earnings Management Research 
In spite of the prevalence of the earnings management tool as one of the most studied areas in 
financial accounting research, considerable literature on earnings management has extended 
beyond original dimensions. A smaller stream of studies has examined the relationship between 
earnings management and market performance at Initial Public Offering. Teoh et al. (1998) 
focused on current working capital accruals and investigated the relationship between the long-
run post-IPO return underperformance and IPO firms’ earnings management. They determined 
that the discretionary current accruals act as proxies for earnings management which are under 
the control of management and are high in terms of the IPO relative to those of non-issuers. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005), using the Basu (1997) tendency-to-reverse measure, based on the 
UK market, found that timely loss recognition is substantially less prevalent on average in 
private firms, compared with public firms, in spite of the groups being subject to equivalent 
regulatory rules. Subject to some concerns as shown in Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model, 
they (2008) investigated earnings quality at the initial public offering. The evidence 
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demonstrated consistency in firms in the UK market as regards meeting the market demand for 
higher quality financials from public firms. In response to public-firm regulation, on average 
they improved their financial reporting quality prior to an IPO, because public investors 
typically faced higher information asymmetry than private investors. Sletten et al. (2018) 
explored the exact timing and motivation behind earnings management at IPO firms, they found 
that IPO firms manage their earnings in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup 
expiration, though there has no earnings management activities engaged by firms in anticipation 
of the IPO issue date. In addition, several studies have started to consider the association 
between earnings management, as the price of a public firm is sensitive to earnings news, and 
is measured by stock recommendation. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) showed that, if firms rate 
a Sell (Buy) to engage more (less) frequently in extreme, income-decreasing earnings 
management, they have relatively stronger (weaker) incentives to take both earnings baths and 
to increase accounting reserves than other firms. However, if firms rate a Buy (Sell) they are 
more (less) likely to engage in earnings management which leaves reported earnings equal to 
or slightly higher than analysts’ forecasts. Meanwhile, Brown, et al. (2016) surveyed 344 buy-
side analysts from 181 investment firms, concluded that buy-side analysts’ avoided to make a 
stock recommendation to invest in a firm with fraudulent financial statements because their 
concerns about financial misrepresentation (earnings manipulation) and financial reporting 
quality were consistent with their economic incentives.  
2.7 Research into the Earnings Benchmark Beating 
In the context of earnings management, accounting researchers have also investigated the issue 
of earnings benchmarks. Numerous accounting literature has held that firms engage in 
manipulate reported earnings through the use of different earnings management methods (i.e., 
accrual-based earning management, real activities manipulation, classification shifting), to 
meet or beat certain earnings benchmarks (also referred to as earnings targets such as (1) 
avoiding negative earnings (‘zero’ level earnings), (2) avoiding earnings decreases (compare 
with last year’s earnings), (3) meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. There are a number of 
studies which employ the ‘zero’ level as their earnings benchmark to examine whether firms 
engage in manipulating earnings to hit specific targets, such as the avoidance of current losses 
(e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Burgstahler and Divhev, 1997; Dechow et al., 2003; Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2009; Gunny, 2010, Mindak, et al., 2016). Some studies, however, have 
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sought to investigate whether earnings management is interpreted as a cause of the kink9. Hayn 
(1995) documented a kink picture whereby, because shareholders have a liquidation option, 
few firms report small losses and too many firms report small profits. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997a), based on empirical evidence on Hayn (1995), established that firms use cash flow from 
operations and changes in working capital to manipulate earnings, in order to show a ‘kink’ of 
unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losses and unusually high 
frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income, specifically in cross-
sectional distributions of earnings changes and earnings. Whilst Dechow et al. (2003) re-
examined whether earnings management is a complete or partial explanation for the kink, built 
on prior research, they did not find consistent evidence that boosting discretionary accruals is 
the key driver of the kink. 
In addition, the analyst earnings forecast provides a good incentive for firms to engage in the 
manipulation of earnings. Some researchers have investigated whether earnings management 
attempts to achieve the analysts’ forecast as analysts’ forecasts can also be achieved through 
either managing sales upwards or managing operating expense downwards. Graham et al. (2005) 
conducted a survey of more than 400 executives and found evidence that the analyst consensus 
estimate is one of the two most important earnings benchmarks because CFOs trust earnings 
which are the key metric considered by outsiders. Kross et al. (2011) examined whether firms’ 
are consistent in meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE), and presented 
evidence that firms, having achieved a string of meeting-or-beating MBE’s, strategically issue 
down-biased management earnings forecasts with the aim of maintaining the string. Mindak, et 
al. (2016) evidence that firms are more likely to use income-increasing earnings management 
that meet analysts’ expectation. By using classification shifting earnings management, McVay 
(2006) and several subsequent researchers (e.g. Fan et al., 2010; Barua, 2010) were able to 
confirm that it is more pervasive when firms tend to beat analyst forecasts. Burgstahler and 
 
9 ‘Kink’ in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. 
According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a), a stronger result in support of earnings management was that cash 
flows increase for the small profit group relative to the small loss group. They evidence that the ‘earnings 
management to avoid a loss’ explanation for the kink predicts that firms with small (pre-managed) losses boost 
earnings to report a profit. This result in fewer firms than expected in the small loss group and more firms than 
expected in the small profit group, was indicating that small profit firms will have higher discretionary accruals 
than small loss firms. In addition, the earnings management explanation was directional: small loss firms manage 
earnings up to report a small profit. Therefore, it also implied that after removing from the earnings distribution 
firms that have positive discretionary accruals, one should see the kink decline. They also concluded five non-
earnings management explanations for the kink in earnings, including: (i) managers taking real actions to improve 
performance; (ii) exchange listing preferences for profitable firms; (iii) the possibility that the kink is driven by 
denominator (market value) rather than the numerator (earnings) due to investors applying different valuation  




Dichev (1997b) examined the association between firms’ earnings management behaviour and 
earnings benchmarks, whilst avoiding earnings decreases and losses. They used distribution of 
earnings, assuming that discontinuities around zero earnings and zero changes in earnings to be 
evidence of managers manipulating earnings to report profits and to sustain previous year’s 
earnings. Some following studies relevant to managers engaging in earning management to 
meet or beat earnings benchmarks, have replicated this methodology of investigating 
distribution of earnings with mixed results, casting doubts on the validity of using the 
distributions method to ascertain earnings management behaviour.  
Alternatively, accounting literature remains unresolved on the issue of whether earnings 
management causes the beating of earning benchmarks, due to, on the one hand, the 
investigation being based on ex post reported earnings figures in order to assert that there is a 
causality relationship between earnings management and earnings benchmarks. However, real  
earnings management tends to hit earnings targets which results in improved firm performance 
and cannot be distinguished from apparent earnings management by examining reported 
earnings, in particular with regard to those firms which are on the margins of earnings 
benchmarks (Dechow, Richardson & Tuna, 2003). On the other hand, the distribution of firms 
‘normal’ earnings level if without any earnings management is not defined, even though 
earnings distribution can be observed (Kerstein & Rai 2007). Managers try to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks which are, in part at least, based on the nature of real earnings figures that 
actually are pre-managed earnings. Managers can boost earnings to meet benchmarks if pre-
managed earnings are lower than the benchmarks. Managers can also decrease earnings if firms 
perform well and the real earnings are above the benchmarks to save some of the profits in 
order to beat benchmarks in future years (referred to as income smoothing, or ‘cookie jar 
accounting’), or if real earnings are at a lower level in so far as that managerial discretion or 
effort is insufficient to meet benchmarks so that accruals are employed to deflate earnings 
(referred as ‘big bath accounting’). Otherwise, econometric and measurement factors of what 
constitutes earnings management may also create problems in using earnings discontinuities to 
provide evidence of earnings management per se.  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997b), important literature of earnings management, presented two 
theories to offer evidence that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses. Based on stakeholder use of information-processing heuristics, they suggested that firms 
which report losses or decreased earnings tend to face higher transactions costs from the firms’ 
stakeholders. According to prospect theory, regarding motivation for avoidance of earnings 
decreases and losses, losses and gains are assumed to be valued differently thus implying that 
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a firm may realise the largest value increase when it turns an expected loss into a profit. In 
addition, decreasing negative earnings affect firms’ credit rating and their capital costs, 
resulting in a loss of firm value and implying further earning decreases in future.  
Earnings benchmarks from the accounting perspective play an important role in earnings 
management in that managers who try to reduce fluctuation may employ accruals to increase 
or decrease current period reported earnings figure in order to meet a pre-managed earnings 
target and to maintain income at a smooth level. From another point of view, earnings 
benchmarks used as a target level are achieved by managers who engage in earnings 
management behaviour because managers, for the purpose of management incentives, are 
generally assumed to be wealth-maximisers who realise that their wealth can be adversely 
impacted when their firms’ reported earnings fail to meet earnings benchmarks. Balsam (1998) 
found that CEO cash compensation is positively associated with discretionary accruals and the 
weight of such association is significantly greater only under the circumstance whereby positive 
discretionary accruals are used to meet earnings benchmarks and reduce or eliminate a loss. 
Healy (1985) conjectured that shareholders increase their monitoring when firms fail to hit their 
earnings benchmarks whilst Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) showed that managers are 
punished in the form of reduced compensation and an increased probability of dismissal. The 
compensation committees can also employ benchmarks to distinguish between the components 
of earnings and reward managers such as rewards for when managers manipulate earnings to 
achieve the firms’ targets. Ke (2001) examined the relationship between CEOs’ compensation 
and earnings benchmark beating behaviour, and found that CEO compensation inventive 
formed one set of economic determinants as regards beating profit and last year’s earnings 
behaviour. Matsunaga and Park (2001) declared that the compensation committee set earnings 
benchmarks as a signal of firms’ management performances, and CEO compensation may be 
reduced when a firm misses its benchmark thus indicating a poor performance. Corporate 
earnings are perhaps the most widely used and studied figures in a firm’s financial reports, 
because reported earnings figures and the circumstances relating to them can indicate whether 
the corporate business will be profitable and successful in the long run. As a key indicator of 
firms’ business and management performance, most of the executive’s review compares this 
year’s earnings performance with previous’ years’ figures. The executive directors will be 
praised and rewarded when a firm that beats earnings benchmarks is outperformed, whilst they 
will be blamed and the board may elect a new director when a firm misses benchmarks and 
underperforms. This implies that meeting or beating earnings benchmarks matter in terms of 
managerial behaviour and provide strong incentives for earnings manipulation.  
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The incentive of firms’ executive directors is to engage in manipulate earnings with the aim of 
meeting or beating earnings targets dependent on real earnings figures, or else it is unnecessary 
to take earnings management action when real earnings are sufficient for the achievement of 
benchmarks during the current period. Some researchers have modelled this conditionality 
about beating earnings benchmarks in circumstances leading to earnings management. 
Fundergerg and Tirole (1995) built a theory on income smoothing based on executive directors’ 
concerns about keeping their position or avoiding interference, and managers’ shifting earnings 
decisions based on the earnings performance of firms. Managers take actions which increase or 
decrease reported income in order to maintain current ‘income smoothing’ performances, based 
on the idea that current earnings performance receives more weight than past performances 
when one is assessing the future, and poor current income performance (high variable) may 
lead to a manager being dismissed. Payne and Robb (2000) investigated managers’ incentives 
to increase reported earnings when the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is low and found that 
managers use income-increasing discretionary accruals to increase earnings to align with 
market expectations. Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2008) presented evidence that CEOs have 
incentives to manage earnings upwards to avoid dividend cuts when they anticipate that 
unmanaged earnings will otherwise fall short of expected dividend levels (benchmarks) in 
dividend-paying firms whose CEOs receive higher dividends payments and have higher pay-
performance sensitivities. Cohen, et al. (2010a) determined that managers tend to engage in 
reducing advertising spending to avoid losses and earnings decreases, and in the latter stages of 
a firm’s life cycle, they increase advertising to meet financial reporting earnings benchmarks.  
Managers employ multiple earnings management strategies to increase or decrease earnings to 
meet or beat earnings benchmarks, when accrual-based earnings management occurs within or 
after the fiscal year, and try to obscure or mask true economic performance, but with no cash 
flow consequence; real activities manipulation takes place during  the fiscal year and alters the 
timing or structure of a real transaction, operation and investment in an effort to influence 
current-period earnings performance; classification shifting through shift of core expenses to 
special items tends to overstate core earning without a change in bottom-line earnings. Dechow 
et al. (2000) reported that executives use working capital and positive special items as a 
mechanism to achieve low profits and to meet analysts’ forecasts. Phillips et al. (2003) found 
that deferred tax expenses are linked to benchmark beating behaviour of reporting profits and 
earnings increases, whereas total accruals are linked to benchmark beating behaviour of 
meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts. Roychowdhury (2006) declared that real earnings 
management primarily aims to mislead certain stakeholders into believing that earnings 
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benchmarks have been met in the normal course of operations, thereby managers avoid 
reporting annual losses and negative earnings changes. Gunny (2010) noted that adopting real 
earnings manipulation to just meet earnings benchmarks (zero earnings and last year’s earnings) 
is positively associated with future performance compared with firms which did not use real 
earnings management and missed the benchmarks. In addition, through using classification 
shifting earnings management to overstate ‘core’ earnings and no change of bottom-line 
earnings, McVay (2006) documented that the result is more significant when managers meet 
analyst the forecast benchmark as special items tend to be excluded from this earnings 
benchmark. Atieh and Hussain (2012) examined the earnings management and dividend 
payments, and evidence that non-dividend paying firms managed earnings upwards through 
manipulating discretionary accruals which aiming to avoiding reporting losses. Shattarat, et al. 
(2018) examined the relationship between earnings management (real activities manipulation) 
and firms’ future operating performance, evidence that firms manipulate their earnings were 
positively associated with future performance when meeting/beating earnings benchmarks (i.e., 
zero earnings, last year’s earnings). As can be seen, most studies documented firms that 
meet/beat their earnings benchmarks by managing earnings up. However, the study of Mindak, 
et al. (2016) focused on investigating at the firms-specific level whether firms manage earnings 
up or down to barely miss or meet/beat three common earnings benchmarks (i.e., analysts’ 
forecasts, zero earnings and last year’s earnings). They found that firms that were assigned to 
zero earnings and/or last year’s earnings threshold targets were more likely to manage earning 
down as they would ‘cookie jar’ earnings to create reserves for future years, even though most 
firms which barely meet/beat their target did so by managing earnings up. Thus, given the scope 
of this study, and based on prior literature, the income-increasing earnings management do not 
apply to all firms when meeting/beating earnings benchmark, firms have incentives to manage 
their earnings downward to meet/beat targets by using different earnings management tool. The 
first part of this thesis is using two main earnings management methods (i.e., accrual-based and 
real earnings management) and linked different earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings and 
last year’s earnings) to estimate whether firms manage their earnings upwards or downwards.   
2.8 Directors’ Remuneration and Earnings Management 
Directors referred to in this study specifically are executive directors, who are the senior 
operating officers or managers in a firm or organisation. This section documents the research 
background of the second empirical results (Chapter 5) by means of introducing directors’ 
remuneration, reviewing prior theories and some empirical literature in the fields of directors’ 
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compensation. It also presents the empirical literature on the relationship between directors’ 
pay and firms’ performance; the relationship between directors’ remuneration and earnings 
management. 
2.8.1 Directors’ Remuneration 
Directors, especially executive directors, who are at, or above, a senior position, are responsible 
for everything which happens in the firm, therefore, their role is related to the formation of the 
firm’s strategic and operational decisions which could have long-term consequences, involving 
strategic planning, working with the Board of Directors, and operating with a budget. Directors’ 
remuneration (also referred to as directors’ compensation or directors’ pay) is composed as the 
financial compensation and other non-financial awards received by directors for service or 
employment of their firm. Compensation which has become one of the main incentives for 
directors, as it typically includes a mixture of base salary, bonuses, any other economics 
benefits, such as shares of or call options on the firm stock, use of the firm’s property and 
perquisites, is ideally designed to take into account government regulations, tax law, the desires 
of the firm or organisation and directors, and rewards for performance. Disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration is more developed and transparent in practice in the UK market, and is regulated 
by the Companies Act 200610 (the 2006 Act) which states that all medium and large-sized firms 
are required to make certain disclosures about the aggregate remuneration of the directors. 
Quoted firms, whose equity share capital is listed in the UK or another EEA state, are subject 
to considerably more onerous requirements which involve preparation of a directors’ 
remuneration report including detailed information about each director’s remuneration.   
2.8.1.1 Remuneration Committee 
In accordance with growing concern of shareholders about directors rewarding themselves large 
compensation packages in spite of poor profit performance, a number of reports into corporate 
governance have stated that controls are required to reduce this kind of risk and there have been 
investigations into these concerns. The Greenbury Report released in 1995 was the first to 
propose the establishment of a directors’ remuneration committee on corporate governance by 
the United Kingdom Confederation of British Industry to control the level of directors’ 
 
10 The Companies Act 2006 (the 2006 Act) is the mainly part of Company Law in the UK, its part 15 (sections 380 
to 474) sets out requirements for the preparation, distribution and filling of accounts and reports including the 
choice of accounting framework. 
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remuneration. The Greenbury Report11 (1995) focused on providing a means of forming a 
committee of remuneration, in order to establish a balance between directors’ remuneration and 
firm performance to try to restore shareholders’ confidence in the firm.   
The role of the remuneration committee12 is to make an appropriate compensation policy that 
attracts, retains and motivates directors to achieve shareholders’ long-term interests, and creates 
a balance between the opposing viewpoints of stakeholders. The members of the committee do 
not require expert knowledge, but must have a thorough understanding of their firm and the 
forces that shape directors’ remuneration and the balance between remuneration and 
performance, because the levels of directors’ remuneration can vary considerably from business 
to business. Remuneration committees take into account multiple factors, including business 
size, performance record and prospects, industry sector, global considerations (e.g., 
internationalisation, complexity, and innovation), cash flow and debt levels. Key performance 
measures are the most common issues which may have an influence in finalising remuneration 
packages, the committees present recommendations to their boards for remuneration 
consideration. In addition, they need to understand firm culture and values, current 
arrangements, stakeholder interests, and the market. These four factors enable the committee to 
make a decision on remuneration.    
As recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code13, the delegated responsibilities of 
remuneration committees include the setting and regular review of the framework, broader 
policy and specific terms for the remuneration and terms and conditions of employment of the 
chairman of the board and of executive directors. They determine targets for performance-
related compensation or share schemes, the complete individual remuneration package of each 
executive director including, where appropriate, salary, bonuses, pension contribution, 
incentive payment and share scheme and recommend and monitor the level and structure of the 
remuneration of senior directors, ensure that the top directors such as executive directors and 
key managers are fairly rewarded for their individual contribution to the overall performance 
 
11 The Greenbury Report released in 1995 was the product of a committee established by the UK Confederation 
of British Industry on corporate governance. It addressed a growing concern about the level of directors’ 
remuneration.  
12 According to practical law, remuneration committee can be explained as a board committee whose delegated 
responsibilities may include setting the policy for the remuneration of the executive management, determining 
targets for performance-related pay or share schemes and determining the total individual remuneration package 
of each executive director including, where appropriate, salary, bonuses, pensions, incentive payments and share 
schemes. The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that the remuneration committee consists exclusively 
of independent non-executive directors. 
13 The UK Corporate Governance Code is a part of UK company law with a set of principles of good corporate 
governance aimed at companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, it is overseen by the Financial Reporting 
Council and its importance derives from the Financial Conduct Authority’s Listing Rules.  
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of the firm and establish pension provision policy for all board members, They also demonstrate 
to shareholders that the directors’ pay is set by each other with no personal interest in the 
outcome of the committee’s decisions, agree to pay any compensation for the loss of any 
executive directors, and ensure that provisions regarding disclosure of remuneration, including 
pensions, as required in the Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Regulations 2002 and the Code, 
are fulfilled.  
The remuneration committee is, and is seen as, independent from the board of directors and has 
independent access to its own external advice or consultants. This can be specified in several 
aspects, such as the committee constructing a clear remuneration policy that is well understood 
and has the support of shareholders. The committee designs the performance-related 
remuneration which is aligned with the long-term interests of shareholders and linked with 
relevant challenging targets. The remuneration report is presented in a clear, concise manner 
and gives the reader of the annual report a bird’s-eye view of remuneration policy and the 
rationale behind it, covering the whole area of directors’ pay and is created or restored through 
good governance and the use of the remuneration committee, thus helping to build greater trust 
between firms and their shareholders.  
2.8.1.2 Directors’ Remuneration Report and Remuneration Strategy 
Remuneration is defined as a combination of the financial compensation and other-financial 
payments received by directors for services or employment from their firm. It includes base 
salary, any bonuses, share schemes and any other economic benefits which ideally is configured 
to consider factors such as regulations, tax law, rewards for performance, etc., received by 
employees or executives during employment. Firms and shareholders expect directors to be 
compensated in a way that reflects the directors’ performance in delivering the firm strategy 
and maximises shareholder interests. The remuneration committee may wish to take into 
consideration disclosure of the facts when they have exercised their judgement in determining 
the extent to which the relevant objective has been satisfied, and to provide outsiders such as 
investors and analysts with sufficient insight to be able to assess the relationship between 
directors’ pay and performance.   
As regulated by Companies Law, all firms are required to make certain disclosures about the 
aggregate remuneration of directors, and listed firms must prepare a considerably more onerous 
directors’ remuneration report. The directors’ remuneration report may present more 
information or detail than required if the directors think it necessary, It consists of three parts, 
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including an annual statement (the chair of the remuneration committee providing the context 
to the report and explaining what decisions have been made during the year and the resultant 
changes), an annual report on remuneration (referred to as the annual remuneration report, a 
detailed report on remuneration paid in the financial year under view) and the directors’ 
remuneration policy (the remuneration policy sets out the proposed approach to remunerating 
directors over the next three years). The annual remuneration report presents information 
showing’ remuneration paid to directors in the reported year, and contains a single total figure 
for the remuneration of each director in the reported year and previous year, and for each 
element of that remuneration package including pension benefits and variable pay with regard 
to share-based payments. It issues a statement explaining how the remuneration policy has been 
implemented in the reported year, including performance measure disclosures and targets and 
how performance-related awards will be calculated. In addition to the report dealing with 
historical remuneration, the remuneration policy report is subject to a binding shareholders vote 
and the firm will be in breach of the law if it pays additional compensation to directors outside 
the approved policy. The remuneration policy can be omitted when the shareholders do not bind 
on remuneration policy or firm does not propose a resolution to approve the remuneration policy, 
hence, the directors’ remuneration report can be composed of just the annual statement and the 
annual report on remuneration in the omission years of remuneration policy.   
An effective remuneration report is like a bridge of trust designed to help build a better 
connection between firms and their shareholders, as it helps increase the transparency of firm 
reports, helps to improve accountability to shareholders and helps to provide clearer evidence 
of the association between performance and compensation. As determinant of directors’ 
remuneration, the remuneration committee will utilise multiple strategies to consider to 
motivate directors. For example, the committee tends to offer benefits in kind to those directors 
who receive a relatively lower basic salary including share options, in order to increase the total 
amount of compensation. The committee also provides other benefits such as additional 
holidays, holiday vouchers, a firm car scheme, use of firm property etc., non-cash motivators 
for all or some firm employees to increase their levels of satisfaction. The committee may utilise 
firm resources, such as a firm will choose to pay share options as an alternative compensation 
to directors if there is insufficient cash available to pay an annual bonus and the committee offer 
long-term market-orientated incentive schemes to encourage the long-term loyalty of executive 
directors, e.g. executive stock/share options purchase schemes.  
The necessity of developing a remuneration strategy which links directors’ compensation to 
performance is the greatest challenge faced by the remuneration committee, as there is critical 
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need to ensure the board of directors maximise their benefits motivated by a desire to strive to 
increase performance, adequately rewarded when performance is improved or targets are met, 
and paid appropriately for their efforts and success at market-based levels, not criticised for 
excessive compensation, Therefore, the remuneration strategy concerns the creation of a 
connection to corporate strategy as corporate strategy is the process through which performance 
is improved, and the extent to which the remuneration strategy achieves the connection with 
corporate strategy or how close this connection is, and is also a measure of the remuneration 
strategy’s success.              
2.8.1.3 Components of Remuneration Package 
The regulations require that remuneration committee will need to analyse each element of the 
remuneration package for directors when in preparing firm’s remuneration report and 
remuneration policy. The overall remuneration package tends to balance the rewards for the 
management performance and a share in the success or failure of the firm, which is also impact 
on the linkage between remuneration and the firm’s strategy. Therefore, following the work of 
the remuneration committee, the firm should consider to provide a remuneration package which 
is needed to attract, retain and motivate executive directors of the quality required under the 
premise of avoiding pay more unnecessary fees. To determine the package of remuneration, 
firm should take a comparison with other firms and judge where to position its package among 
the industry, need to keep abreast of what competing firms are paying and should take account 
of performance relative to compensation. In addition, a firm should consider other issues when 
designing the remuneration package of directors, such as being sensitive to the pay and 
employment conditions elsewhere in the firm (especially when setting an increase in annual 
salary). In short, however the remuneration package is determined, its essential objective is to 
ensure that directors are compensated at a satisfactory level and they have a stake in doing a 
good job for shareholders. The design of each component of a remuneration package is aimed 
at providing incentives to improve performance and ensuring that the directors are focused on 
the firm’s benefits. In the meantime it is more important that a balance is struck when a firm 
offers its package, for example, the level of remuneration package may be too small and hence 
demotivate directors leading to potential underachievement of performance, whilst if the level 
of the package is too large, it indicates that directors earn too easily without making sufficient 
effort for the firm.     
Each component of the directors’ remuneration package is designed to support the firm’s short-
term and long-term strategic objectives, including basic salary, performance-related 
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remuneration, pension, and benefit in kind. The setting of basic salary is based on the job itself, 
the skills of the directors in doing the job, directors’ performance in the position, the overall 
contribution to firm strategy, and market rates for the same level of job. Comparing it with 
comparable firms may give some indication as to expectation of directors’ performance because 
the upper percentage of salary generally suggests the directors are being paid a premium for 
their premium effort in the future. Pension-related compensation is generally based on salary, 
and requires a clear explanation, including the consideration of pension consequences, related 
costs to the firm of basic salary increases and the approach taken in making payments in lieu of 
retirement benefits or defined benefit arrangements. In addition to normal compensation such 
as basic salary, pension, benefits in kind, (also called perks), vary in the form of non-wage 
compensation provided to directors and employees, such as health care, firm property use, firm 
car or car parking, holidays, children vouchers, etc. In order to increase directors especially 
executive directors’ loyalty and motivation, the remuneration committee may wish to provide 
other ancillary benefits concordant with their relevant position in the firm. All such benefits 
which could be offered to directors and how these benefits support the firm’s strategy should 
be broadly presented in the remuneration report, and the description requires it to be broad and 
detailed enough to encompass all benefits which may be provided to directors during both the 
course of the remuneration policy period and those benefits not currently being paid.  
The performance-related element of remuneration is defined as that compensation dependant 
on the achievement of some form of performance measures or target criteria and it usually forms 
a significant part of the total remuneration package. Performance-related remuneration can 
come in two main forms, short-term and long-term incentives, which are the usual approaches 
adopted by firms to support their goals or objectives. Short-term incentive is the amount (e.g. 
cash, shares, other assets) received or receivable as a result of a payment made in the reported 
year and the achievement of performance measures or targets within that year, where the 
performance period will generally be one year. For example, the short-term bonus is a common 
form of short-term incentive in that the award provided to directors is based on related 
performance measurement and the amount received at the end of the accounting year. Similarly,  
long-term incentive is the amount (e.g. cash, shares or other assets) received or receivable as a 
result of an award produced before the reported year and the achievement of performance 
measures or targets over a period that ends within that year (performance period is more than 
one-year), and comprises, for example, shares, rights to shares, options, etc. Executive share 
options are the most popular form of long –term incentive scheme and are market orientated. 
The share options give executives the opportunity to buy shares at the exercise price and sell 
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the share options at a profit if the share price rises above the exercise price. The remuneration 
committee sets the share options as part of an executive’s compensation, most executives will 
exercise the share option when available to generate the profit that gives the executives the 
incentive to manage the firm in such a way as to increase the firm’s share price. Share options 
are designed to align the firm’s strategy and objectives with the shareholder’s interests, from a 
theory perspective, the alignment between executive directors’ personal goals and the firm’s 
objectives helps to overcome the problem of the separation between ownership and control as 
when executives hold firm shares, they, in effect, become an owner of the firm. As required by 
the remuneration committee, the actual shares or share option incentives have to be approved 
by shareholders, preferably replacing an existing scheme or at least form part of a well-
considered overall strategy, incorporating existing schemes. The reward provides that directors 
should be reliable and not behave excessively. Pay-outs or the grant of share options are subject 
to the challenging performance measurement criteria and indicate that the firm’s goals and 
performance relate to a group of comparative firms in some key variables such as total 
shareholder return as the level of option profit depends on share prices, and the profit from 
options is phased rather than being awarded as a block payment. In addition, to determine share 
options as part of executive directors’ remuneration, the firm, complying with the remuneration 
committee, has several considerations to take on board, such as to consider whether the directors 
are eligible for rewards under long-term schemes, to weigh traditional share option schemes 
against other types of long-term incentive schemes, to ensure that executive share options are 
not provided at a discount, to ensure that granted shares or other forms of deferred awards 
should not be vested and options should not be exercisable in less than three years, and to 
encourage directors to hold onto their shares for a further period after vesting or exercising, 
subject to the need to pay any costs of acquisition and related tax liabilities.   
In conclusion, it is an important practical issue that the approach adopted by a firm’s 
remuneration committee to design and determine directors’ compensation package 
demonstrates flexibility, discretion and judgement. Firms and shareholders tend to wish 
directors to be compensated in such manner, that reflects the director’s performance in 
delivering firm strategy to hit the firm’s targeted objective to maximise shareholders’ interests, 
and to meet directors’ personal goals, Therefore, each element of a director’s remuneration 
package is designed to ensure that the directors maintain their focus on the firm doing a good 
job and to be motivated to improve the firm performance.   
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2.8.1.4 Other Issues of Directors’ Remuneration  
In addition to understanding the role of the remuneration committee, the directors’ 
remuneration report and strategy and the components of the remuneration package, the firm 
should consider a number of other issues associated with the directors’ remuneration, including 
legal, ethical, competitive, and non-executive directors. The remuneration committee is 
instructed by Regulation (The UK Directors’ remuneration Report Regulations 2002 by 
Practical Law), which presents the guidance that a firm should aim to avoid rewarding poor 
performance and carefully consider the compensation commitments, including pension 
contributions and all other elements of a remuneration package, relating to their directors’ terms 
of appointment as would apply in the event of termination.    
Currently the traditional view of the separation of ethics and business, is rarely accepted by 
corporations as firms or organisations become more aware of a rising consumer-based society 
showing concern for the environment, social causes, corporate responsibility and other social 
issues. They are increasingly demonstrating sensitivity in applying ethical practical issues into 
their commercial success, also known as business ethics. Business ethical is a system of moral 
and ethical beliefs which guides the values, behaviour and decisions of a business organisation 
and the individuals within that organisation. It helps maintain a certain basic level of trust which 
exists between consumers and various forms of market participants with businesses. Some 
ethical requirements for firms or organisations are codified into law, such as environmental 
regulations, the minimum wage, and restrictions against insider trading and collusion. They are 
the government setting minimum standards for business ethics. The commercial environment 
is progressively affected by the very ethical issues that firms are dealing with, therefore, the 
Companies Act (2006) in the UK states that directors have the legal requirement to act as ‘good 
corporate citizens’ and pay attention to the ethical effects when they make decisions. The public 
has required firms to change best practice disclosure requirements on board structure and 
executive pay and put pressure on them to change their board policies to be in line with accepted 
best practice. There has been a rise in perceptions of excessive pay in underperforming firms 
and privatised utilities. As a result, many leading firms are developing plans to incorporate 
business ethics into their management processes, directors’ employment contracts and 
performance related remuneration systems.   
As a competitive firm, it is very important that the firm should have a proficient, motivated 
board of directors working hard in the interest of shareholders and can attract, recruit and retain 
the individuals required for successful performance. However, the overall remuneration 
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package of directors has to strike a balance. It cannot be too small or the level of remuneration 
will result in failure to recruit the required calibre of individual being unattractive for potential 
new appointees, and which may cause potential underachievement as it is demotivating for 
existing directors. It also cannot be too large, as excessive remuneration will make it too easy 
for directors to earn compensation and shareholders will consider they are not getting ‘value 
for money’ in terms of performance. Moreover, there is an increasingly regulatory environment 
for firms to operate in and this in turn is placing greater demand on directors. For example, 
Regulations (2002) clearly require that directors must submit a remuneration report to members 
at the annual general meeting every year, the remuneration report must provide full details of 
each director’ remuneration, and the report should be clear, transparent and understandable to 
shareholders. In order for a firm to release an executive director to serve as a non-executive 
director elsewhere, the remuneration report should include a statement as to whether the 
directors will retain such remuneration and disclose it. The remuneration of the non-executive 
directors consists only of a basic salary with no other performance related benefits. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) regulates that the remuneration of non-executive directors 
should be determined within the scope of the firm’s constitution of association, in order to avoid 
a situation whereby the remuneration committee is solely responsible for determining the 
remuneration of the non-executive directors as the committee consists of non-executive 
directors. The main task of the non-executive directors is oversight of the performance of the 
executive directors and of the firm as a whole. They are best placed to play a role to exercise 
flexibility, discretion or judgement and to ensure a fair outcome in remuneration.  
2.8.2 Determinant of Directors’ Remuneration  
In many large UK firms, directors’ remuneration is set by a remuneration committee, and 
according to several predominant theories in directors’ compensation literature, executive 
directors’ compensation can be affected by many factors, including firm performance, 
shareholders interest or value, etc. The principal-agent theory predicts a positive relationship 
between directors’ compensation and firm performance, suggesting that performance related 
compensation offers financial incentives for executive directors to directly help to alleviate the 
interest-conflicts between directors and shareholders as it achieves alignment between 
executives’ interests and that of their shareholders’. The agency theory suggests that managerial 
compensation is related to performance measures. A simplified form of agency theory, the rank 
order tournament theory, thus provides a supplementary explanation of classical principal-agent 
theory in that the positional hierarchy of directors in the firm plays a role in the determination 
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of their compensation. However, the managerial power theory offers a contrary opinion of 
directors’ remuneration, that executive directors are a party to the principal-agent relationship 
and the directors’ compensation may be involved in the agency problem itself because 
executive directors have the possibility through their power to influence the determination of 
their remuneration. Although the managerial power theory takes an opposite view from the 
classical principal-agent theory and tournament theory, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) 
stated that principal-agent theory could not be completely replaced by the managerial power 
approach and should be considered together to explain and solve compensation issues. In fact, 
these three major theories, the classical principal-agent theory, tournament theory and 
managerial power theory can be seen as complementary theories which complement each other 
in explaining the determinant of directors’ pay. The classical principal-agent theory suggests 
that the directors’ remuneration package is designed to be associated with performance 
measures, thus directors’ compensation is tied to firm performance in order to offer incentives 
to maximise shareholders’ interests, whilst directors’ remuneration may not only be affected by 
performance and an optimal contract cannot be found to perfectly align the interests of 
managers and shareholders.           
2.8.2.1 Principal-Agent Theory 
Many previous studies investigated the relationship between shareholders and directors, and 
examine whether there is a relationship between directors remuneration and firm performance 
(e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Cosh and Hugn, 1997; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004; Banks, et al., 2018; Gayle, et al., 2018). The one basic challenge is to design 
an incentive mechanism to encourage directors to manage the firm on the behalf of the 
shareholders and to act in the best interests of shareholders, whereas directors may work for 
themselves to pursue their personal interests. This conflict of interest is often explained as the 
principal-agent problem, whereby shareholders have difficulty in monitoring the executive 
directors and it is hard to ensure that directors are acting to maximise shareholder interests as 
shareholders do not usually have enough knowledge such as a firm’s daily operation, production, 
marketing, etc. Hence, the principal-agent theory, in fact, is introduced to focus on the 
relationship between principal and agent (also known as principal-agent problem) as a result of 
the separation of ownership and control, and it plays a foundation and important role in directors’ 
compensation literature. The principal-agent theory dates back to the 1970s deriving from the 
combined disciplines of economics and institutional theory. The most popular cited reference 
to this theory, comes from Jensen and Meckling (1976) who defined it as the principal-agent 
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relationship arising when a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf and which involves 
delegating some decision making or action - taking authority to the agent. The relationship 
between principal and agent is like a separation of ownership and control and can lead to a 
dilemma whereby agents are motivated to act in their own best interests which are contrary to 
those of their principals, and which also caused the moral hazard problem.  
The principal-agent problem mainly occurs when the two parties have different interests and 
asymmetric information, and usually the agent has more information, so that the principal 
cannot directly control matters so that the agent is always working in their (the principal’s) best 
interests, particularly when activities useful to the principal are costly to the agent, and where 
elements of what the agent does are costly for the principal to observe (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). This kind of divergence from the principal’s interest by the agent is referred to as agency 
costs, because the principal usually may be sufficiently concerned as to the possibility of being 
exploited by the agent in that they chose not to engage in the transaction when it would have 
been mutually beneficial that a suboptimal outcome, which causes a lower welfare overall 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Therefore, the existence of interest conflict between the principal 
and agent and the moral hazard problem caused by asymmetric information in the principal and 
agent relationship may lead to the problem of the agent not always performing to maximise the 
interests of the principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bedchuk and Fried, 2004). The principal 
tends to utilise appropriate incentives to motivate the agent through establishing reasonable 
monitoring mechanisms to regulate the aberrant behaviour of the agent, in order to mitigate the 
principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, the stock market may 
punish directors who fail to achieve a certain share price, as outside investors may be able to 
profit by taking over the firm, resulting in the management being replaced. For this reason, 
directors may be motivated to keep the share price at a certain level. Outside directors are 
considered to be sufficiently independent to act as a certain institution and group, and may 
therefore be able to monitor the top directors. As a result, according to principal-agent theory, 
the design of the remuneration package is essential to ensure that the directors always do their 
job in the best interests of their shareholders in order to align the interests of directors with 
those of shareholders, thus alleviating the conflict of interests between shareholders (the 
principals) and directors (the agents).        
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2.8.2.2 Tournament Theory 
The classical principal-agent theory is important and is dominant in compensation literature, 
however, does not demonstrate sufficient empirical evidence that compensation schemes in 
hierarchical organisations influenced by the position hierarchy as some researchers have argued 
that compensation not only motivates the directors but also the employees of firms (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 1991; Lazear, 1995; Gibbs, 1995; Lambert et al., 1993; Ortin-Angel & 
Sales-Fumas, 1998). Due to the imperfection of the classical principal-agent theory that there 
is no optimal contract to perfectly align the interests of directors and shareholders, the 
compensation differences may not only be based on performance but may instead be based on 
relative differences between the positions of individuals in the firm. Researchers, therefore, 
have developed a supplementary theory named the tournament theory by considering the role 
of position hierarchy in explaining directors’ compensation. The tournament theory was 
proposed by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen in 1981, and suggests that employees can be 
rewarded by their rank in the firm, examples being directors at a higher position whose pay may 
be greater than their productivity, such that ‘large payment to the directors’ may be efficient 
under some circumstances and other employees who may put in enough effort to be promoted 
to the top positions. According to rank order tournament theory, it provides an efficient system 
of directors’ compensation in that large compensation differences across the directors’ position 
hierarchy within the same firm may require offering adequate incentives for directors, and 
suggests the internal remuneration plans of directors be operated as sequential tournaments 
whereby directors compete against others at a given hierarchical position in order to be 
promoted to a higher rank and gain more compensation related to the promotion (Rosen, 1986).    
Eriksson (1999) and Conyon and Sadler (2001) found  testable evidence relating to directors’ 
remuneration, indicating that compensation is an increasing function of position within the firm, 
so that the higher payment applies to directors, in turn meaning that there is a loss of promotion 
opportunities to higher hierarchical positions. Executive directors at the top of the firm, as 
suggested by tournament theory, should be compensated more because they have no further 
promotion opportunities at the final stage of the game (Rosen, 1986). Therefore, the 
compensation level between top executive directors and managers at the next rank below them 
should have an extraordinarily wide difference compared with wage differences across other 
adjacent hierarchical levels within the firm (Lambert et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999; Conyon and 
Sadler, 2001). In addition, under tournament theory, the lifetime output of an employee in the 
firm can be dictated by two aspects: chance and skills. The employee can control his lifetime 
output to achieve earnings through investing his skills at an early stage, such as attending 
57 
 
training sessions and achieving qualifications, whilst some part of his achievement is 
determined by chance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Therefore, tournament theory can be an 
efficient method of labour compensation when it is difficult or expensive to quantify output but 
easy to rank employees, as in tournament theory the opportunity, luck, or other random factors 
play a more important role as regards making contributions to output and it needs greater 
differential pay to substitute for the effort to reduce the effect of randomness (Eriksson, 1999). 
It is also effective as tournament theory provides opportunities for employees and incentives to 
make the best possible effort in order to attain or be promoted to coveted positions at the top 
for large rewards. In short, tournament theory indicates that the larger the compensation 
difference between top directors and managers results in a greater level of effort, so that it has 
a positive effect on firm performance (Eriksson, 1999; Chen et al., 2011).      
2.8.2.3 Managerial Power Theory 
The principal predominant theory in directors’ compensation literature in the area of corporate 
governance, the classical principal-agent theory, suggests that directors’ pay is positively 
associated with firm performance so that performance-related compensation creates financial 
incentives for executive directors to behave and act in the best interests of shareholders, as it 
helps to align the directors’ interests with those of shareholders and to alleviate the conflict of 
interests between the ownership and control. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argued that the 
principal-agent problem is that executive directors’ pay is set through an arm’s-length 
bargaining approach between directors and boards of directors, however, does not adequately 
account for directors’ compensation in practice, rather the compensation can be explained once 
the managerial power theory is accepted. Managerial power theory holds an opposing view to 
classical principal-agent theory, arguing that executive directors’ remuneration is often set at 
an excessive level compared with a hypothetical, economically efficient compensation package, 
whilst pay may not be linked to performance with high compensation earners not necessarily 
high performers. In managerial power theory, executive directors who control firm business are 
able to use the benefit of their power to influence their pay decision made by the remuneration 
committee (Murohy, 2002). Specifically, executives at the top of the firm have sufficient power 
to make decisions which take advantage of their power to obtain a higher compensation level 
which is not related to performance.    
The missing link between ownership and control poses a risk that the interests of the agent who 
controls the firm may not align with the interests of the principal who owns the firm, and that 
this power imbalance between executive directors and shareholders can cause disconnection 
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between directors’ remuneration and firm performance (Tosi et al., 1999). Finkelstein (1992) 
identified four types of executive power: structural power, ownership power, expert power and 
prestige power. Lambert et al. (1993) defined this power as executives being able to influence 
pay decisions made by the board of directors or the remuneration committee. Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia (2002) used the  researchers’ work  to build a managerial power model and 
argued that, although principal-agent theory implicitly acknowledges the existence of power in 
the relationship between directors and shareholders because directors are able to pursue their 
own interests to obtain higher compensation, agency theory focuses on the financial incentives 
perspective rather than behavioural hypotheses. Therefore, managerial power theory suggests 
that executives as top directors in high positions have an unequal bargaining power which may 
result an inefficient market and that they obtain an excessive level of compensation without any 
necessarily high performance., Directors pay, for instance, is determined by the board of 
directors or the remuneration committee, and an executive director can be a member of the 
board or committee, thus the executive director has the ability to leverage his/her power over 
the board or committee when deciding to pay him/her at a favourable higher compensation level.  
In conclusion, the classical principal-agent theory argues that the directors are compensated on 
a performance-related basis, whilst managerial power theory holds the opposite view that 
directors’ compensation may be part of the agency problem and does not correlate to 
performance. According to managerial power theory, a conflict of interest may create poor 
decision-making such as seeking short-term benefits regardless of long-term risk, because 
executives are able to use their power to obtain excessive compensation for themselves and 
avoid demonstrating higher performance. Hence, it is important that the compensation package 
of directors needs to be designed to align the interests of directors and shareholders, to ensure 
that directors behave and act in the best interests of the shareholders. The study attempts to use 
principal-agent theory to explain that directors’ remuneration is mainly determined by 
performance such as earnings performance, sales growth, etc., although directors’ pay may also 
be influenced by position hierarchy and managerial power.    
2.8.3 Directors’ Remuneration and Firm Performance 
Much attention in the literature on directors’ compensation is paid on the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and firm performance. Some empirical studies indicate that directors’ 
pay is positively linked to firm performance (i.e., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main, et al., 1996; 
Cheng, et al., 2016; Elsayed and Elbardan, 2018), whilst others have suggested that the 
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relationship between directors’ remuneration and performance is very weak, or even does not 
exist (i.e., Gregg, et al; 1993; Conyon, 1997; Brunello, er al., 2001). This section reviews 
previous studies on the relationship between the level of directors’ compensation and firm 
performance.     
Top directors’ pay in the UK is typically determined by the remuneration committee which 
designs the compensation plans based on setting some performance targets and setting some 
kind of ‘formula’ to calculate the directors’ annual bonus which is likely related to firm 
performance; although the firm size is indeed another very important factor in influencing 
determination of directors’ remuneration. As discussed in section 2.8.2, there are three 
important theories in compensation literature, namely the classical principal-agent theory, the 
tournament theory and the managerial power theory. They offer supporting evidence as regards 
empirical studies on the relationship between directors’ compensation and firm performance, 
in that directors’ pay is positively dependent on firm performance, the role of position hierarchy 
in directors’ compensation and the role of managerial power in influencing the remuneration 
committee to determine compensation packages, and the effectiveness of using equity-related 
compensation to improve firm performance.         
Firms would frequently prefer to use profit improvement as the performance measurement, so 
that the objective of a firm is primarily to maximise its profit. Previous research suggested that 
directors make an effort to improve profit as they behave or act in the best interests of 
shareholders, however executive directors have incentives to focus on their own interests and 
adopt sales and asset improvement as the firm’s objective to measure the performance (e.g., 
Baumol, 1959; McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing, 1962; Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; Meeks and 
Wittington, 1975; Rosen, 1990;). Ciscel (1974) declared that directors’ compensation is 
positively associated to both sales and profits, and the relationship between compensation and 
sales is stronger than the relationship between compensation and profits. Smyth, et al. (1975) 
and Ciscel and Carroll (1980) provided supporting evidence that directors’ pay is influenced by 
firm performance and both are determined by sales and profits performance. In addition, Cosh 
(1975) suggested that profitability is an influential factor in executive directors’ compensation 
determination, however used the natural logarithm of total assets as the measurement of firm 
size, and found that firm size plays a more important role in determining executive directors’ 
remuneration than profitability. Therefore, firm performance is normally measured by profit, 
sales, and total assets and have an effect on compensation determination, however directors’ 
pay may also be influenced by firm size.  
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Some later research argued that early studies employed accounting-based profitability such as 
sales and profits as firm performance measurements to estimate compensation and the 
performance relationship but errors and biased and misleading results occurred, because 
accounting-based profitability ignored unobserved individual or firm specific effects. Coughlan 
and Schmidt (1985) suggested that previous cross-sectional estimations of directors’ pay and 
performance relationship relied on accounting-based profitability resulting in an omitted 
variables problem as it at the discretion of a firm’s management. In recent decades, equity-
based compensation became popular and relatively more prevalent, thus directors’ 
compensation may be more relevant in market-based firm performance, in that directors’ wealth 
varies with the market performance, which is indicated by stock price. Consequently, studies 
into directors’ compensation and the performance relationship should also take account of the 
stock market factor, as equity-related compensation is a significant component of a 
compensation package. Jensen and Murphy (1990) produced an influential study on the pay-
performance link. They found that the relationship between performance and executive 
directors’ compensation tends to be relatively stronger when stock options and stockholdings 
are contained in the directors’ remuneration package. Consistent with Jensen and Murphy’s 
(1990) finding, Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) were among the first to investigate cash 
compensation and equity-based compensation (e.g. value of option holdings) and found that the 
aggregate compensation is more significantly linked to firm performance than compensation 
without equity-based pay. Hall and Liebman (1998) observed that CEO compensation is 
significantly positively associated with firm performance, and results in changes in the value of 
equity-related rewards which take a large proportion (98%) of total compensation. Murphy 
(1999) declared that the compensation-performance relationship is enhanced primarily by stock 
options and stock ownership and the association is doubled to 0.6% compared with a test in 
1996 when equity-based compensation was not added to compensation plans.  
However, some studies have found that the relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
firm performance is weak. Jensen and Murphy (1990) only ascertained a minor relationship 
between CEOs’ cash compensation and firm performance using US data. This was also 
indicated in the UK market. Gregg, Machin, and Szymanski (1993) adopted the difference 
estimator to investigate the pay-performance relationship and predicted that the highest paid 
director’s cash compensation which has strong growth is weakly associated with firm 
performance, and the association between them even disappeared during the 1989 and 1991 
recession period. They also stated that executive directors’ high compensation is not relevant 
to both firm accounting-based performance and stock market-based performance. Conyon 
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(1997) did not find evidence of a relationship between the highest paid directors’ remuneration 
and pre-dated shareholder returns. In addition, Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) using 
survey data, provided evidence from the Italian market that there is a minor association of 
directors’ incentive compensation to firm performance.    
2.8.4 Directors’ Remuneration and Earnings Management 
The second part of this thesis is aimed to investigate whether and how the relationship between 
earnings management and directors’ remuneration varies with the degree of earnings 
management, the method of earnings management, and the level of directors’ compensation. 
Prior studies have conducted relevant investigations into the relationship between them. Healy 
(1985) evidenced that accrual policies of managers are related to income-reporting incentives 
of their bonus contracts, and changes in accounting procedures by managers are associated with 
adoption or modification of the executives’ bonus plan. Cheng and Warfield (2005) examined 
the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management, and found that stock-
based compensation and ownership can lead to incentives for earnings management as, if 
earnings management can increase short-term stock prices, managers can benefit from doing so 
by increasing the value of the shares they are going to sell. Dutta and Fan (2014) studied a two-
period agency setting in which the manager shifted earnings across periods, in order to examine 
how the possibility of earnings manipulation affects managerial compensation contracts. They 
concluded that the manager increased his compensation by moving earnings from the period 
with low pay-performance sensitivity to the period with high pay-performance sensitivity. 
When earnings manipulation becomes more difficult, the optimal incentive contract induces 
more productive effort from the manager, who, in turn, requires a higher level of managerial 
compensation. Hou et al. (2015) showed that firms entering into performance commitment 
contracts did indeed manage earnings upwards to achieve the pre-specified performance targets 
to avoid paying default costs when actual performance falls short (such as debt and managerial 
compensation contracts), and that they responded to the specific terms stipulated in the contract 
with regard to choice of the method of earnings management. Habib and Bhuiyan (2016) 
investigated the association between the presence of problem directors (defined as involvement 
in financial failure and involvement in integrity indiscretions, such as particularly egregious 
managerial compensation packages) on the audit committee and financial reporting quality, and 
revealed that there is a positive association between the presence of problem directors on the 
audit committee and real earnings management. 
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In addition, a large body of previous studies have explored the notion of a positive relationship 
between directors’ compensation and earnings management, as directors will often have a 
position on the board of the firm whose main responsibilities include developing and 
implementing high-level strategies, making major corporate decisions, managing the overall 
operations and resources of a firm, and acting as the main point of communication between the 
board of directors and the corporate operations. Balsam (1998) found that operating cash flows 
and non-discretionary and discretionary accruals are positively related to the CEO salary and 
bonus compensation after control of returns, and that the major association is with operating 
cash flows. The weight on positive discretionary accruals is significantly greater when accruals 
are used to reduce or eliminate a loss. Baber, Kang, and Kumar (1999) found a stronger 
relationship between salary and bonus compensation change and unexpected earnings in firms 
with more persistent earnings, whilst Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) documented that the 
weight placed on earnings relative to operating cash flows is lower for firms with lower earnings 
persistence, higher earnings variability, and higher total accruals. Gaver, Gaver, and Austin 
(1995) found that transitory gains are included in earnings for compensation purposes, whilst 
transitory losses are excluded. Cornett, et al. (2008) showed that the impact of CEO option 
compensation on performance disappears when reported profitability is adjusted with regard to 
the effect of earnings management. Recent research invariably has argued that CEOs have 
undesirable managerial incentives to manipulate earnings for personal gain (e.g. Dempsey et 
al., 1993; Hall and Murphy, 2003; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; and Balachandran et al., 2008; Houmes and Skantz, 2010; 
Mande and Son, 2012). Dechow, Huson, and Sloan (1994) determined that compensation 
appears to be adjusted for non-recurring charges (e.g., restructuring charges). Dechow, Myers, 
and Shakespeare (2010) showed that compensation is as sensitive to highly discretionary 
securitization gains as it is to other components of earnings. Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith 
(2004) concluded that firms use more equity-based compensation when earnings are less 
informative, and their main proxy for earnings in formativeness is timeliness. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) presented evidence that stock-based compensation and ownership can lead to 
incentives for earnings management, and if earnings management can increase the short-term 
stock price, managers can benefit from doing so by increasing the value of the shares they are 
going to sell. Cheng and Farber (2008) found that the proportion of option-based compensation 
in a CEO’s package declined following a restatement. Earlier evidence found variations in the 
weights placed on different components or properties of earnings. Laux and Laux (2009) 
analysed the board of directors’ equilibrium strategies for setting CEO’s incentive pay, 
overseeing financial reporting and their effects on the level of earnings management, and found 
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that an increase in CEO equity incentives does not necessarily increase earnings management 
because directors adjust their oversight effort in response to a change in CEO incentives.  Ali 
and Zhang (2015) when examining the changes in the CEO’s incentive to manage the firm’s 
reported earnings during their tenure, found that discretionary accruals are significantly higher 
and abnormal discretionary expenses, such as R&D expenses, are significantly lower in the 
early years than in the later years of a CEOs’ service. This indicates that new CEOs try to 
favourably influence the market’s perception of their ability in their early years of service, when 
the market is more uncertain. Capalbo, et al. (2018) conducted an empirical test of the 
relationship between executive directors narcissism and earnings management, argued that 
firms with narcissistic executive directors engage in accruals earnings management to 
manipulate earnings positively, highlighting the important effect of executive directors’ 
personality on accounting choices. Several research studies have invariably provided 
supporting evidence that CEOs have undesirable managerial incentives to manipulate earnings 
to gain more personal benefit (e.g. Dempsey et al., 1993; Hall and Murphy, 2003; Bartov and 
Mohanram, 2004; Cheng, and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; and 
Balachandran et al., 2008; Houmes and Skantz, 2010; Mande and Son, 2012). In short, directors’ 
remuneration is positively associated with their earnings management, they have incentives of 
achieving more compensation to engage in earnings management to manipulate earnings 
upward (income-increasing earnings management).   
However, several more recent studies documented directors attempted to engage in earnings 
management activities to manage earnings downward, whereby directors’ remuneration was 
negatively associated with their earnings management. For example, Cheng, et al. (2016) 
examined whether internal governance affects the extent of earnings management (real 
activities manipulation) by using directors’ compensation, and found that CEOs presumably 
have incentives to manipulate earnings downward to reduce the exercise price of the option 
grants for their personal purpose if the effect of internal governance is weaker for firms with 
large forthcoming fixed-date option grants. Meo, et al. (2017) looked at the firms that just meet 
or marginally beat earnings benchmarks; and found a negative association between managerial 
entrenchment which was measured by firms’ compensation mechanisms and both the 
opportunistic use of accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation. 
Buchholze, et al. (2019) examined directors’ narcissism and its implications for accounting 
choice, they found evidence that highly narcissistic CEOs engaging in earnings management 
(i.e., accrual-based earnings management) not only for income-increasing but also for income-
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decreasing earnings management, as it mainly served to help them cope with their trait and to 
be seen as selfish behaviour. 
Further, some literature suggested that directors have incentives to report a decline of firm’ 
performance through different earnings management tool, to achieve more compensation.  For 
example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) found that the post-SEO operating performance decline is 
driven not only by accrual-based earnings management, but also reflects the real activities 
manipulation undertaken to manage earnings at the time of the SEO. Kothari et al. (2016) also 
established the existence of a decline in firm performance, presenting evidence that earnings 
management is most closely and predictably linked with the post-SEO stock market under-
performance when it is driven by real activities manipulation. Tahir et al. (2019) investigated 
the importance of the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus contracts was impacted 
by earnings management, and evidence that managing earnings decreasing by using accrual 
earnings management and real activities manipulation (discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation) takes place when financial-performance measures and nonfinancial-performance 
measures are adopted together to measure executive director’s performance. As a result, the 
second part of this thesis aims to explore the association between directors’ remuneration and 
their earnings management with the degree of earnings management, the method of earnings 
management, and the extent of directors’ remuneration.  
2.9 Summary  
Earnings management as a significant accounting issue for both researchers and regulators, has 
received much attention in the field of earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010b; Dichev, et al., 
2013; Beyer, et al., 2019). This is because earnings management is believed to be widespread 
as it acts to change or alter the process of financial reporting leading to stakeholders 
misunderstanding the firm’s underlying performance in order to seek to hit specific target. The 
ability to understand the extent of firms engaged in earnings management has significant 
implications for regulators, analysts, investors, and researchers. For analysts, investors, or other 
professionals, to understand the extent to which managers manipulate earnings provides 
supporting idea of examination of earnings quality. It also helps regulators, government, and 
policy setters to have a comprehensive understanding of whether firms engage in earnings 
management, how they undertake it, and also encourages them to implement improvements to 
prevent further impact on the limitations of accounting rules, regulations and standards.  
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This chapter reviews three important methods in the field of earnings management, namely 
accrual-based earnings management, real activities manipulation, and classification shifting 
earnings management. As a dominant method in earnings management, accrual-based earnings 
management occurs when managers present a given transaction in financial reporting to 
manipulate reported earnings by means of changing the accounting methods or estimates used, 
such as provisions for bad debt expenses, delaying asset write-offs and changing the 
depreciation method for fixed assets. It has been extensively studied by researchers (Jones, 1991; 
Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Fields et al., 2001; 
Kothari et al., 2005). Accrual-based earnings management is widely estimated by a variety of 
models, including Jones’ (1991) model, the modified Jones’ model (Dechow et al., 1995), 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) approach, the performance matched model (Kothari et al., 2005), 
and the discretionary estimation errors approach (Francis et al., 2005). Real activities 
manipulation has appeared more frequently in recent years in earnings management literature 
as more studies have presented evidence that managers manipulate reported earnings not only 
through accounting estimates and methods but also via real operating activities, although it is 
relatively under-researched compared with accrual earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohn and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Eldeberg et al., 2011; Zang, 2012, Cohen, et al., 2019). 
Graham et al. (2005) revealed that 80% of surveyed CFOs said they alter real transaction to 
manage earnings, such as by decreasing R&D, advertising expenses and maintenance 
expenditures and postponement of new projects. Roychowdhury (2006) was among the first to 
provide a comprehensive overview of the altering of real operational activities to manage 
earnings, and developed three proxies for detecting real activities manipulation, focusing on 
sales manipulation, reduction of discretionary expenses and overproduction. The third type of 
earnings management is less popular than the first two types and is named classification shifting. 
It is achieved by the deliberate misclassification of items within the income statement with no 
change of bottom line earnings. McVay (2006) found evidence that managers overstate ‘core’ 
earnings without changing bottom line earnings by shifting core expenses to special items.        
This chapter has described the development of research on earnings management. It was 
established particularly in the literature review that firms that meet or just beat important 
earnings benchmarks have greater incentives to engage in earnings management activities 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Baderscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Mindak, et al., 2016). As 
summarised in this chapter, important earnings benchmarks include (1) zero level of earnings 
(avoiding negative earnings), (2) last year’s earnings (avoiding earning decreases), (3) meeting 
or beating analysts’ forecasts. This chapter also reviewed the literature on the association 
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between directors’ compensation and earnings management. A number of previous studies 
found that there is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and earnings 
management (Balsam, 1998; Baber et al., 1998; Cheng and Wrfied, 2005; Dechow, Myers, and 
Sharespear, 2010; Tahir, et al., 2019). However, some studies did not ascertain any evidence of 
directors’ pay being associated with earnings management (Cornett et al., 2008).     
From the review of prior literature, there are some research gaps in the area of earnings 
management literature. Firstly, firms can manage earnings up or down; most firms that meet or 
beat earnings benchmarks did so by managing earnings upward, whereas firms also have 
incentives to manage earnings downward to meet/beat earnings targets (i.e., Big Bath, cookie 
jar reserves). This is not well investigated, thus, the primary objective of this thesis is to explore 
whether firms engage in earnings management activities (i.e., income-increasing earnings 
management, income-decreasing earnings management) to hit their specific targets; and the 
first part aims to investigate whether firms manage reported earnings through accrual-based 
and/or real earnings management that just meet or beat important earnings benchmarks (zero 
earnings or last year’s earnings).     
Secondly, it can be seen in this Chapter directors’ remuneration are designed by remuneration 
commitment that takes account of firm’s performance. A number literature provides evidence 
that directors’ remuneration are positively associated with their earnings management as they 
through managing earnings upward to report an improvement of operating performance. 
However, accounting to the suggests from a few prior studies (i.e., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010b; 
Kothari et al., 2016; Tahir et al., 2019), directors attempt to present a decline in performance 
by using earnings management methods to manipulate earnings downward because they aim to 
achieve more compensation. This point is under-researched, and from prior literature it cannot 
find an efficient estimation model to measure whether directors receive abnormal remuneration 
from prior literature, therefore, the second part of this thesis is aiming to examine whether firm 
directors use accrual-based earnings management or real activities manipulation to achieve 
abnormally high remuneration by establishing a new model to estimation abnormal directors’ 
remuneration. In short, the findings of this thesis will help develop accounting literature on 
earnings management when firms just meet or beat different earnings benchmarks, and shed 







Chapter 3 Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary objective of this study was to examine whether firms in the UK market engage in 
earnings management through accruals earnings management, sales-based manipulation, 
discretionary expenses-based manipulation and production costs-based manipulation to hit 
specific target. The first empirical study aimed to measure any accrual-based and real earnings 
management activities when firms just meet or beat important earnings benchmarks: zero level 
of earnings and last year’s earnings whilst the second empirical study investigated whether firm 
directors utilise earnings management methods to obtain abnormal compensations. Chapter 2 
reviewed related literature in the field of earnings management, and the aim of this chapter is 
to develop hypotheses, and present the sample data selection and methodology for this thesis. 
Sample firms were selected from all shares listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
(FTSE All-share) over a period from 2009 to 2015. The variables definition and estimation 
models of different types of earnings management applied to this thesis are introduced in detail, 
and relevant statistical methods for both empirical studies explained.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 consists of hypotheses of this 
study developed according to background and theoretical and empirical literature which has 
been discussed and reviewed in previous chapters; Section 3.3 consists of a selected sample and 
data collection; Section 3.4 describes the research methodology of the first empirical study, 
regarding how to investigate firms engaged in earnings management which meet or just beat 
important earnings benchmarks; section 3.5 explains the estimation model which explores the 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and earnings management; Section 3.6 presents 
the conclusion of this chapter 
3.2 Hypotheses Development  
As can be seen in the literature review chapter, earnings management is a significant accounting 
issue for both researchers and practitioners, as it increases the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour, particularly providing the opportunity for a firm to manipulate discretion in earning 
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to hit certain objectives. The object of this research is to examine the quality of earnings 
reported in UK market and to explore whether firms engage in any earnings management 
activities to achieve specific targets. Analysis of this research is divided by two factors: whether 
firms engage in accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation which just 
beat or meets earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings); 
alternatively, whether directors who receive abnormal remuneration are associated with 
earnings management activities.  
3.2.1 Hypotheses Development of Earnings Management Just Beat/Meet Earnings 
Benchmarks 
Earnings benchmarks play an important role in earnings management studies as firms 
attempting to reduce fluctuation may seek to employ earnings management methods in order to 
manipulate the current period earnings figure upwards or downwards to meet pre-managed 
earnings targets to maintain earnings at a steady level. Prior literature on earnings management 
provides evidence that firm managements have greater incentives to manage earnings upward 
to avoid falling short of important earnings benchmarks when earnings are around the 
benchmarks considered to be significantly relevant to stakeholders or investors. Burgstahler 
and Dicheve (1997b) and Degeorge et al. (1999) argued that firm stakeholders, such as boards 
of directors, equity investors and creditors may suggest that, earnings benchmarks can be used 
as reference points or heuristics for the evaluation of a firm’s performance. Alternatively, 
executive directors subject to compensation incentives from the board of directors are wealth-
maximisers who realise their wealth can be adversely impacted by their firm’s reported earnings 
failure to meet earnings targets. As a result, earnings benchmarks can be seen as the target level 
to be achieved by executive directors engaged in earnings manipulation behaviour.  
According to Graham et al.’s (2005) survey and interview of over 400 executives established 
that financial executives attach a high importance to meet or beat the following earnings 
benchmarks: some of last year quarter, analyst consensus forecast, zero earnings and previous 
quarter earnings per share. Consistent with this, a number of accounting researchers (Hayn, 
1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997b; Bartov et al., 2002; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; Gunny, 
2010; Zang, 2012; Mindak, et al., 2019) documented that firms engage in managing reported 
earnings through the use of different earnings management methods (accrual-based earnings 
management, real activities manipulation) to just meet or beat certain earnings benchmarks 
(also referred to as earnings targets), including (1) around ‘zero’ level earnings (avoiding 
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negative earnings), (2) comparison with last year’s earnings (avoiding earnings decreases), (3) 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. They found that firms, whose earnings are right at or 
just above benchmarks use upward earnings management to meet or beat the important earnings 
benchmarks.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997b) through using earnings distribution, held the 
view that discontinuities at around ‘zero’ level of earnings and zero changes in earnings were 
evidence of firms engaging in manipulating earnings to report profits and sustain previous 
year’s earnings, and that there was an association between firm earnings management behaviour 
and earnings benchmarks: ‘zero’ level of earnings (avoiding earnings losses) and last year’s 
earnings (avoiding earnings decreases). Kross et al. (2011) presented evidence that analysts’ 
earnings forecast offers a good incentive for firms to engage in earnings management, because 
firms strategically issue down-biased management earnings forecasts with the aim of 
maintaining the string of meeting or beating MBE’s. Mindak et al. (2016) examine whether 
firms manage earning to meet or beat different earnings threshold targets, namely, analysts’ 
forecasts, ‘zero’ level earnings, and last year’s earnings, and they find that the meet/beat 
earnings benchmark premium does not apply to all firms because rewards firms that managed 
earnings down (i.e. created a cookie jar of reserves) for some purposes to barely meet/beat their 
target, even most firms which barely meet/beat target did so by managing earnings up.    
More recent literature on earnings management showed that firms engaging in earnings 
management activities to meet or beat various earnings benchmarks are more likely to adopt 
real activities manipulation and enhance the strength of these tests to detect real activities 
manipulation which lies around important earnings benchmarks. Graham et al. (2005) reported 
that 80% of surveyed CFOs are willing to use real earnings management activities including 
cutting discretionary spending on advertising, research and development (R&D), and 
maintenance expenses to meet their short-term earnings targets. Roychowdhury (2006) set ‘zero’ 
level as the earnings benchmark to investigate whether firms use real activities manipulation to 
meet their specific targets, such as avoidance of reporting annual losses. Gunny (2010) 
examined earnings management using real activities manipulations with regard to firms just 
meeting two earnings targets (zero earnings and last year’s earnings), and established that real 
activities manipulation is positively associated with firms just meeting earnings benchmarks. 
Zang (2012) offered evidence of firms just meeting important earnings benchmarks: zero level 
of earning, last year’s earnings, and that analysts’ earnings forecasts all had abnormally high 
real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. Al-Shattarat et al. (2018) 
examined the relationship between real activities manipulation ad firms’ subsequent operating 
performance, and evidence firms that manipulate their earnings by using real earnings 
70 
 
management (accrual-based earnings management as well) are positively related to future 
performance when meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (i.e. zero earnings, last year’s 
earnings). This study explored the two commonest earnings benchmarks for detecting earnings 
management suspects which a firm with earnings tends to meet or beat due to data access 
limitations, ‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings. This thesis thus has formulated the 
following hypothesis:           
Hypothesis 1: Firms that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings 
and last year’s earnings) are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation. 
Real activities manipulation is an activity whereby management alters the executive of a real 
transaction which takes place during the fiscal year to manipulate reported earnings upwards or 
downwards, which is achieved by changing the timing or structure of an operation, investment, 
or financing a transaction in an effort to optimise the output of business consequences. 
Roychowdhury (2006) offered a comprehensive overview of real earnings management of 
operational activities, and developed empirical methods to detect real activities manipulation 
that widely applied by the most subsequent literature on real earnings management. They 
focused on following three primary methods of real activities manipulation to manage earnings 
upwards: sales-based manipulation, reduction in discretionary expenses and overproduction.   
Sales-based manipulation. Accelerates the timing of sales and/or generating additional 
unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms. Firms 
attempt to generate more sales or accelerate a sales shift from the next fiscal year into the current 
year by offering limited-time price discounts. These increased sales volumes as a result of 
discounts are temporary, and are reversed when the firm re-sets the previous prices. Total 
earnings in the current period are higher as they boost sales by offering price discounts but 
margins are lower, hence the cash inflow from operations is lower. As a result production costs 
relative to sales are abnormally high. In addition, offering more lenient credit terms are, in 
essence, price discounts which temporarily boost sale volumes to increase earnings leading to 
a lower cash inflow during the sales boosting. As a rule, sales-based manipulation will lead to 
abnormally low cash flows from operations and abnormally high production costs 
(Roychowdhury, 2006).   
Reduction in discretionary expenses. Managing earnings upward can be achieved by reducing 
or cutting discretionary expenditure, such as research & development (R&D), advertising, 
selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses. The discretionary expenses will be 
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unusually low if firms reduce or cut discretionary expenditure to boost their current earnings. 
The cash flow from operations in a current period will be abnormally low if discretionary 
expenses are paid in the form of cash. However, abnormal CFO possibly runs the risk of being 
reversed in the future. (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Overproduction. Firms produce more goods than necessary to meet expected demand, with the 
fixed overhead costs spread over a larger number of units, thus lowering the cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and increasing the operating margin, with earnings reported upwards. However, firms 
may incur additional holding costs for overproduced goods if they are not recovered at the same 
time through sales. This leads to cash flows from operations being lower than that of the normal 
sales level, and production costs are abnormally high relative to sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Therefore, these expectations regarding real activities manipulation methods can be expressed 
as the following three subsidiary hypotheses to H1:  
Hypothesis 1a: Firms which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of 
earnings and last year’s earnings) exhibit unusually low cash flows from operations. 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of 
earnings and last year’s earnings) exhibit unusually low discretionary expenses. 
Hypothesis 1c: Firms which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of 
earnings and last year’s earnings) exhibit unusually high production costs. 
A further type of managing earnings by manipulation of accruals, referred to as accrual-based 
earnings management, has been widely discussed in earnings management research. Unlike real 
activities manipulation, whereby actions affect the underlying activities and cash flows, 
accrual-based earnings management is a purposeful action which changes the accounting 
methods or estimates used when presenting a given transaction in the financial statements. 
Changing the depreciation method for fixed assets and the estimate of provision for bad debt 
expenses can bias reported earnings upwards or downwards without changing the real 
transactions and there are no direct cash flow consequences. Discretionary accruals which have 
been utilised to measure earnings management in this research, are defined as the difference 
between reported annual earnings and annual operating cash flows. The firm-years above and 
below the two earnings benchmarks (zero earnings level and last year’s earnings) should present 
differing levels of discretionary accruals. Hence, this hypothesis is based on the premise that 
firms engage in manipulating earnings upwards to meet earnings benchmarks as followed:  
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Hypothesis 2: Firms that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of 
earnings and last year’s earnings) are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings 
management.  
3.2.2 Hypotheses Development of the Relation between Directions’ Remuneration and 
Earnings Management 
The disclosure of directors’ compensation is more developed and transparent at present. The 
UK Firms Act 2006 (The 2006 Act) set out detailed regulations, including requirements for the 
disclosure of directors’ remunerations. All firms, except for those which are small, are required 
to make certain disclosures about the aggregate remuneration of the directors. All quoted firms 
with more than 250 employees are subject to considerably more onerous requirements about 
the preparation of a directors’ remuneration report including full detailed information of each 
director’s remunerations, and the report should be clear, transparent and understandable to 
shareholders. Directors’ remuneration is defined as payment or compensation received for 
services or employment and includes base salary, fees, bonuses and any other economic benefits 
which an employee or executive receives during the course of their employment. Directors’ 
remuneration is a part of corporate strategy which creates and develops an association between 
rewards and firm performance. The directors’ remuneration package is determined to be 
attractive, retained, comparable, and to ensure that directors will do a good job to maximise the 
interests of shareholders. Each element of the remuneration package is designed as an incentive 
to ensure directors concentrate on the firm and are motivated to improve performance and to 
maximise the value of the firm.     
The theoretical foundation for the literature on the subject of directors’ compensation is based 
on three important theories, namely the principal-agent theory, tournament theory and 
managerial power theory. It can be viewed as a complementary association between these three 
theories, which are linked to the relationship between directors’ pay and firm performance, the 
effect of rank on directors’ remuneration plans, the role of the remuneration committee in 
determining directors’ compensation, and the effectiveness of the remuneration package in 
improving firm performance. The principal-agent theory separates ownership and control, and 
suggests a relationship between directors’ pay and firm performance in that directors, especially 
executive directors, are motivated by the compensation because their interests (rewards) are 
aligned with those of shareholders and alleviate the interest-conflicts between the principal 
(shareholders) and agent (directors). According to this theory, directors’ remuneration may 
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depend on shareholders’ interest, thus directors may have incentives to perform better and 
maximise firm benefit. Some studies have investigated the relationship between directors’ pay 
and firm performance and explored whether directors have incentives to increase shareholder 
value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). According to the principal-agent 
theory, remuneration packages are assumed to be optimally determined and are designed to 
ensure directors perform well to maximise shareholder value, because directors’ compensation 
may depend on shareholder interest and they have incentives to improve firm performance and 
to pursue a benefit-maximising strategy for the firm. However, the principal-agent theory does 
not offer sufficient insight into the opinion that compensation does not only motivate the 
directors but also the other firm employees. Bechuk et al. (2002) argued that no optimal contract 
can be found in practice to perfectly align the interests of directors and shareholders. Lazer and 
Eosen (1981) developed the Tournament theory, which looked at performance related pay, and 
suggested that compensation differences are based not on marginal productivity but rather on 
relative differences between the levels or positions of the employees. According to tournament 
theory, employees may work hard to be promoted to a higher position as their rewards are 
determined by their rank in the firm; thus, directors receive a bigger compensation package, as 
this overpayment is treated as a ‘prize’ for those who put in sufficient effort to garner a higher 
position. Managerial power theory which focuses more on top directors or executive 
compensation, provides an alternative perspective to explain directors’ compensation as being 
that directors pay is not linked to performance and directors may utilise their managerial 
authority to extract additional rewards (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). According to the managerial 
power theory, directors usually in a top position are able to take advantage of their power to 
influence both the level and structure of compensation (Murphy, 2002). 
According to these three theories, directors’ remuneration can be determined by firm 
performance, firm size, shareholders’ value, etc. In large firms such as those which are listed, 
directors’ pay is more tied to firm performance targets in order to offer them incentives. 
However, directors have an incentive to utilise their accounting discretion by adopting reporting 
methods and estimates which do not accurately reflect firms’ underlying economics to 
maximise wealth for themselves. Some researchers have investigated the relationship between 
directors’ compensation and earnings management, and have provided substantial proof that 
directors are able to use accounting earnings management methods to achieve a higher salary 
and bonus compensation (e.g., Balsam, 1998;  Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Shuto, 2007; Ali and Zhang, 2015; Capalbo, et al., 2018). For example, Healy (1985) 
declared that managers have the income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts to engage 
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in accrual-based earnings management activities because changes in accounting procedures by 
managers are linked to adoption or modification of executives’ bonus compensation plans. 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) explored the relationship between equity incentives and earnings 
management, establishing that directors used earnings management to gain the benefit of selling 
increasing in value shares to enlarge their stock-based compensation and ownership. Dutta and 
Fan (2014) offered evidence regarding how the possibility of earnings manipulation activities 
affect managerial compensation contracts.  
Numerous prior studies have tended to ascertain a positive relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and earnings management, and found evidence that directors’ remuneration 
motivates directors to manage earnings upwards by using earnings management activities. 
Balsam (1998) declared that operating cash flows and non-discretionary and discretionary 
accruals are positively linked to executive directors’ compensation after controlling returns, and 
the extent of positive discretionary accruals is significantly greater when the accruals are used 
to reduce or eliminate a loss. Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) stated that the weight placed on 
earnings relative to operating cash flows is lower for firms with lower earnings persistence, 
higher earnings variability, and higher total accruals. Cornett et al. (2008) documented that the 
impact of CEO option compensation on performance disappears when reported profitability is 
adjusted for earnings management effect.  Capalbo et al. (2018) provided evidence that firms 
with narcissistic CEOs engage in accruals management to manage earnings positively as they 
lead and expend considerable effort to achieve their own goals. On the contrary, literature into 
the relationship between directors’ earnings management and their remuneration shows fewer 
of them tend to find a negative relationship (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016; 
Meo, et al., 2017; Tahir, et al., 2019). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) found that the post-SEO 
operating performance decline is driven not only by accrual reversal (accrual-based earnings 
management), but also reflects the real consequences of operational decisions (real activities 
manipulation) undertaken to manage earnings at the time of the SEO. Kothari et al. (2016) also 
established the existence of a decline in firm performance, presenting evidence that earnings 
management is most closely and predictably linked with the post-SEO stock market under-
performance when it is driven by real activities manipulation. Tahir et al. (2019) examined 
whether the choice of performance measures in directors bonus contracts were constrained by 
earnings management both through accruals and real earnings management, evidence that less 
income-increasing earnings management by using accrual earnings management and real 
activities manipulation (discretionary expenses-based manipulation) takes place when 
financial-performance measures and nonfinancial-performance measures are adopted together 
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to measure executive director’s performance. These ideas offer an insight into this research 
study as to whether directors tend to engage in earnings management activities to manipulate 
earnings downwards for the purpose of maximising their personal gains. Therefore, this 
expectation can be expressed as the following hypothesis:    
Hypothesis 3: Directors’ remuneration is negatively associated with their earnings 
management.    
3.3 Sample and Data 
The research was conducted in terms of the UK market. The investigation sample covered the 
period from 2009 to 2015 and included FTSE All shares. It started in 2009 because firstly 
managers had strong incentives through engaging in earnings management activities to increase 
or decrease earnings to avoid the negative effects of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008; 
secondly, the period followed the introduction of the disclosure requirement of sections 420 to 
421 of the Firms Act 2006 that in all financial years the directors’ remuneration report must 
include details of the actual remuneration of the directors (referred as Annual report on 
remuneration). This study was implemented by using a large range of accounting data. Due to 
the limitations of database, such as a few key accounting data (e.g. directors’ remuneration) 
was not available to download until 1-2 years after their financial year, some variables (i.e. 
change of assets, change of sales, etc.) were calculated manually which required the data for 
the next year of the sample period; also in order to include available firms as many as possible, 
the sample period ended in 2015 as it was the most recent fiscal year-end available for all 
accounting data. All accounting financial and market data between 2009 and 2015 was collected 
from the database, namely FAME Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (FAME). Initially, 
the sample included all active firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) ,and included 
in Financial Times Stock Exchange indexes (FTSE indexes) containing FTSE 100, FTSE 250, 
FTSE 350, and FTSE All-share. In accordance with UK SIC (2007) 5-digit codes, 17 main 
industry activities were identified, comprising 5,058 firm-years and 562 firms over the period 
of 2009-2015.  
Table 3.1 shows the sample set out based on selection criteria used for testing accrual-based 
earnings management, real activities manipulation in the first empirical study, and abnormal 
directors’ remuneration in the second empirical study. In the first stage, the sample selection 
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was made using a type of Boolean search14 to choose firms, which combined four criteria with 
sufficient financial and market data available in FAME database, including: 1. All active firms 
not in receivership nor dormant and not unknown in the UK market (164,360 firms), 2. FTSE 
indexes: FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 350, FTSE ALL-Share (566 firms), 3. All UK SIC (2007) 
codes (193,768 firms), 4. All major sectors (191,260 firms), a result of Boolean search 1 and 2 
and 3 and 4, there are 562 firms, and 3,934 firm –year observations. At the later stage, the 
sample ruled out all firms in financial, insurance activities industries (UK SIC 5-digit codes 
between 64110 and 66300), and the real estate activities industry (UK SIC 5-digit codes 
between 68100 and 68320).The sample contained 177 firms and 22 firms, respectively, because 
firms from such industries (i.e., bank, real estate, insurance) have regulations and incentives in 
terms of earnings management which differ from those of firms from other industries. Some 
variables of these firms were abnormal which could impact on the test results of earnings 
management. This is also consistent with prior studies on earnings management (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997b; Roychowdhurt, 2006; MacVay, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Burgstahler, 
2010; Zang, 2012, Cohen, et al., 2019), beyond this stage, there were 363 firms. Due to the 
earnings management detection models for normal or expected discretionary accruals, cash 
flow from operations, discretionary expenses, and production costs were estimated every year 
and in every industry, at least 15 firm-year observations were required for each year-industry 
grouping (including 7 years and 17 main industries), and, as with prior research, those whose 
year-industry was less than 15 firm-years were excluded from the sample. Extreme observations 
were truncated at 1% and 99%, therefore, imposing all the data-availability requirements yields, 
2,513 firm-year observations over the year from 2009 to 2015, including 11 main industries and 
359 individual legal firms (shown in Table 3.1, the list of sample firms has displayed in 
Appendix B). 
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the distribution of the sample firms from different classified 
industries based on the UK SIC (2007) 5-digit code. As with prior research for detecting 
earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Burstahler, 2010; Zang, 2012), both accrual-based earnings management and real activities 
manipulation were estimated on across-sectional regressions for each industry and each year 
with at least 15 firm-year observations. The classification of industry in this study was initially 
based on the UK SIC (2007) five-digit code, the current Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
 
14 Boolean search is a type of search allowing users to combine keywords with operators (or modifiers) such as 
AND, NOT, and OR to further produce more relevant results. For example, the Boolean search in this study could 
be ‘All active firms’ AND ‘FTSE indexes: FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 350, FTSE All-share’ AND ‘UK SIC 
(2007)’ AND ‘All major sectors’. This would limit the search results to only those firms containing the four criteria.  
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(2007) used in classifying business establishments and other statistical units by the type of 
economic activity that they are engaged in. The condensed list of SIC 5-digit codes was 
provided by Firms House with a description of the firm’s business. As the UK SIC (2007) 5-
digit classifies firms’ business in great detail and the distribution of the firms across the 
classifications of industry is highly unbalanced between larger units of economics activities, 
the industries were summarised as main industries according to the UK SIC (2007) code. As 
can be seen from panel B in Table 3.1, at the end, the sample firms are involved in 11 main 
industries, covering 6 major business sectors: mining, manufacture, construction, wholesale 
trade, retailer, communication, and services (the list of the main industry has listed in Appendix 
C).    
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Sample Firms 
Panel A: Sample selection criteria for using to test hypotheses 
Part 1 
    








All active firms (not in receivership nor 
dormant) and firms with unknown 
situation 
164,360 164,360 1,150,520 
2 FTSE indexes: FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 
350, FTSE ALL-Share 
566 566 3,962 
3 All UK SIC (2007) codes 193,768 565 3,955 
4 All Major Sectors 191,260 562 3,934 
 




    
Less Bank, insurance firms  177 385 2,695 
 
Other financial and real estate industry  22 363 2,541 
 
less than 15 firm-year observations 
industry 
4 359 2,513 






Panel B: Distribution of the sample firms classified by industry 
Main Industry UK SIC (2007) 5-digit code Major Sector Firms No. Firm-year No. 
Mining, Quarrying (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas) 
05101-09900 Mining 28 196 
Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 




Manufacture machinery, vehicle, transport 26110-27900, 28110-30990 20 140 
All other Manufacturing 13100-15200, 16100-18203, 22110-25990, 
31010-32990 
26 182 
Construction  41100-43999 Construction 40 280 
Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, sale 
of fuel 
45111-47990 Wholesale and retail 55 385 
Transportation and Storage 49100-53202 Transport, Post and 
telecommunications 
20 140 
Information and Communication 58110-63990 34 238 
Business services 64110-82990  
           Services 
67 469 
Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
35110-39000, 84110-88990 18 126 
Other Service activities 55100-56302, 90010-99999 23 161 
Total   359 2,513 
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Table 3.2 reports the distribution characteristic of sample firm-year observations by year (Panel 
A) and by main industry (Panel B). It can be seen in Panel A, that the distribution of sample 
firms is over 7 years for the period between 2009 and 2015, and the number of firms is very 
evenly distributed in each year, 359 firms are included in each year, and no significant variation 
from year to year, thus, all years (2009, 2010, 2011 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) have the same 
percentages of firms per year (14.3%). Panel B displays the basic statistics of firm-year 
observations distribution by industry. The sample of this study consisted of 359 firms from year 
2009 to 2015, and 2,513 firm-years observation from 11 main industries involved  a variety of 
business sectors: mining, manufacture, construction, wholesale, retail, transport, post, 
communications, and service, which is classified by UK SIC (2007) 5-digit code. The service 
sector is the most highly distributed of industries, with in total, 763 firm-year observations (the 
number of firm-years in business service; government administrative functions, education, 
health; and other service activities are 469, 126, and 168, respectively) included in the sample 
(30.4% of 2,513 observations). The second largest represented industries are that of 
manufacturing with 518 firm-year observations (20.6%). The following presented in order are 
the wholesale and retail sector (385 observations, 15.3%), the communications sector (378 
observations, 15.04%), the construction sector (280 observations, 11.14%), and the mining 
sector (196 observations, 7.8%).    
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of industry and year distributions for sample firms from 2009 
to 2015 
Panel A: Distribution of observations by year 
Year Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
2009 359 14.3 14.3 
2010 359 14.3 28.6 
2011 359 14.3 42.9 
2012 359 14.3 57.2 
2013 359 14.3 71.5 
2014 359 14.3 85.7 
2015 359 14.3 100 




Panel B: Distribution of firm-year observations by industry 
Main industry Firm No. Frequency % Cum. % 
Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
28 196 7.8 7.8 
Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
28 196 7.8 15.6 
Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
20 140 5.6 21.2 
All other Manufacturing 
26 182 7.2 28.4 
Construction 
40 280 11.1 39.6 
Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, sale 
of fuel 
55 385 15.3 54.9 
Transportation and storage 
20 140 5.6 60.4 
Information and Communication 
34 238 9.5 69.9 
Business service 
67 469 18.7 88.6 
Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
18 126 5.0 93.6 
Other service activities 
23 161 6.7 100 
Total 359 2,513 100 
 
 
3.4 Estimation Models 
3.4.1 Accrual-Based Earning Management 
Accruals are defined as the difference between reported annual earnings and annual operating 
cash flows. Firms can utilise the accruals-based earnings management method to manage 
earnings upwards or downwards. This is achieved by changing the accounting methods or 
estimated used when presenting a given transaction in the financial statements (Zang, 2012).  
Firms can, by changing the depreciation method for fixed assets and the estimate for provision 
for doubtful accounts, bias reported current period earnings in a particular direction with no 
change of the underlying transactions. As can be seen, firms engage in accrual-based earnings 
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management attempts to obscure or mask true economic performance, as it is not implemented 
by changing the underlying operating activities of the firm but through altering the choice of 
accounting methods adopted to present those activities. Therefore, accrual-based earnings 
management has no cash flow consequences as it manage earnings by exercising discretion 
inherent in the accrual method of accounting.   
A large amount of research into earnings management has indicated that firms have incentives 
to use accrual-based earnings management to hit their specific targets (i.e., Jones, 1991; 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Fields et al. 2001; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Zang, 2012, Mindak, et al., 2016). As noted in Chapter 2 ,the literature has shown that firms 
have incentives to manage earnings increasing or decreasing through the accrual-based earnings 
management method, such as firms who just meet or beat the earnings benchmarks around zero 
and last year’s earnings, the  ‘big bath’15 purpose, or firm directors gaining a higher level of 
compensation. As in previous literature, for those who provide evidence of the validity of using 
discretionary accruals to detect accrual-based earnings management activities, this study has 
adopted discretionary accruals as the proxy for accrual-based earnings management. Thus, the 
abnormal discretionary accruals in this study indicated by the residuals from the estimation 
model represent the measure of accrual-based earnings management activities.  
3.4.1.1 The Normal Level of Discretionary Accruals 
Discretionary accruals were adopted to measure whether firms engage in accrual-based 
earnings management activities, and calculated as the difference between firms’ actual level 
and normal level of accruals. The normal level of discretionary accruals is expressed as a linear 
function of change in sales and gross property, plant, and equipment in the current period 
following the modified Jones’ (1991) model. Some recent research, such as Roychowdury 
(2006), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Zang (2012), employed the modified Jones’ (1991) model 
to estimate discretionary accruals to detect accrual-based earnings management (an estimation 
model identified by Kothari, et al. (2005) was one of the most widely used accruals models, 
shown in Appendix D). In order to estimate this model, this study used a cross-sectional 
regression to calculate discretionary accruals for each industry and each year for all firms 
 
15 A ‘big bath’ is an accounting term defined by a management team’s strategy of manipulating a company’s 
income statement to make poor results look even worse to make future results better. It is often implemented in a 
bad year so that a company can enhance the next year’s earnings in an artificial manner. 
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contained in FTSE All Shares, where every industry is classified by the UK 5-digit SIC code. 
As a result, the normal level of discretionary accruals is estimated as follows:     
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                              (1) 
where 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  = is calculated as the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations minus the operating cash flows reported in the statement of cash flows in year 𝑡 for 
firm 𝑖; 
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = is equal to 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, the change in sales, is the difference between sales revenue at 
the end of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 and the sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 = is the gross property, plant, and equipment in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = is the error term.  
All variables were scaled by lagged total assets consistent with prior research in accrual-based 
earnings management (the definitions of all used variables have showed in appendix A). The 
estimated coefficients 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, and 𝛼3 from equation (1) were used to estimate the normal 
level of discretionary accruals ( 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ). Therefore, the estimated abnormal 
discretionary accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡) were computed as the accrual value of discretionary 
accruals ( 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) minus the normal level of discretionary accruals 
( 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ), which is expressed as 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ −
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 . The abnormal discretionary accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) indicate the 
magnitude of accrual-based earnings management. To be specific, positive abnormal 
discretionary accruals imply income-increasing earnings management, whilst negative 
abnormal discretionary accruals imply income-decreasing earnings management, and zero 
abnormal discretionary accruals imply the firm’s current accruals are the same as predicted so 
that no accruals earnings management are engaged in.  
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3.4.2 Real Activities Manipulation  
Real activities manipulation is defined as ‘management actions which deviate from normal 
business practices, motivated by a managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into 
believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Following Roychowdhury’s (2006) study, firms can focus on three real 
activities manipulation methods to manage earnings upward or downward, including sales 
manipulation, which involves accelerating the timing of sales or generating additional 
unsustainable sales through increased price discounts and more lenient credit terms; cutting or 
reducing discretionary expenses containing advertising, research and development, and selling, 
general and administrative expenses; overproduction, or increasing production to report a lower 
cost of goods sold. These actions alter the executive‘s real transaction activities taking place 
during the fiscal year and affect the firm’s cash flow from operations, discretionary 
expenditures, and production costs, resulting in their departure from their normal activity levels. 
Both sales-based manipulation and overproduction lead to abnormally high production costs as 
they are linked to goods sales, and cutting or reduction of discretionary expenses will generate 
abnormally low discretionary expenses relative to sales. On the other hand, there is a lack of 
validation for Roychowdhury’s (2006) findings, because the three proxies to examine real 
activities manipulation may have indicate an ambiguous effect on cash flow from operations. 
For instance, explanation given on the measure of cash flow from operations should be paid 
attention to, as both sales-based manipulation and overproduction relative to sales, influence 
abnormal current-period cash flow from operations negatively for a given level of sales, whilst 
the reduction of discretionary expenses affects abnormal current-period cash flows from 
operations positively.   
This thesis has aimed to investigate whether firms have strong incentives to use real activities 
manipulation to hit specific targets, as observed in contexts where the literature has shown that 
such firms which just meet or beat important earnings benchmarks around zero level of earnings 
and last year’s earnings, and directors receive a higher level of compensation. This research has 
utilised four measures to detect real activities manipulation based on Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
study and some other research  studies which have  provided valid evidence on real earnings 
management measurement (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; 
Zang, 2012). The following four measures have been adopted to examine real activities 
manipulation in this research: the abnormal level of cash flow from operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂), the 
abnormal level of discretionary expenditures ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ), and the abnormal level of 
production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷), the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal 
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discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs (𝑅𝐴𝑀 ). Therefore, these abnormal 
levels have been measured as residuals which deviated from estimation models of normal levels   
3.4.2.1 The Normal Level of Cash Flow from Operations  
The first proxy to examine real activities manipulation is the abnormal cash flow from 
operations, also referred to as sales manipulation. Rochowdhury (2006), defined it as sales 
manipulation which accelerates the timing of sales and/or generates additional unsustainable 
sales through increased price discounts and more lenient credit terms. Hence, there is a 
temporary increase in sales volume, which helps boost current period earnings. Sales-based 
manipulation leads to a lower current-period operation of cash flows for a given level of sales 
because the price discounts and more lenient credit terms temporarily accelerate the sales 
volume in the next period and the margins are assumed to be positive. However, once the firm 
sets the price back to the original level, the increased sales and temporary boosted earnings are 
likely to disappear. Therefore, a firm can adopt real activities manipulation to manage earnings 
upwards through sales-based manipulation by accelerating the time of sales or generating more 
unsustainable sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
The abnormal level of cash flow from operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂), models the normal level of cash 
flow from operations as a linear function of sales and change in sales in the current year by 
using the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented in Roychowdhury (2006). 
In order to estimate the model of the normal level of cash flow from operations, this study 
generated the following cross-sectional regression for each every industry and year for all firms 
included in FTSE all shares, where the industry is defined by the UK five-digit SIC code:     
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                     (2) 
where   
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡  = is cash flow from operations for firm 𝑖  in the year 𝑡 , defined as cash flow from 
operations divided by lagged total assets; 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = is the total sales revenue during the year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖;  
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∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, is the difference between sales revenue at the end of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 and 
the sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = is the error term.  
All variables in this study are deflated by lagged total assets (the definitions of all variables 
have displayed in Appendix A), because Easton and Sommers (2003) suggested that variables 
deflating by lagged assets will bring several potential advantages to the estimation as follows: 
a large reduction of scale difference; for a specific firm, the risk differences become smaller 
through time than for the other firms; limiting the estimation error, if without deflating the 
biases in coefficients on leverage and size is inconsequential. Barth and Clinch (2009) 
mentioned that using the simulating data can have scale effects and market capitalisation more 
effectively mitigates the scale effects compared with the other potential deflators such equity 
book value, lagged price, returns, lagged market capitalisation, lagged total assets and lagged 
total sales. Concordant with prior literature on earnings management (Dechow et al., 1998; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen, et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012), the estimation model in 
order to control the size as recommended, adds a scaled intercept, (1 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ), which helps to 
avoid artificial correlation between cash flow from operations and sales revenue resulting from 
the difference in the total assets. An unscaled intercept, 𝛼0, has also been added to all the 
estimation models of the normal level of cash flow from operations, discretionary expenses, 
production costs, and discretionary accruals, to ensure that the means of abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 , 
abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary 
accruals are equal to zero for every industry and every year.       
Thereafter, in equation (2), the estimated coefficients 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝛽1, and 𝛽2 have been used to 
estimate the normal level of cash flow from operations (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡) for all firms contained 
in FTSE All Shares for every industry-year. Thus, in each firm-year, abnormal cash flow from 
operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡) is the actual cash flow from operations (CFO𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) minus the 
normal level of cash flow from operations (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡) calculated by using estimated 
industry-level coefficients and the firm-year’s sales and lagged assets from the model (2), where 
is 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡. 
3.4.2.2 The Normal Level of Discretionary Expenses 
The second proxy to detect real activities manipulation is the abnormal decrease in the amount 
of discretionary expenditure. According to previous research, managers tend to cut or reduce 
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discretionary expenses (i.e., the sum of research and development, advertising, selling, general 
and administrative expenditures) in order to manage earnings upwards. Graham et al. (2005) in 
a survey of CFOs found that 80 percent of surveyed CFOs would like to engage in real activities 
manipulation through delaying discretionary spending to achieve an earnings target. Hence, 
firms can reduce reported expenses, and increase current-period earnings, by cutting or reducing 
discretionary expenses including advertising, R&D, selling, general and administrative 
expenses. However, discretionary expenses manipulation possibly may cause a negative effect 
to cash flows in the future, as if outlays on discretionary expenses are generally in the form of 
cash, reducing such expenses lowers cash outflow and has a positive effect on abnormal cash 
flow from operations in the current period, thus the risk of lower cash flows may occur in the 
future (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Similar to Roychowdhury’s (2006) study, this study used the metric to estimate the 
discretionary expenses-based manipulation and abnormal discretionary expenses. A several 
studies following Roychowdhury (2006) apply the estimation model of discretionary expenses 
to detect real activities manipulation (e.g., Cohen, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 
2011; Zang, 2012). However, both Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
reported that the normal level of discretionary expenses when estimated as a function of sales 
for the current year 𝑡, will lead to problems if firms boost sales to manage reported earnings 
upward during any year, and unusually lower level residuals from running a linear regression 
of use of current sales in that year 𝑡, even when they do not reduce discretionary expenses. To 
address this issue, consistent with prior research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Badertscher, 2011; 
Zang, 2012), this study drew the estimation model of discretionary expenses as a linear 
regression of lagged sales. Therefore, the normal levels of discretionary expenses 
(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) should be estimated as a linear function of sales at the beginning of year 
𝑡 for all firms listed on the FTSE, and the regression within each industry by year is as follows:        
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                       (3) 
where   
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = is the discretionary expenses in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, it is the sum of research and 
development (R&D), advertising, and selling, general, and administrative expenses for firm  𝑖 
in year 𝑡; 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
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𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, given that firms with 
higher sales revenue generally have higher expenses, the coefficients on lagged sales should be 
positive.   
For every firm-year, the abnormal level of discretionary expenses (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) is the actual 
discretionary expenses (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) minus the normal level of discretionary expenses 
( 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ) using the estimated coefficient from equation (3), in which 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 (all used variables have defined in 
Appendix A). 
3.4.2.3 The Normal Level of Production Costs 
The third proxy for real activities manipulation is abnormally high inventory production, 
referred to as production costs-based manipulation, which produces a maximum level of units 
for a given level of fixed manufacturing overhead costs for each product unit. Thus, managers 
can produce more goods than necessary to meet expected demand in order to spread over a 
larger number of units, lower costs of goods sold by allocating more fixed manufacturing 
overhead to the inventory with higher production levels to manipulate earnings upwards. This 
implies that there is a lower level of reported costs of goods sold, so that firm reports have better 
operating margins. However, for managers engaged in overproduction, it only works if the 
reduction in reported product costs offsets the inventory holding costs that the firm has to 
recognise in the current period. In fact, the reduction of production and holding costs on the 
over produced goods are difficult to recover in the same period through sales. Thus, the cash 
flow from operations have been expected to be lower than normal levels (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Later studies on earnings management, such as those of Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Gunny 
(2010), Badertscher (2011), and Zang (2012), follow Roychowdhury’s (2006) production costs 
model to measure the amount of abnormal production costs to detect real activities manipulation. 
As in Roychowdhury’s (2006) study, the production costs are defined as the sum of costs of 
goods sold and changed in the inventory during the year, therefore, the normal level of 
production costs can be estimated as a linear function of contemporaneous sales, involving the 
variables of sales revenue (𝑆𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ), change in sales revenue (∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ), and lagged 
change in sales revenue (∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ), within each industry by year as follows:   
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                              (4) 
88 
 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), the model for normal level of cost of goods sold in year 𝑡 
for firm 𝑖 is following: 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                           (5) 
The model for ‘normal’ inventory growth in year 𝑡 firm 𝑖 as follows:  
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                    (6) 
where  
 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = is production costs, in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, it is the sum of the cost of goods sold in 
year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 (𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡) and the change in inventory from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 
(∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡); 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = is the cost of goods sold in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = is the change in inventory from period year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = is the sales revenue in the year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖;  
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, is the change in sales revenue from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡; 
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the change in sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖.  
The abnormal production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡) is calculated as the actual value of production 
costs (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ )) minus the normal levels of production costs (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡) 
which is predicted from the equation (5), express as 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ −
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 (all used variables have defined in Appendix A). 
3.4.2.4 Aggregate Real Activities Manipulation   
As developed by Bartov and Cohen (2007), Cohen et al. (2008), and Badertscher (2011), in 
order to capture the total effects of real earnings management, this study aggregated the three 
measures of real activities manipulations (abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs) into an overall variable of 𝑅𝐴𝑀 proxies 
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as a single measure of real activities manipulation by taking the sum of them (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡, 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡). Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang’s (2012) 
development, prior to summing up, both abnormal cash flow from operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡) and 
abnormal discretionary expense (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) were multiplied by -1 as both of them have 
an adverse effect on earnings upwards, so that higher levels of  𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
are proxies for higher amounts of using 𝑅𝐴𝑀. It it was unnecessary to multiply abnormal 
production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡) by -1 as higher 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 implied higher levels of 𝑅𝐴𝑀. 
Therefore, the aggregate of real activities manipulation is expressed as 𝑅𝐴𝑀 = 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ∗
(−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ∗ (−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 (all used variables have defined in Appendix A). 
3.5 Earnings Management Suspect Firm-years  
3.5.1 Selection of Suspect Firm-years  
In order to enhance the power of those tests to detect earnings management, prior literature 
suggested that suspect firm-years such as those with earnings right at or just above any 
benchmarks are likely to manage earnings to meet these important benchmarks (Hayn, 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997b; Degeoge et a. 1999; Bartov et al., 2002; Jacob and Jorgensen, 
2007; Gunny, 2010). Graham et al. (2005) who surveyed and interviewed more than 400 
executives found that managers want to meet or beat the following most important earnings 
benchmarks: a quarter last year, analyst consensus forecast, zero earnings, and previous quarter 
earnings per share (EPS).  
Moreover, as discussed in section 2.6, both theoretical and empirical studies have found 
evidence that managers use different type of earnings management to meet or beat three major 
earnings benchmarks. These include avoid negative earnings (‘zero’ level earnings), earnings 
decreases (compared with last year’s earnings), and meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
Roychowdhury (2006) provided evidence consistent with managers engaging in real activities 
manipulation around earnings thresholds commonly discussed in the literature, in particular, 
that of the zero threshold (avoid reporting annual losses). He concentrated on suspect firm-years 
in the intervals, based on net income scaled by total assets to the immediate right of zero, as 
this would increase the power to test whether there is real activities manipulation. Concentrating 
on these suspect firm-years for avoiding loss, however may cause two potential problems. The 
first is where managers have to pre-commit to some earnings management activities before the 
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end of the fiscal year, especially real activities manipulation, because real activities 
manipulation alters the executive of a real transaction only taking place during the fiscal year. 
When firms aim to meet zero earnings targets through different earnings management method, 
especially real activities manipulation, they probably are not the only ones as firms just want to 
hit ‘zero’ level of earnings, thus, it would restrict the testing power if the focus is only on firm-
years in the short interval to that of zero level. The second is the interval in earnings just right 
of zero may include firm-years with downward earnings management, as those firms, which do 
not engage in earnings management, possibly have an incentive to manipulate earnings 
downward to report profits that are simply slightly above to zero as their earnings are 
substantially right to zero level.  
As a result, two common earnings benchmarks have been adopted to define earnings 
management suspects as firm-years with earnings which tend to meet or beat, and are zero level 
of earning, and the last year’s earnings. Consistent with the previous literature, the same 
assumption was employed to identify the sample of suspect firm-years which engage in 
earnings management to meet or beat benchmark targets. To meet/beat zero level earnings 
targets, according to Roychowdhury16 (2006), the suspect firm-years is defined as firm-years in 
the interval to the immediate right of zero level, as they increase the detecting power, so suspect 
firm-years have net income scaled by total assets which is greater than or equal to zero but less 
than 0.005. For meeting/beating last year’s earning benchmark. In addition, based on Gunny17 
(2010), this research identified suspect firm-years with a change in net income before 
extraordinary items from last year between 0 and 0.01.       
3.5.2 Suspect Firm-years just Beating/Meeting Important Earnings Benchmarks  
A sample of earnings management suspect firm-years has been used to test the hypotheses about 
managers’ earnings management through different method (accrual-based earnings 
management, real activities manipulation), and the relationship between real activities 
manipulation and accrual-based earnings management, in order to increase the power of my 
tests. As suggested by prior research carried out by Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010), and 
Zang (2012), Al-Shattarat, et al. (2018), this study employed firm-years just beating or meeting 
 
16 To increase the power of tests to detect real activities manipulation to avoid losses, Roychowdhury (2006) 
concentrated on firm-years in the interval to the immediate right of zero, the suspect firm-years. Suspect firm-
years have net income scaled by total assets that was greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.005.   
17 To identify firms that just meet last year’ earnings, Gunny (2010) grouped firm-years into intervals based on the 
change in net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Then he constructed categories of scaled 
changes in earnings for widths of 0.01. The firms to the immediate right of zero have earnings scaled by total 
assets that are greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01.  
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important earnings benchmarks as a situation in which earnings management was more likely 
to occur, thus zero level of earnings and last year’s earnings have been considered in this study. 
As undertaken by Roychowdhury (2006), just beating or meeting the zero benchmark have been 
defined as firm-years with earnings before extraordinary items over lagged total assets between 
0 and 0.005. To measure suspects just beating or meeting last year’s earnings, Gunny (2010) 
carried out research in firm-years presenting change in net income excluding extraordinary 
items from last year between 0 and 1 cents. Therefore, the Fama-MacBeth18 (1973) approach 
was used to examine whether suspect firm-years are more likely to manage reported earnings 
compared with non-suspect firm-years and are less likely to engage in earnings management. 
To test the hypotheses, it can be estimated the following regression, developed by 
Rocychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012), as a comparison of suspect firm-years with the rest 
of the sample from 2009 to 2015:      
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                          (7) 
where the dependent variables, 𝑌𝑡 , were measures of accrual-based earnings management 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 ), real activities manipulation (𝑅𝐴𝑀 ), and classification shifting earnings 
management (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐸, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝐶𝐸). Each dependent variable (earnings management) 
was run separately with a similar set of independent and control variables. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 is an indicator variable set to equal to 1 if the firm-years belonging to  just beats or meets 
one of the earnings benchmarks, and 0 if it clearly missed or beat all the benchmarks. This is 
because firm-years may still have incentives to manage earnings upwards when they close. 
Durtschi and Easton (2005, 2009) presented evidence that discontinuity around zero earnings 
as an artefact of the data can be caused by the deflator because it is significantly lower in firms 
just below zero than at zero because small profitable firms are on average more highly valued 
than small loss firms. This research thus defined firm-years that clearly meet or beat all earnings 
benchmarks as those which meet or beat zero earnings by 2.5 percent of lagged total assets, and 
last year’s earnings by more than 5 cent. In line with prior studies, if suspect firm-years engage 
 
18 Fama-Macbeth regression is a traditional approach to deal with panel data, the greatest advantage of Fama-
Macbeth regression is that it excludes the influence of residual cross-sectional correlation on standard errors. The 
residuals here have a high correlation on the cross-section, so the correction is crucial to accurately calculate the 
standard error. Now there has a big killer like GMM, which can conveniently handle various correlations of 
residuals, so it may not necessary to use Fama-Macbeth. But Fama-Macbeth was raised nearly 10 years earlier 
than GMM. In the absence of GMM or other more advance methods, Fama-Macbeth regression cleverly eliminated 
the influence of residual cross-section correlation through the idea of ‘regression first, then mean’ in the cross-
section regression, which has been widely recognised and used by the research of earnins management and has a 
far-reaching impact.  
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in earnings management (e.g., real activities manipulation, accrual-based earnings 
management), these firm-years have abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal 
discretionary expenses which should be lower, abnormal production costs and abnormal 
accruals which should be higher, on average, compared to the rest of the sample. In addition, 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 , are added to equation (7), as suggested by Gunny (2010) and Zang (2012), 
to control general economy conditions in each year. The full sample consisted of 2513 firm-
years over the period 2009-2015; during the sample period there were 43 firm-years just 
beating/meeting the zero level benchmark and 65 firm-years just beating/meeting last year’s 
earnings benchmark. 
In accordance with prior literature (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012), this study added 
three control variables to the model which are linked to different types of earnings management, 
which include firm growth opportunities, firm size, and firm performance. This was in order to 
control systematic variation in earnings management (e.g., abnormal production costs, 
abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal accruals) which might include potential sample 
bias (estimation errors) which are correlated with such firm characteristics. This study included 
the natural logarithm value of market value of equity (𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1) to the model to control the 
potential impact of the relative firm size effect in the industry. Firms’ growth opportunities may 
cause measurement errors, which could be controlled by market-to-book ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1) in the 
model, and it was calculated by the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
In addition, return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡) is included as a control variable for current-period firm 
performance, computed using net income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total 
assets. The measurement method of these three control variables was considered individually 
as they are independently, and all needed to be measured as deviations from industry-year 
means because the dependent variables were measured in this way. However, due to the 
evidence regarding the relationship between these three controlled variables was mixed, the 
coefficient sign from the regression will thus not be predicted (all used variables have defined 
in Appendix A).   
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3.6 The Relation between Directors’ remunerations and Earnings 
management 
3.6.1 Empirical Model of Directors’ Remuneration 
As noticed in section 2.8, all firms in UK, except those which are small, are required to make 
certain disclosures about the aggregate remuneration of the directors, especially publicly traded 
firms. Their accounting procedures for financial reporting are heavily regulated by the UK 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Therefore, publicly traded firms are subject to 
considerably more onerous requirements involving preparation of a directors’ remuneration 
report including detailed information about each director’s remuneration, because shareholders 
have concerns about the large compensation directors award themselves in spite of poor profits. 
However, UK firm directors are likely to manage earnings figures to present a better 
performance, in order to achieve greater personal gain. A number of prior studies have 
documented substantial evidence that directors have incentives to receive higher compensation 
by engaging in different earnings management activities (e.g., Balsam, 1998, Guidry, Leone, 
and Rock, 1999; Healy, 1985; Shuto, 2007, Cornett et al., 2008, Dechow, Myers, and 
Shakespeare, 2010, etc.) 
Directors’ remuneration ( 𝐷𝑆𝐵 ) is the payment or compensation received for service or 
employment, and thus the measure of directors’ remuneration includes different type of rewards 
that a director earns during employment. There are four main elements of a directors’ 
remuneration package, including basic salary (basic directors’ fees), pension contribution 
(mostly pensioned on basic salary), performance-related compensation (e.g., bonus, share 
options, etc.), benefit in kind (also referred to as perks, various non-wage compensations, e.g., 
health insurance, firm car scheme, etc.). Each component of directors’ remuneration is designed 
to ensure that the directors remain focused on the firm’s operation and help to motivate 
improvement in firm performance. Directors’ remuneration is closely linked to firms’ operating 
performance, business conditions, such as firm size, profitability, financial risk, and are directly 
determined by how much remuneration directors’ will have received.   
Whether directors receive any excessive level of compensation is measured by abnormally high 
directors’ remuneration (referred to as abnormal directors’ remuneration, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵 ) by 
utilising accounting choices to present a better performance, such as growth in sales, expended 
in number of employees, lower financial risks, and strong profitability. Directors’ remuneration 
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is defined as the total value of each individual element of directors’ remuneration package (e.g., 
directors’ fees, pension contribution, and other emoluments) in order to capture the total effects 
of compensations. Based on the analysis of prior studies, the level of directors’ compensation 
is linked to firm performance (i.e., better performance firms, such as profit growing, production 
capacity expending, paying extra reward to directors), and firm size (i.e., larger firms pay higher 
directors’ compensation). This study built a new model to estimate the amount of abnormal 
directors’ remuneration (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵 ), whereby the variables included sales revenue, profit 
margin, z_score, and number of employees employed to estimate the normal levels of directors’ 
remunerations (detailed analysis in Chapter 5). Therefore, the normal level of directors’ 
remuneration can be expressed as a linear function for all firms listed on FTSE All-share cross-
sectionally for each industry and year as follows,  
𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    (8) 
where the dependent variable, 𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡, is total value of directors’ remuneration by aggregated 
directors’ fees, pension contributions, and other emoluments for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is 
total sales revenue in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡19 is from Altman (1968) to indicate the risk 
of bankruptcy in year 𝑡  for firm 𝑖  (definition see appendix A); 𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡  is number of 
employees in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the profit margin, calculated by net income 
divide sales revenue in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 (all used variables have defined in Appendix A).   
The abnormal level of directors’ remuneration for every firm (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡) was calculated as 
the difference between the actual level of directors’ remuneration (𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡) and the normal level 
of directors’ remuneration (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡) using the estimated coefficient from equation (8) 
as follows,  
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑆𝐵i,t.                                                                                (9)  
 
19 The prediction of distress and turnaround. This method is successful in predicting the status of financial distress 
in any firm. Altman z-score can help in measuring the financial health of a business organization by the use of 
multiple balance sheet values and corporate income. The value of the Altman z-score is generally around – 0.25 
for firms that have the highest probability of going bankrupt. On the other hand, for firms having the least 
probability of facing a bankruptcy, the value of Altman z-score value is as high as + 4.48. The Altman z-score 
formula is helpful for investors to determine if they should consider buying a stock or sell some of the stocks they 
have. Generally, the Altman z-score below 1.8 denotes that the firm is under the chance of getting into bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, the firms with Altman z-score above 3 are deemed to be less likely to go bankrupt. So an 
investor can decide to buy a stock if the Altman z- score is closer to value 3 and similarly they can decide to sell 
a stock if the value is closer to 1.8.  
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3.6.2 Estimation Model of Directors’ Remuneration Associate to Earnings 
Management 
Earnings management is the use of accounting techniques adopted by some firms or 
organisations to produce financial reports which do not accurately reflect firms underlying 
economic performance to achieve their specific targets. Accruals-based earnings management 
activities are achieved by changing the accountings methods or estimates used when presenting 
given transactions in the financial statements. Real earnings management activities are achieved 
by affecting the underlying operating activities and cash flow by the executive altering a real 
transaction undertaken during the fiscal year (sales-based manipulation, discretionary 
expenses-based manipulation, and production costs-based manipulation). On the other hand, 
from the opportunistic perspective, firm directors, especially executive directors, who have the 
right to exercise their accounting discretion, do not maximise the value of the firm, however, 
tend to transfer wealth, strive for more additional personal gains, and make themselves better 
off at the cost of other parties by using accounting choices and methods (i.e., accrual-based 
earnings management, real activities manipulation) which misrepresent or disguise their firms’ 
real economic values. Prior literature under the bonus-maximisation hypothesis provided 
substantial evidence that directors have greater incentives to engage in earnings management 
activities to search and maximise the amount of their compensations (e.g., Healy, 1985; Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser, and Philippon, 2006).   
Moreover, directors and shareholders do have information asymmetry, thus providing 
opportunities to directors to engage in accounting activities to maximise their own wealth at the 
expense of shareholder benefit. Directors engage in real activities manipulation as real 
transaction manipulation activities which deviate from normal business practices, motivated by 
directors’ desire to mislead some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals 
have been met in the normal course of operations (Roychowdhury, 2006). Executive directors, 
may under pressure from other more powerful directors and shareholders, be more likely to 
utilise material earnings management methods to present a better firms’ performance, as they 
are in a position to strongly influence accounting choices and activities.    
In this study, in order to analyse whether directors can increase their personal gain by 
manipulating accounting information dependant on the benefits of earnings management, this 
study conducted a regression model to estimate the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and different types of earnings management (e.g., accrual-based earnings 
management, real activities manipulation) (there are two early versions of the estimation 
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models of the relationship between directors remuneration and earnings management that 
discussed in Appendix E). This model was estimated with a pooled ordinary least squares20 
(OLS time series cross sectional) regression linked to abnormal directors remuneration 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵, calculated as residuals from Equation 8) as the dependent variables. Abnormal 
discretionary accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 ), abnormal cash flows from operating (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ), 
abnormal discretionary expenses (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃), and abnormal production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) 
as independent variables, computed t-statistics follow the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach, 
and run cross-sectionally for each of the seven years from 2009 to 2015, 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,                                                                                                           (10) 
where the dependent variable, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡, is the abnormal level of directors’ remuneration, 
the actual level of directors’ remuneration (𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡) is estimated minus the normal level of 
directors’ remuneration ( 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ). The following set of independent 
variables,  𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , is the abnormal level of discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
accrual-based earnings management, and is the difference between actual level of accruals and 
normal level of accruals, in accordance with the modified Jones’ (1991) model (see equation 
(1) in section 3.4.1). 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 are the three measures of 
real activities manipulation; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal level of cash flow from operations and 
measures sales-based manipulation, calculated as actual level of cash flows from operations 
minus the normal level of cash flows from operations (see equation (2) in section 3.4.2); 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal level of discretionary expenses and measures whether firms 
manipulate discretionary expenditure such as R&D expenses, advertising costs, equal to actual 
levels of discretionary deduction of normal levels of discretionary expenses (see equation (3) 
in section 3.4.2); 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal level of production costs and measures whether 
firms engage in abnormally high inventory production (overproduction), is equal to the 
difference between actual level of production costs and the normal level of production costs 
(see equation (4) in section 3.4.2). 
 
20 The analysis of this research is based on the cross-sectional data, the OLS would be the main approach (the 
most used in the area of earnings management) to measure the relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
earnings management, because the other statistical modelling techniques, such as Fixed/Random Effects, GMM 
etc, that are related to ‘time’ and are not able to be applied in the sample of this study.   
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3.7 Summary  
This research has been based on the UK market, and aimed to investigate whether firms manage 
earnings through utilising accrual-based earnings management activities and real activities 
manipulation activities to meet specific targets, such as meeting or just beating different 
earnings benchmarks: zero level of earnings and last year’s earnings, and whether directors 
obtain higher level of compensation. Two major hypotheses categories have been developed in 
accordance with the review of theoretical and empirical prior literature, One is firms in the UK 
market that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks to avoid loss (zero earnings level) or avoid 
earnings fall (last year’s earnings) are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings 
management or real activities manipulations; the other concerns the relationship between 
earnings management and directors’ remuneration, to be specific, firms directors having 
incentives to manage earnings by using accruals-based or real earnings management method to 
achieve abnormally high remuneration. The sample covered the period between 2009 and 2015 
and firms included in FTSE All-share. In accordance with sample selection criteria, 2,513 firm-
year observations including 11 main industries and 359 individual legal firms were applied to 
test the objectives of this research. All the accounting and financial data are available to extract 
from the FAME database. This chapter also explained estimation models for detecting earnings 
management. The measure of accrual-based earnings management has followed the modified 
Jones’ (1991) model, and three measures of real activities manipulation were consistent with 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) study. In addition, this chapter discussed the research methodology to 
test suspect firms that just beat or meet important earnings benchmarks in the first empirical 
study. A new model was identified to measure abnormal directors’ remuneration, in order to 
examine the relationship between abnormal compensation and abnormal earnings management. 
The next two chapters present the empirical results of testing the hypotheses developed and use 












Chapter 4 Earnings Management just beating/meeting 
Earnings Benchmarks 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the first part of empirical results by using both univariate and multivariate 
analyses. The aim is to examine whether UK firms meet or just beat important earnings 
benchmarks (e.g., avoiding loss, avoiding earnings decrease) through engaging in accrual-based 
earnings management and/or real activities manipulation. The analysis covers the measurement 
of abnormal levels of earnings management but concentrates mainly on the estimation of 
suspect firm-years just beating or meeting earnings benchmarks. The chapter is divided into 
several sections as follows: Firstly, section 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of accrual-based 
and real earnings management activities of the full sample. In section 4.3, estimation of the 
normal level of discretionary accruals, cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses, and 
production costs is presented. Section 4.4 gives the summary statistics of abnormal level of 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation. Moreover, the correlation 
coefficients between abnormal accrual-based and real earnings management are shown in 
section 4.5. Section 4.6 and 4.7 present the tests and analysis of whether firms use earnings 
management that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level earnings and last year’s 
earnings). In addition, this study has conducted an additional analysis in section 4.8 concerning 
firms with negative earnings. Finally, the chapter then concludes with an overview of the results.     
4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-
based Earnings Management  
Table 4.1 commences with a direct comparison of firm characteristics and earnings 
management proxies for the suspect firm-years to the full sample. Suspect firm-years, in order 
to just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (e.g., avoiding losses, avoiding earnings decrease), are 
more likely to be utilised in earnings management, whether through real activities manipulation 
or accrual-based earnings management. There are two comparison groups: Panel A in Table 4.1 
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presents summary statistics of the full sample, including 2,513 firm-year observations in total 
between 2009 and 2015 comparing suspect firm-years just meeting or beating zero level of 
earnings. There are 43 suspect firm-years and 2,470 non-suspect firm-years; Panel B presents 
descriptive statistics comparing the suspect firm-years just meeting or beating last year’s 
earnings to the full sample, and includes 65 suspect firm-years, 2,448 non-suspect firm-years. 
In addition, non-suspect firm-years are also included for comparison with suspect firm-years 
and a full sample, for the purpose of maintaining completeness and comparability with the 
original comparisons.  
Panel A of Table 4.1 compares suspect small profit firm-years just beating or meeting zero 
levels of earnings to all other firm-years. Suspect firm-years are intended to hit a zero level of 
earnings benchmark which implies a small profit, on average, and are of smaller size and have 
lower growth opportunities than other firm-years. Whilst it is interesting that the mean market 
capitalisation of suspect firm-years, at round £7.013 billion, is not lower but unexpectedly is 
62% higher than the rest of the sample, £4.4 billion, meanwhile the mean total assets (£67.6 
billion) of the suspect firm-years are much larger than the sample of all other firm-years (£7 
billions), which is nine times the rest of the sample. This, implies that suspect firm-years if 
tending to meet zero level of earnings (avoiding loss), on average, are relatively higher than the 
rest of sample. On account of the difference in market capitalisation and total assets, suspect 
firm-years have a significantly lower mean ratio of market equity than non-suspect firm- years 
(0.98 and 3.83, respectively) at less than 1%. This indicates that firm-years which just beat or 
meet zero level of earnings have fewer growth opportunities than all the other firm-years 
engaging in earnings management. Similarly, the mean market capitalisation (£7.5 billion) of 
suspect firm-years, in Panel B, is significantly 73% greater than the mean market capitalisation 
of non-suspect firm-years at, at least, at 1% level, and the mean total assets of suspect firm-
years are higher than those of all other firm-years (£9.2 billion and £8.1 billion, respectively) 
at a significant 1% level. As a result, the mean ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity for suspect firm-years are lower than the overall sample (1.34 and 2.14, respectively),  
meaning that suspect firm-years if last year’s earnings is set as their target, have on average 
lower growth opportunities than non-suspect firm-years.                
From the perspective of firm operating performance, the mean net income of suspect firm-years 
which is in order to avoid losses in panel A, at round £1,455 million, is nearly twice as large as 
all the other firm-years at £742 million, however, after scaling net income by total assets, the 
mean value of suspect firm-years is only 4.8% which is lower than the mean of non-suspect 
firm-year, 15.1%, and is significantly less than 1%. This implies that the sample of small profit 
100 
 
firm-years (suspect firm-years) have less efficient management than those of other firm-years 
which use their assets to generate firm earnings. Therefore, 𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  firm-years with 
lower profitability and worse firm performance are more likely to engage in earnings 
management when they are just beating or meeting the zero level earnings benchmark compared 
with non-suspect firm years. Alternatively, if the suspect firm-years try to compare with last 
year’s earnings, their mean net income from Panel B, at round £1114 million, is 67% higher 
than the mean value of all other firm-years, at £744.5 million, and significantly at 1%, however, 
mean lagged net income divided by total assets is similar for suspect firm-years and the rest of 
the sample (15% and 14.8%, respectively), and is not significantly different.  
According to prior research (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; and 
Zang, 2012; Mindak, et al., 2016; Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018) and the earnings management 
hypothesis, firms have incentives to employ a variety of methods, including real activities 
manipulation (e.g., cutting discretionary expenses, sales manipulation, and overproduction), 
and accrual-based earnings management, to beat or meet earnings benchmarks (e.g., avoiding 
loss, avoiding earnings decrease). Thus, whether just beating or meeting the zero_level earnings 
benchmark or last year’s earnings, suspect firm-years should have lower cash flows from 
operations (𝐶𝐹𝑂), lower discretionary expenses, higher production costs, and higher accruals 
than non-suspect firm-years. Consistent with the researcher’s hypothesis, suspect firm-years in 
Panel A have a significantly lower mean 𝐶𝐹𝑂 as a percentage of total assets at 1%. The mean 
scaled 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is 5% for suspect firm-years around the zero level of earning, versus 12.2% for the 
rest of the sample. The mean of scaled discretionary expenses by total assets for suspect firm-
years of around zero earnings are lower than the mean for those other firm-years (26.5% and 
43.2%, respectively) and significantly those at the 1 % level. Mean production costs scaled by 
total assets of suspect firm-years which set zero earnings as the benchmark, are also lower 
compared with the rest of the sample (38.7% and 63.9%) although they are not significant. 
Mean accruals scaled by total assets are close both for suspect firm-years around zero level 
earnings and for non-suspect firm-years (-4% and -1.3%, respectively), and they are not 
significantly different. However, suspect firm-years around last year’s earnings in Panel B, 
mean scaled 𝐶𝐹𝑂, mean scaled discretionary expenses and mean scaled production costs, are 
all lower as a percentage of total assets by around 11.6%, 31.4%, and 45%, respectively than 
the mean for non-suspect firm-years ( 12.1%, 43.2%, and 64.1%, respectively), though all of 
them are not significant. By contrast, mean accruals scaled by total assets of suspect firm-years 
achieved last year’s earnings and have a higher mean than the mean for non-suspect firm-years. 
(-0.9% and -2%, respectively).                 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of suspect firm-years vs non-suspect firm-years 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by suspect_zero_level firm-years vs non-suspect_zero_level firm-years 
 
Variables 
Full Sample Suspect_zero firm-years Non-Suspect_zero firm-years Differences in 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Means t test 
𝐌𝐕𝐄 (£ million) 2,513 4,451.674 1,008.268 43 7,013.085 1,154.429 2,470 4,402.873 1,007.433 2,610.212 1.467 
𝐌𝐓𝐁  2,513 3.772 2.157 43 0.983 1.869 2,470 3.825 2.179 -2.841 -3.608*** 
𝐑𝐎𝐀  2,513 0.136 0.119 43 0.048 0.039 2,470 0.137 0.121 -0.090 -6.526*** 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 (£million) 2,513 8,147.169 1,021.800 43 67,637.376 2,384.500 2,470 6,979.096 1,014.430 60,658.280 2.198** 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬 (£ million) 2,513 4,922.305 767.350 43 9,494.325 703.000 2,470 4,833.405 768.321 4,660.920 -0.316 
𝐄𝐁𝐈𝐓𝐃𝐀 (£ million) 2,513 755.285 117.940 43 1,455.383 124.600 2,470 741.507 117.780 713.875 -0.418 
𝐂𝐅𝐎 (£ million) 2,513 578.736 88.150 43 1,126.747 71.836 2,470 568.120 88.300 558.627 0.914 
𝐄𝐁𝐈𝐓𝐃𝐀/𝐓𝐀  2,513 0.149 0.129 43 0.048 0.037 2,470 0.151 0.131 -0.102 -6.937*** 
𝐂𝐅𝐎/𝐓𝐀   2,513 0.121 0.102 43 0.050 0.048 2,470 0.122 0.103 -0.073 -3.867*** 
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃/𝐓𝐀  2,513 0.635 0.403 43 0.387 0.135 2,470 0.639 0.410 -0.252 -1.458 
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏/𝐓𝐀  2,513 0.429 0.265 43 0.265 0.085 2,470 0.432 0.268 -0.167 -3.229*** 








Panel B: Descriptvie statistics by Suspect_last_year firm-years vs Non-suspect_last_year 
 
Variables 
Full Sample Suspect__last firm-years Non-Suspect_zero firm-years Differences in 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Means t test 
𝐌𝐕𝐄 (£ million) 2,513 4,451.674 1,008.268 65 7,524.295 1,999.973 2,448 4,354.419 989.988 3,169.875 2.795*** 
𝐌𝐓𝐁  2,513 3.772 2.157 65 1.343 2.692 2,448 3.848 2.143 -2.505 -0.481 
𝐑𝐎𝐀  2,513 0.136 0.119 65 0.139 0.125 2,448 0.136 0.118 0.003 0.919 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 (£ million) 2,513 8,147.169 1,021.800 65 9,177.140 1,778.000 2,448 8,116.289 1,016.000 1,060.852 2.917*** 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬 (£ million) 2,513 4,922.305 767.350 65 6,232.518 975.000 2,448 4,882.453 763.300 1,350.065 1.428 
𝐄𝐁𝐈𝐓𝐃𝐀 (£ million) 2,513 755.285 117.940 65 1,114.054 304.000 2,448 744.503 116.591 369.551 2.950*** 
𝐂𝐅𝐎 (£ million) 2,513 578.736 88.150 65 782.397 128.200 2,448 572.565 87.000 209.833 2.281** 
𝐄𝐁𝐈𝐓𝐃𝐀/𝐓𝐀  2,513 0.149 0.129 65 0.150 0.135 2,448 0.148 0.128 0.001 0.788 
𝐂𝐅𝐎/𝐓𝐀   2,513 0.121 0.102 65 0.116 0.104 2,448 0.121 0.102 -0.005 -0.796 
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃/𝐓𝐀  2,513 0.635 0.403 65 0.450 0.284 2,448 0.641 0.410 -0.191 -0.546 
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏/𝐓𝐀  2,513 0.429 0.265 65 0.314 0.195 2,448 0.432 0.269 -0.119 -1.572 
𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬/𝐓𝐀  2,513 -0.020 -0.020 65 -0.009 -0.013 2,448 -0.020 -0.020 0.010 -0.152 
 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***significant at the 1% level. 
Note to Table 4.1: This full sample spans 2009-2015 and includes 2,513 firm-years. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 firm-years are the 43 firm-years with reported 
income before extraordinary items between 0% and 0.5% of scaled by total assets in Panel A. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 firm-years are the 65 firm-years with 
reported change in net income before extraordinary items from the last year between 0% and 1% in Panel. The numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics from t-tests for the differences in means (unequal variances). Please see Appendix A for all variables descriptions.    
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4.3 Estimation of Normal Level of Cash Flows from Operations, 
Discretionary Expenditures, Production Costs, and Accrual-based 
Earnings Management 
This section concerns estimation of normal levels through relevant models (discussed in 
Chapter 3) to determine real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management, 
which are indicated by abnormal levels of cash flows from operations ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ), 
discretionary expenditure (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃), production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷), and discretionary 
accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠). As discussed in Chapter 3.4, consistent with Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
research there are three empirical proxies which estimate whether firms engage in real activities 
manipulation (e.g., abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
abnormal production costs), which are involved in increasing earnings by reducing the cost of 
goods sold by means of an overproduction inventory, and cutting discretionary expenditures, 
such as research & development, advertising, and selling, general, and administrative 
expenditure.  In addition, discretionary accruals in this study are a measure of accrual-based 
earnings management, and are the difference between firms’ actual accruals and the normal 
level of accruals, where the normal level of accruals is estimated by using the modified Jones’ 
(1991) model. Abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses, 
production costs, and discretionary accruals (e.g., 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 , 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) are used to measure earnings management, and they are estimated by the 
residuals (also referred to as error terms) from relevant estimation models (e.g., equation (1), 
(2), (3), (4) in Chapter 3.4). Higher values of abnormal production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) and 
discretionary accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) indicated more real activities manipulation through 
overproduction and more accrual-based earnings management, respectively. Both abnormal 
cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses were multiplied by (-1), such 
that their higher values indicate a higher extent of real activities manipulation through boosting 
sales and cutting discretionary expenditure.         
Table 4.2 presents the regression coefficients for some of the key regressions used to estimate 
normal levels of cash flow from operations, discretionary expenses, production costs, and 
discretionary accruals. All of these models were estimated cross-sectionally for every industry 
and every year, and by using the entire sample of 2,513 firm-years over the period 2009-2015. 
UK five-digit SIC codes (2007) were used to define industries, and 11 major industries are 
included in the sample. Each model was estimated for industry-years, on average, having at 
least 1,155 observations with fewer than 15 firms eliminated from the sample (there are 77 
104 
 
separate industry-years from 2009 to 2015).  All variables were scaled by previous year’s total 
assets (𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1), and all estimation models winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent to avoid 
extreme observations due to noisy estimation. The reported coefficients in Table 4.2 are the 
mean value of the coefficients across all industry-years. 𝑡 -statistics (in parentheses) were 
calculated using the standard error of the mean coefficients across all industry-years (Fama and 
Macbeth, 1973). The adjust 𝑅 square (number of observations) is the mean adjust 𝑅 square 
(number of observations) across industry-years in Table 4.2.  
All the mean coefficients of the three real activities manipulation models ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 , 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) and accrual-based earnings management model (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) 
calculated in this chapter differed significantly from zero (0.08, 0.1622, -0.1819, and -0.0234, 
respectively), and all were general consistent with those in Roychowdhury’s (2006) results 
(which are 0.0308, 0.1524, -0.1715, and -0.0311, respectively) with several exceptions both in 
terms of the sign and magnitudes. The coefficient in scaled sales at the beginning of year 𝑡 
(𝑆𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) in cash flows from the operations model and production cost model should be 
positive, as firms with higher sales typically have greater expenses. The mean coefficient both 
of scaled 𝐶𝐹𝑂 and scaled production costs on 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) is statistically significant and positive 
(0.0386 and 0.6768, respectively), consistent with those reported in Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
and Zang’s (2012) results. The net income is assumed to be completely determined by 
contemporaneous sales and is independent of sales in the previous period. As a result the mean 
coefficient of changed sales (∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) on the abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 model is positive (0.0298) and 
of a similar magnitude to the coefficient of scaled changed sales on the abnormal accruals model 
(-0.0026), although they are insignificant. As with the Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012) 
research study, the mean coefficient of scaled accruals on property, plant, and equipment 
(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) at the beginning year of 𝑡 is significantly negative (-0.0901). Otherwise, the 
mean coefficients of 1 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  both in cash flow from the operations and accruals models are 
significant with positive signs.  
In addition, the mean adjusted 𝑅 squares across the industry-year are also similar to 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) and Zang’s (2012) results with 23% for the 𝐶𝐹𝑂 model, 19% for the 
discretionary expenses model, 61% for the production cost model, and 18% for the accrual-
based earnings management model. Consistent with previous literature, it indicated that these 
estimation models have a reasonable and certain degree of explanatory power with regard to 
earnings management.    
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Table 4.2: Measurement of Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
Estimation of the Normal Levels of Cash Flow from Operation, Discretionary Expenditures, Production Costs, and Discretionary Accruals 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  
 
𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑬𝑿𝑷𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  
 
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  
 
𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄   





(-6.7660)  (-3.6681) 





(1.0704)  (1.7344) 
𝑺𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  0.0386*** Mean Adj. 𝑹
𝟐 0.1926 𝑺𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  0.6768*** ∆𝑺𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  -0.0026  
(5.0912) 
   
(21.5853)  (-0.1908) 
∆𝑺𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  0.0298 No. of Industry-
years 
77 ∆𝑺𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  0.0088 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  -0.0901*** 
 
(0.9855) 
   
(0.0695)  (-2.8682) 
Mean Adj. 𝑹𝟐  0.2311 No. of 
Observations 
2,113 ∆𝑺𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏⁄  -0.1586 Mean Adj. 𝑹
𝟐 0.1821 
     (0.4205)   
No. of Industry-
years 
77 Avg. No. of Obs 27.442 Mean Adj. 𝑹𝟐 0.6092 No. of Industry-
years 
77 
No. of Obs. 1,811 
  
No. of Industry-years 77 No. of Obs. 1,830 
Avg. No. of Obs. 23.519 
  
No. of Obs. 1,621 Avg. No. of Obs. 23.766 
    
Avg. No. of Obs. 21.052   
 
*Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 4.2: All the following (ordinary least square) regression models are estimated across-sectionally for each industry and each year 
over the period of 2009-2015. UK five-digit codes (2007) were used to define industries. Industry-years with fewer than 15 firms were eliminated 
from the sample. There were 77 separate industry-years over the sample period. All variables were scaled by the previous year’s total assets (𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1), 
and all estimation models winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent to avoid extreme observations due to high estimation. The reported coefficients 
are the mean value of the coefficients across all industry-years. 𝑡-statistics (in parentheses) were calculated using the standard error of the mean 
coefficients across all industry-years (Fama and Macbeth, 1973). The adjust 𝑅 square (number of observations) is the mean adjust 𝑅 square (number 
of observations) across industry-years. Please see appendix A for all variables descriptions.
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Real activities manipulation 
Consistent with the Roychowdhury (2006) model, the first proxy for real activities manipulation 
is the abnormal cash flow from operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂), and is the difference between actual 
level of cash flow from operations and normal levels of cash flow from operations. It was 
modelled on the normal cash flow from operations as a linear function of sales and change in 
sales in the current year. The normal level of cash flow from operations from a sample of UK 
firms was estimated as the following cross-sectional regression for each every industry and year:     
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡is cash flow from operations for firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡. In each firm-year, abnormal 
cash flow from operations ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ) is the actual 𝐶𝐹𝑂  minus the ‘normal’ level of 
𝐶𝐹𝑂 calculated by using estimated industry-level coefficients and the firm-year sales and 
lagged assets from the above model. 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total assets of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 − 1, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
total sales during year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, ∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡  and is equal to 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 minus 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1,  𝜀𝑖,𝑡is the error term.  
The second proxy of real activities manipulation concerns the abnormal decrease in the amount 
of discretionary expenses, for every firm-year. Abnormal discretionary expenses 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ) is the actual 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃  minus the estimated ‘normal’ level of 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 . In 
accordance with Roychowdhury (2006), the normal level of discretionary expenses should be 
expressed as a linear function of contemporaneous sales, and the regression within each industry 
by year then would be: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
Where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the discretionary expenses in year 𝑡, it is sum of research and development 
expenses (R&D), advertising, and selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) for 
firm  𝑖 in year 𝑡.  
The third proxy is abnormal high inventory production (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 ), it is the difference 
between the actual production cost and the normal level of production cost. Based on 
Roychowdhury (2006), the normal level of production costs within each industry by year can 
be estimated as:  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
Where 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is production costs for year 𝑡, it is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year 𝑡 
(𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡) and the change in inventory from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 (∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡). 
Accrual-based earnings management 
Accrual-based earnings management is measured by discretionary accruals, are the difference 
between firms’ actual accruals and the normal level of accruals. As followed by the modified 
Jones (1991) model, the normal level of actuals is following as    
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,   
Where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus 
the operating cash flow reported in the statement of cash flow in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖,  𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the 




4.4 Summary Statistics Abnormal Level of Real Activities Manipulation 
and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
The estimated residuals (e.g., error term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ) from the relevant regression models have 
measured the abnormal cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses, production costs 
and the discretionary accruals level. Abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 and abnormal discretionary expenses are 
required to multiply (-1), so that higher values of them indicate more real activities 
manipulation through acceleration of the timing of sales, and reduction in discretionary 
expenses. Abnormal production costs do not require multiplication by (-1), as higher abnormal 
production costs imply a greater amount of real activities manipulation by overproduction. 
𝑅𝐴𝑀 aggregates the three real activities manipulation measures (−𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, −𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) in an overall proxy, so that higher values indicate greater use of 𝑅𝐴𝑀 to manage 
earnings. Otherwise, a higher abnormal level of discretionary accruals indicates additional 
accrual-based earnings management. Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics on abnormal 
levels of real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management, including mean, 
median, 25th Percentile, 75th Percentile, skewness, and kurtosis for each estimation model 
separately. Total real activities manipulation (𝑅𝐴𝑀) is different from zero, which is around 
0.0096: all the other mean amounts of abnormal earnings management levels (e.g., 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 , −𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 , −𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ) are 
equal to zero, indicating that the regression lines of them are the best fitting and the sum of the 
residuals always equals zero. Overall, the descriptive statistics for UK market have been 
generally consistent with findings documented in prior research for the US market. Means of 
abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs are both equal to zero in 
Gunny’s (2010) study. This is also similar to Badertscher’s (2011) results, with the mean of 
accrual-based earnings management proxy and real activities manipulation proxies at around 
zero.  
The median of abnormal cash flows from operations is weakly negative, -0.0072% of total 
assets in the UK, because cash flow from operations are lower at the given sales level if firms 
accelerate the timing of sales through price discounts and more lenient credit terms, according 
to Roychowdhury (2006). This research found that the median of abnormal discretionary 
expenses was negative, at -0.0362% of total assets, similar to Gunny’s (2006), findings and 
indicating that reducing such advertising, R&D, and SG&A discretionary expense can boost 
current earnings. On the contrary, the median of abnormal production cost is 0.0195% of total 
assets in UK firms, implying that firms through producing more goods than necessary to meet 
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expected demand, the fixed overhead costs are spread over a larger number of units, lowering 
fixed cost per unit and thereby increasing their operating margins (Roychowdhury, 2006). On 
average, the median of total real activities manipulation proxy (𝑅𝐴𝑀) is positive, 0.0639% of 
total assets, consistent with the result reported in Zang’s (2012) study. Moreover, the median 
of abnormal discretionary accruals level is similar to the findings of previous literature (e.g., 
Cohen, 2008; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018), at 0.0009% of total 
assets. As a result, UK firms tend to use accrual-based earnings management to increase their 
earnings.   
In addition, according to Gunny (2010), in order to exhibit the distribution of the residuals is 
followed by normal distribution: both skewness and kurtosis of sample distribution are 
documented in this study. Skewness measures the degree of distortion from the symmetry. The 
skewness data of the residuals distributions are all relatively near to zero level, indicating that 
the distribution of abnormal earnings management levels are symmetrically distributed. 
Kurtosis is used to describe the distribution and measures whether distribution is heavy-tailed 
or light-tailed relative to normal distribution. The kurtosis data for all residuals’ distribution is 
relatively high due to firms engaging in real activities manipulation through sales manipulation, 
reduction of discretionary expenditure, overproduction, and engaging in accrual-based earnings 
management. Thus, the distribution of abnormal values tends to have heavier tails than that of 












Table 4.3: Summary statistics for abnormal levels of real activities manipulation and accrual-
based earnings management 
Variable N Mean Median Std. 
Dev 
25% 75% Skewness Kurtosis 
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑪𝑭𝑶  1,811 0.0000 -0.0072 0.1002 -0.0461 0.0358 0.7501 13.2708 
A𝒃𝒏_𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑬𝑿𝑷 2,113 0.0000 -0.0362 0.3926 -0.1839 0.1509 1.9465 13.3189 
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫  1,621 0.0000 0.0195 0.3581 -0.1508 0.1667 -1.1945 9.1770 
−𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑪𝑭𝑶    1,811 0.0000 0.0072 0.1002 -0.0358 0.0461 -0.7501 13.2708 
−𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑬𝑿𝑷   2,113 0.0000 0.0362 0.3926 -0.1509 0.1839 -1.9465 13.3189 
𝑹𝑨𝑴  1,608 0.0096 0.0639 0.7423 -0.2945 0.3760 -1.4534 10.8191 
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 1,830 0.0000 0.0009 0.0648 -0.0284 0.0326 -0.9825 7.2011 
Note to Table 4.3: This table shows properties of the abnormal levels of various variables for 
2,513 firm-years over the period of 2009-2015, including the mean, median, standard deviation, 
the 25th quintiles, 75th quintiles, skewness, and kurtosis. Please see appendix A for descriptions 
of variables. 𝑅𝐴𝑀  aggregates the three real activities manipulation measures (−𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 
−𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) in an overall proxy, where defined as follows, 
𝑅𝐴𝑀 = 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ∗ (−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ∗ (−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂. Please see Appendix A for all 
variables descriptions.    
 
 
4.5 Correlation Coefficients Among Real Activities Manipulation and 
Accrual-based Earnings Management 
This section presents correlation coefficients between various variables, in order to measure the 
extent to which one variable and another variable change together. Table 4.4 presents the results 
of both the Pearson correlation coefficients (Upper Triangle) and the Spearman correlation 
coefficients (Lower Triangle) amongst real activities manipulation measures, accrual-based 
earnings management measures, and relevant variables for the entire sample of 2,513 firm-years 
between 2009 and 2015. The Pearson correlation is also known as the ‘product moment 
correlation coefficient’, suitable only for metric variable, and used for evaluation of the linear 
relationship amongst three proxies of real activities manipulation, accrual-based earning 
management, and ratio variables in this study. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 
based on the ranked values of each variable rather than the raw data, and was also employed as 
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an additional correlation test to assess monotonic relationships between various variables, 
because the variables tend to change together but not necessarily at a constant rate in a 
monotonic relationship.    
Accruals as a percentage of total assets are highly positively correlated with both discretionary 
expenses and production costs of total assets (Pearson100% and 99.5%, respectively), however, 
similar to prior studies (Dechow and Dichew, 2002; Kothari, et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006), 
accruals and cash flows from operations (𝐶𝐹𝑂) as a percentage of total assets for UK firms 
display a strong negative correlation, with a significant correlation coefficient of Pearson -1 and 
Spearman -41.6%. This is due to any change in accruals having to be offset by a reverse change 
on 𝐶𝐹𝑂. Net income (referred to as earnings before extraordinary items) of total assets is highly 
positively correlated with accruals, discretionary expenditures, and production costs (Pearson 
100%, 100%, and 99.5%, respectively), whilst only in the Spearman correlation is net income 
significantly positively correlated with the 𝐶𝐹𝑂 of total assets (75.4%). As expected, 𝐶𝐹𝑂 as a 
percentage of total assets is highly negative correlated with both discretionary costs and 
production costs (-100% and -99.5%, respectively), because higher cash inflows from operation 
implies higher amounts of money being spent in the operation and production in firms. The 
discretionary expenses are always positively correlated with the production costs (99.5%), as 
both are very highly correlated with sales. The correlations between the total level and abnormal 
levels of various variables are usually positive, as abnormal levels of variables are estimated as 
deviations from the predicted normal values from industry-year regressions. The correlation 
coefficients between 𝐶𝐹𝑂 and abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂, between discretionary expenses and abnormal 
discretionary expenses, between production costs and abnormal production costs, between 
discretionary accruals and abnormal discretionary accruals are all highly positive significantly 
at 64.6%, 75.1%, 46.7%, and 76.2%, respectively.  
According to prior studies (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018), the 
measure of total real activities manipulation and three measures of real activities manipulation 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) are mechanically and highly correlated. This is 
because total real activities manipulation (𝑅𝐴𝑀) is an overall proxy to aggregate abnormal 
levels of the three real earnings management earnings proxy together. Therefore, the correlation 
coefficients between 𝑅𝐴𝑀 and abnormal cash flow from operations, and between 𝑅𝐴𝑀 and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are negative and statistically significant (Pearson correlations: 
-22.7%, and -95.3%, respectively), and (Spearman correlation: -28%, and -93.2%, respectively). 
The negative correlations are due to before taken from the sum total, both abnormal cash flow 
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from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by (-1), so that higher 
values of them indicate high use of real activities manipulation. The high correlations between 
them imply that a greater amount of real activities manipulation can be achieved by increasing 
price discounts and more lenient credit terms to accelerate the timing of sales to help boost 
current period earnings, or reducing such discretionary expenses to maintain current period 
earnings at a higher level. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to multiply abnormal production 
costs by -1, as a higher abnormal value of production costs imply more real activities 
manipulation. Thus, there is a significant positive correlation between RAM and abnormal 
production costs (96.3% in Pearson, and 93% in Spearman, respectively). This highly 
correlation coefficient between them indicates that UK firms engage in real activities 
manipulation to manage earnings upwards (or downwards) through producing more (or less) 
goods than necessary to meet expected demand fixed overhead costs are spread over a larger 
number of units, lowering fixed cost per unit, thereby increasing operating margin 
(Roychowdhury, 2006).      
The abnormal cash flow from operations is positively correlated with abnormal discretionary 
expenditure (Pearson correlation of 3.4%, and Spearman correlation of 7.6%, respectively).This 
suggests that when firms tend to use real activities manipulation which may lead to abnormally 
high sales manipulation at the same time as they are engaging in reduction of discretionary 
expenditure, both aimed at boosting current period earnings. The correlation coefficient 
between abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal production costs are significantly 
negative (Pearson correlation of -17.2%, and Spearman correlation of -23.6%, respectively). 
This also indicates the common goal is that managers engage in real activities manipulation 
leading to acceleration of the timing of sales to manage earnings upwards and abnormally high 
production costs to simultaneously increase the operating margin. The correlation coefficient 
between abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs is highly negative and 
statistically significant (Pearson correlation of -86.2%, and Spearman correlation of -79.2%, 
respectively). This is consistent with Roychowdhury’s (2006) findings, that the high correlation 
implies that UK firms engage in real activities manipulation through cutting discretionary 
expenditures, and overproduction at the same time in order to achieve a higher earnings level.     
In addition, abnormal discretionary accruals measure the extent of accrual-based earnings 
management. This study found that the correlation coefficient between abnormal discretionary 
accruals and abnormal cash flows from operations is positive and significant both in the Pearson 
correlation of -1.83% and Spearman correlation of -28.3%. As indicated by Roychowdhury 
(2006), this probably can be explained in two ways (a) UK firms manage earnings upwards by 
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using accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation at the same time, 
and (b) three proxies of real activities manipulations have different impacts on abnormal 
discretionary accruals, for instance overproduction has a positive effect while it has a negative 
effect on abnormal cash flow from operations. The correlation coefficient between abnormal 
discretionary accruals and abnormal discretionary expenses is also significantly negative 
(Pearson correlation of -4.1%, and Spearman correlation of -6.2%, respectively). Similar to 
correlation between abnormal accruals and abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂, this is likely as managers engage in 
accrual earnings management and discretionary expenditure manipulation at the same time with 
reduction of discretionary expenses having a negative effect on abnormal discretionary accruals. 
Similar to the above interpretation, abnormal discretionary accruals and abnormal production 
costs are positively correlated (Pearson correlation of 2.1%, and Spearman correlation of 1.4%). 
Due to the fact that overproduction possibly has a positive effect on abnormal accruals, there is 
an indication that firms in the UK market tend to use both manipulating discretionary accruals 
and the production of more goods to boost reported earnings. As a result, there is a significantly 
positive correlation between abnormal discretionary accrual and the aggregate proxies of real 
activities manipulation (Pearson correlation of 6.4%, and Spearman correlation of 8.1%, 
respectively). The positive correlation between 𝐴𝑀 and 𝑅𝐴𝑀 is consistent with the hypothesis, 
suggesting that firms in the UK have incentives to employ both accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation to report earnings upwards or downwards 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 
2012; Mindak, et al., 2016; Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018).  
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Table 4.4: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) correlations among real and accrual-based earnings management 
Variable 𝐄𝐁𝐈𝐓𝐃𝐀/𝐓𝐀 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬/𝐓𝐀 𝐂𝐅𝐎/𝐓𝐀 𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏/𝐓𝐀 𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃/𝐓𝐀 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃 𝐑𝐀𝐌 𝐀𝐌 
𝐄𝐁𝐈𝐓𝐃𝐀/𝐓𝐀  1 1.000*** -1.000*** 1.000*** 0.995*** 0.479*** 0.023 -0.113*** -0.112*** 0.140*** 
𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬/𝐓𝐀  0.075*** 1 -1.000*** 1.000*** 0.994*** -0.152*** -0.043* 0.024 0.071*** 0.762*** 
𝐂𝐅𝐎/𝐓𝐀  0.754*** -0.416*** 1 -1.000*** -0.995*** 0.646*** 0.024 -0.134*** -0.149*** -0.129*** 
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏/𝐓𝐀   0.259*** -0.178*** 0.322*** 1 0.995*** 0.023 0.751*** -0.651*** -0.714*** -0.042* 
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃/𝐓𝐀  0.082*** 0.030 0.071*** -0.199*** 1 -0.124*** -0.474*** 0.467*** 0.498*** -0.014 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎  0.528*** -0.288*** 0.682*** 0.073*** -0.063** 1 0.034 -0.172*** -0.227*** -0.183*** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏  0.003 -0.052** 0.010 0.601*** -0.626*** 0.076*** 1 -0.862*** -0.953*** -0.041* 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃  -0.191*** 0.023 -0.191*** -0.568*** 0.550*** -0.236*** -0.792*** 1 0.963*** 0.021 
𝐑𝐀𝐌  -0.172*** 0.093*** -0.194*** -0.631*** 0.617*** -0.280*** -0.932*** 0.930*** 1 0.064** 
𝐀𝐌  0.097*** 0.722*** -0.281*** -0.070*** -0.028 -0.283*** -0.062*** 0.014 0.081*** 1 
 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 4.4: This table reports the pooled Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman correlation (Lower Triangle) for the entire sample of 
2,513 firm-years in the period 2009-2015 between various variables as follows: earnings before extraordinary items as a percentage of total assets, 
discretionary accruals as a percentage of total assets, cash flow from operations as a percentage of total assets, discretionary expenditure as a 
percentage of total assets and production costs as a percentage of total assets. Abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary 
expenditure, and abnormal production costs are estimated using regression models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by 
Roychowdhury (2006). 𝑅𝐴𝑀  aggregated the three real activities manipulation measures (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 , and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) into an 
overall proxy, by taking the three measures sum. Before the summing up, both abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary 
accruals were multiplied by (-1) showing levels of 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 proxy for higher amounts through the use of 𝑅𝐴𝑀. Abnormal 
production costs are unnecessary for multiplication by -1 as higher 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 implies higher levels of 𝑅𝐴𝑀. Abnormal discretionary accruals 
measure the accrual-based earnings management, whereby estimated residuals use the modified Jones’s (1991) model. Please see Appendix A for 
all variables descriptions.        
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4.6 Suspect Firm-years Just Beating/Meeting ‘Zero’ Earnings Benchmark 
This section (Table 4.5) used five measures of abnormal earnings management including four 
measures of abnormal real earnings management and one measure of abnormal accrual-based 
earnings management as dependent variables from the estimation model (Equation (7)) in 
section 3.5.2). This presents the results for suspect firm-years just beating or meeting zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings level in UK market. The reported coefficients are the mean 
values of the coefficients from the five annual across-sectional regressions over the period of 
2009-2015 from the Fama and Macbeth (1973) approach.  
In order to test the hypotheses about whether firm directors engage in real activities 
manipulation or accrual-based earnings management to hit their targets. This study used a 
sample of earnings management suspect firm-years to increase power. In accordance with prior 
research, this research considered firm-years just beating or meeting important earnings 
benchmarks (e.g., ‘zero’ level of earnings, last year’s earnings) and situations in which earnings 
management is more likely to occur. Further to Roychowdhury (2006), suspect firm-years aim 
to avoid losses and just beating or meeting the zero level of earnings benchmark is defined as 
firm-years with earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets between 0 and 0.005. 
This study measured suspect firm-years just beating or meeting last years’ earnings as firm-
years following Gunny’s (2010) research with a change in net income from the last year 
between 0 and 0.01. During the sample period, 43 firm-years just beat or met the ‘zero’ level 
of earnings benchmark; 65 firm-years just beat or met last year’s earnings level, respectively.     
In Table 4.5, the mean coefficients on control variables are statistically significant partially, and 
most are similar to results in previous literature albeit with some exceptions. Panel A reported 
the estimation results of a model (Equation (7) in section 3.5.2) with suspect firm-years just 
beating or meeting the zero earnings benchmark. When abnormal cash flows from operating 
activities measure is employed the coefficient on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 as the dependent variable as 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) model is positive (0.01294) but it is not significantly different from 
zero. The insignificant coefficient appears in firms which do not just meet the zero level of 
earnings benchmark nor are associated with an abnormally increase in sales volume in order to 
boost current period earnings. This result is inconsistent with Roychowdhury’s (2006) findings 
that firm-years prefer to engage in earnings management using sales-based manipulation 
(abnormal cash flow from operations) and, in turn, indicates that UK firm-years just beating or 
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meeting zero earnings do not report upward earnings and lower cash flow in the current period 
through boosting sales by offering more price discounts and more lenient credit facilities.   
The second column in Table 4.5 (Panel A) provides evidence of the hypothesis: UK firm-years 
which just beat or meet the earnings benchmark around the zero level of earnings are more 
likely to engage in real activities manipulation. Specifically, when the dependent variable in 
regression (7) (see section 3.5.2) has abnormal discretionary expenses, the coefficient in 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 is positive (0.05129) and significant at a 5% level (t=1.66852). The coefficient 
indicates that suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) have abnormal discretionary expenses which 
are higher on average by 5.1% of assets compared to the rest of the sample, which means that 
the higher the residuals, greater reduction of such discretionary expenses including advertising, 
R&D, and SG&A expenses can boost current period earnings. In addition, this result is 
consistent with the findings in prior studies (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; 
Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018) provided supporting evidence that firm-years just beating or meeting 
zero level of earnings benchmarks engage more in real activities manipulation through 
discretionary expenses based manipulation. This in turn indicates that a reduction in 
discretionary expenses results in a boost of reported earnings in the current period, as well as 
generating a higher cash flow in the current period.    
The positive and statistically significant coefficient in suspect firm-years just beating or meeting 
zero level earnings (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) presents evidence of the hypothesis which assumes that 
firms that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks around zero earnings are more likely to use 
real earning management activities in the UK market. The third column in Table 4.5 (Panel A) 
presents the results from the estimation model (Equation (7) in section 3.5.2) where the 
dependent variable is set equal to abnormal production costs. The results imply that abnormal 
production costs are unusually high in UK suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) when they just 
beat or meet the zero earnings benchmark. The coefficient on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  is positive 
(0.09867) and significant at 5% level (t=3.11589) in the abnormal production costs regression 
and this significantly positive coefficient indicates that the mean abnormal production costs of 
suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) are greater by 9.87% of assets compared to the mean across 
the rest of the sample. Thus, the higher the residuals (error term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ), more goods than 
necessary meet expected demand are produced, and lower fixed costs per unit as fixed overhead 
costs are spread over a larger number of units, thereby greatly increasing the operating margin. 
This result is consistent with the findings in prior literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; 
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Zang, 2012; Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018) presented evidence that firm-years just beat or meet zero 
earnings have more incentives to engage in real earnings manipulation through overproduction.      
In order to capture the total effects of real activities manipulation, this study aggregate the three 
real activities manipulation measures into one proxy, 𝑅𝐴𝑀, by drawing on their sum. Both 
abnormal cash flow from operations ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ) and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃) are multiplied by -1, so that higher values indicate a greater extent of real 
activities manipulation by acceleration of the timing of sales and cutting expenses. Alternatively, 
higher values of abnormal production costs indicate real activities manipulation through 
overproduction. The sum of abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
production costs is a measurement of the total level of real activities manipulation. The fourth 
column in Table 4.5 (Panel A) presents results that the higher amount of these aggregate 
measures (𝑅𝐴𝑀) implies that suspect firm-years are more likely to apply in real activities 
manipulation in the UK to boost current period reported earnings. When 𝑌𝑡 is set equal to the 
aggregate proxy, 𝑅𝐴𝑀 , in regression (7), the sign of the coefficient on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  is 
positive (t=0.19525) and significant at a 5% level (t=2.36285). The coefficient indicates that 
the mean of the total real activities manipulation (𝑅𝐴𝑀) of suspect firm-years are larger by 
19.53% of assets than the mean across the rest of the sample. Consistent with prior literature 
(Cohen and Zaro, 2010; Zang, 2012), this result provides supporting evidence that managers in 
suspect firm-years just beat or meet an earnings benchmark around zero level and are more 
likely to engage in real activities manipulation by using sale-based manipulation, reducing or 
cutting discretionary expenses, and simultaneous overproduction than non-suspect firm-years. 
UK firm-years tend to focus on three real activities manipulation methods such as acceleration 
of the timing of sales, reduction in discretionary expenses, and overproduction at the same time, 
to manage current period earnings upwards.     
The fifth column in table 4.5 (Panel A) gives the results of the estimation model (Equation (7)) 
using the abnormal accruals measures as the dependent variable to predict whether suspect firm-
years just beat or meet the earnings benchmark around zero earnings by using accrual-based 
earnings management. Similar to when the dependent variable is set equal to abnormal cash 
flow from operations, the coefficient in 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  is negative but is not significantly 
different from zero. This result indicates that UK firm-years which just beat or meet the zero 
level of earnings benchmarks are not engaged in accrual-based earnings management through 
abnormally high accruals to boost current period years.  
117 
 
In addition, 𝐸𝑀 is the proxy of total earnings management, which is the sum of real activities 
manipulation and accrual-based earnings management which helps to capture the overall effect 
of all earnings management activities. The results in the final column in Table 4.5 (Panel A) 
show that a large number of the total earnings management measure implies that suspect firm-
years are more likely to be engaged in both real activities manipulation and accrual-based 
earnings management to boost current period earning by using 𝐸𝑀 as the dependent variable 
in the estimation model (Equation 10). The coefficient sign in Suspect_zero is positive (0.18797) 
and significant at the 1% levels (t=1.94538). The positive coefficient indicates that the mean of 
total earnings management, 𝐸𝑀 of suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) is higher by 18.8% of 
assets than the mean across the rest of the sample. These results provide supporting evidence 
that directors in suspect firm-years just beat or meet an earnings benchmark around zero 
earnings thus indicating higher levels of earnings management measures by directors engaging 
in real activities manipulation such as cutting discretionary expenses and overproduction, and 
accrual-based management activities at the same time. In short, UK firms have incentives to 
adopt real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management together to increase 
reported earnings.        
To summarise, the reported results in Table 4.5 (Panel A) provide supporting evidence as 
regards the hypothesis that UK suspect firm-years just beat or meet zero level of earnings 
benchmarks and engage more in real activities manipulation through reducing or cutting 
discretionary expenses to boost current period earnings, whilst producing more goods than 
necessary to meet expected demand with a reduced fixed cost, thereby increasing the operating 
margin. Furthermore, suspect firm-years tend to use sales-based manipulation, reduction in 
discretionary expenses, and overproduction at the same time to manage earnings upwards. 
However, it appears suspect firm-years which just meet the zero earnings benchmarks are not 
associated with abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal accruals. In addition, suspect 
firm-years engage in using real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management 
together to beat or meet the zero level of earnings benchmark.   
4.7 Suspect Firm-years Just Beating/Meeting Last Year’s Earnings 
Benchmarks 
Table 4.5 (Panel B) presents the estimation results in the following five columns setting each 
of the five measures of earnings management (e.g., 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 , 
𝑅𝐴𝑀, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) as dependent variables for suspect firm-years just beating or meeting 
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last year’s earnings from the regression model (7). There are 43 suspect firm-years 
(𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) for the abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
abnormal production costs, and abnormal accruals. The mean coefficients in control variables 
in Table 4.5 (Panel B) are not statistically significant and are not similar to those reported in 
previous studies, with one exception. When the dependent variable is set equal to abnormal 
discretionary expenses in regression (7), the coefficient on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 is positive (0.03041) 
and significant at the 5% level (t=1.55263), confirming the hypothesis that UK firms are more 
likely to engage in real activities manipulation through a reduction in discretionary expenses to 
boost reported earnings in order to meet or beat last year’s earnings benchmark. The positive 
coefficient indicates that suspect firm-years have abnormal discretionary expenses which are 
higher on average by 3.04% of assets compared to the rest of the sample, so that the higher the 
level of abnormal discretionary expenses, the larger the amount of reducing or cutting 
discretionary expenses, thereby increasing current period reported earnings.  In addition, it is 
similar to previous studies. (Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018) predicted that 
firm-years which just beat or meet the earnings benchmark around last year’s earnings engage  
more in earnings management by using discretionary expenses based manipulation, as cutting 
or reducing discretionary expenses results in upward reported earnings in the current period, as 
well as generating  higher current period cash flows.     
However, when the abnormal cash flows from operations is the dependent variable, the mean 
coefficient on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 is negative (-0.00937) and insignificant (t=-1.28008). It appears 
that firm-years which just beat/meet the earnings benchmark around last year’s earnings are not 
associated with the real earnings management method through a temporary increase in the sales 
volume (sales-based manipulation). Similarly, the coefficient (0.01926) in 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡, when 
abnormal production costs is the dependent variable, is not significantly different from last 
year’s earnings benchmark (t=0.60723), indicating that UK firm-years around last year’s 
earnings are not associated with more actual real activities manipulation regarding over 
production to increase current reported earnings. A positive coefficient of 0.0327 (t=0.56343) 
in 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡  is not significant when the aggregate measure of three real activities 
manipulation methods (abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production 
costs), 𝑅𝐴𝑀, is a dependent variable. It indicates that UK firm-years which just beat or meet 
last year’s earnings benchmark are not more likely to engage in real activities manipulation 
through both sales-based manipulation, reduction discretionary expenses, and overproduction 
at the same time. The results of accrual-based earnings management when last year’s earning 
is just beaten or met is similar to when earnings benchmark is around the zero level. The 
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coefficient in 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 when the dependent variable is abnormal results in accruals being 
negative (-0.00309) and insignificant (t=-0.83443). Thus firm-years in the UK market which 
just beat or meet the earnings benchmark around last year’s earnings are not associated with 
more actual accrual-based earnings management. As a result, the coefficient of the aggregate 
measure of total earnings management, 𝐸𝑀, is insignificant, meaning that suspect firm-years 
are not engaged in real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management together 
to beat or meet last year’s earnings benchmark.          
To summarise, this section has provided evidence that UK firm-years which exhibit unusually 
lower discretionary expenses are likely to engage more in real activities manipulation to manage 
earnings upwards when just beating or meeting last year’s earnings benchmark. This research 
could not find sufficient evidence to prove suspect firm-years which are just around last year’s 
earnings are associated with abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs, 
𝑅𝐴𝑀, and abnormal accruals. This in turn shows that firms in the UK market are not involved 
in managing earnings upwards by using sales-based earnings management, overproduction, and 
accrual-based earnings management, rather they are involved more in real activities 
manipulation through reduction or cutting of discretionary expenses when just meeting last 
year’s earnings benchmark. The results indicate that with UK firm directors who manage 
earnings upwards are more likely to opportunistically adopt real activities manipulation to meet 
earning targets, as some directors tend to utilise earnings management to hit the earnings 
benchmark in order to release a signal predicting a firm’s better performance in the future to 











Table 4.5: Comparison of suspect firm-years just beating/meeting earnings benchmarks with 
the rest of the sample 
Panel A: Comparison of suspect firm-years just beating/meeting zero level of earnings with 
the rest of the sample 
Variable 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃 𝐑𝐀𝐌 𝐀𝐌 𝐄𝐌 
𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭  0.0007 -0.0056*** -0.0023 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006  
(0.706) (-4.928) (-0.961) (0.089) (-1.012) -0.133 
   
    
𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄  -0.0070*** -0.0103** -0.0114** -0.0258** 0.0017*** -0.0242** 
 
(-3.513) (-1.987) (-2.234) -(2.401) (3.905) (-2.275) 
       
𝐌𝐓𝐁  0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004 
 
(0.154) (0.260) (0.174) (0.130) (0.176) (0.202) 
       
𝐑𝐎𝐀  -0.4679*** -0.0740* -0.5922*** -1.1120*** 0.0711*** -1.0408*** 
 
(-6.815) (-1.527) (-6.471) (-6.318) (4.260) (-5.544) 
       
𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨  0.0129 0.0513** 0.0987** 0.1953** -0.0070 0.1880* 
 
(0.688) (1.667) (3.116) (2.363) (-0.579) (1.945) 
       
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝐍𝐨. 𝐨𝐟 𝐎𝐛𝐬.  2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 
𝐀𝐝𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐑𝟐  0.401 -0.008 0.023 0.018 0.030 0.015 
 























Panel B: Comparison of suspect firm-years just beating/meeting last year’s earnings level 
with the rest of the sample 
Variable 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃 𝐑𝐀𝐌 𝐀𝐌 𝐄𝐌 
𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭  0.0010 -0.0061*** -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0010  
(0.999) (-3.908) (-0.907) (-0.028) (-1.160) (-0.210) 
       
𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄  -0.0068*** -0.0104** -0.0118** -0.0261** 0.0018*** -0.0243** 
 
(-3.369) (-2.017) (-2.357) (-2.419) (3.940) (-2.277) 
       
𝐌𝐓𝐁  0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004 
 
(0.159) (0.200) (0.188) (0.127) (0.167) (0.198) 
       
𝐑𝐎𝐀  -0.4685*** -0.0770* -0.6008*** -1.1294*** 0.0715*** -1.0590*** 
 
(-6.775) (-1.605) (-6.625) (-6.489) (4.171) (-5.685) 
       
𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭  -0.0094 0.0304** 0.0193 0.0327 -0.0031 0.0281 
 
(-1.280) (1.553) (0.607) (0.563) (-0.834) (0.460) 
       
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝐍𝐨. 𝐨𝐟 𝐎𝐛𝐬.  2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 
𝐀𝐝𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐑𝟐  0.400 -0.007 0.023 0.017 0.028 0.014 
 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 4.5: This table presents the results of Fama-Macbeth regressions, over a period 
of seven years from 2009 to 2015. The total sample includes 2,513 observations. The 
regressions being estimated are of the form:   
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
Each column presents the results of the above regression for a different variable, whose name 
appears at the top of the respective column. T-statistics are calculated using the standard errors 
of the mean across seven years. They are reported in parentheses. The table also reports the 
average number of annual observations and mean adjusted R square. 
The dependent variable, 𝑌𝑡 , refers to one of the four measures for abnormal real earnings 
management activities (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷, and 𝑅𝐴𝑀) and one abnormal 
accrual-based earnings management activity (𝐴𝑀): Abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is measured as deviations 







) + 𝛽1 (
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) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; abnormal discretionary expenses are measured as 
deviations from the corresponding industry-year regression 
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) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ;  abnormal production costs are measured as deviations from the predicted 
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values from the corresponding industry-year regression  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1







) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑀 is the sum of 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 multiplied by (-1), 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 multiply by (-1), and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷; abnormal discretionary accruals are measured 
as deviations from the predicted values from the corresponding industry-year regression 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
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1
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∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; EM is the sum of real activities 
manipulation and accrual-based earning management, which is equal to 𝑅𝐴𝑀 + 𝐴𝑀.  
There are three control variables: 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸 𝑡−1 is the log value of market value of equity in year 
𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑇𝐵  𝑡−1 is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity in year 𝑡 − 1; and 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is the net income before extraordinary items are divided by lagged total assets in year 
𝑡.These three independent variables are measured a deviations from the corresponding industry-
year means. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 is an indicator variable for suspect firm-years just beating 
or meeting important earnings benchmarks. Each panel reports the estimation results using a 
different definition of suspect firm-years as discussed below. Panel A reports results for 
suspects just beating or meeting the zero earnings, which are firm-years with earnings before 
extraordinary items over lagged assets between 0 and 0.005. Panel B reports results for suspects 
just beating or meeting last year’s earnings, which are firm-years with a change in net income 
from the last year between 0 and 0.01. All regressions include year indicators. Both abnormal 
cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by (-1) to allow real and accrual 
earnings management measures to have the same interpretation. Please see Appendix A for all 
variables descriptions. 
 
4.8 Additional Analysis  
This section undertakes additional analysis to extend the results of firms that meet earnings 
benchmarks through using accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation. 
Section 4.8.1 groups the firm-years with negative earnings, and conducts the examination of 
whether those 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years engage in any earnings management methods to hit their specific 
targets.     
4.8.1 Firms with Negative Earnings   
A variety of accounting literature has found that firms engage in manipulation of reported 
earnings by using different earnings management methods (accrual-based earnings 
management, real activities manipulation), to meet or beat certain earnings targets such as 
avoiding negative earnings (‘zero’ level earnings) (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Burgstahler and 
Divhev, 1997; Dechow et al., 2003; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2009), and avoiding 
earnings decreases (last year’s earnings) (e.g. Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; Mindak, et al., 2016; 
Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018). Some studies, however, have sought to explore whether firms engage 
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in earnings management activities  designed to depress reported income effects and/or produce 
poor results in a current period in order to show a better future performance (e.g. Kirscheneiter, 
and Melumad, 2002; Sevin, and Schroeder, 2005; Shuto, 2007; Nieken, and Sliwka, 2015). The 
latter is also referred to as ‘Big Bath’, whereby firms use earnings management strategy to make 
poor results look even worse so that future performance appears better. This is because the 
compensation of executive directors may be associated with firm performance, thus they have 
an incentive to engage in earnings management activities to move earnings from the present to 
the future, to ensure executives maintain both their earnings targets and external reputations. 
Some new executive directors, sometimes take big bath action in order to blame the firms’ poor 
performance on previous executives, and take credit for improvements in the future. 
In this subsection, this study performed a series of tests to examine whether firms utilise 
different earnings management method to decrease reporting earnings or shift positive earnings 
to negative earnings, for complete comparability with the analysis in previous sections which 
suggested that firms use earnings management methods to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. 
This study commenced with a direct comparison of the magnitude of earnings management 
proxies for negative earnings firms with other firms, the idea being that negative earning firms 
do not avoid loss or avoid earnings decreases rather they may aim to decrease current earnings 
to present a poor performance in order to show a future better performance.  
Table 4.6 reports the results of the test, the full sample of which included 2,513 firm-year 
observations from 2009 to 2015, with 169 suspect firm-years presenting earnings less than zero 
level. Panel A gives basic statistics comparing the negative earnings suspect firm-years to the 
rest of the sample. The mean abnormal cash flows from operations of 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years, is at 
around -0.048, and lower than the mean for the rest of the sample, 0.003, a statistically 
significant level of 1%. Both mean abnormal discretionary expenses and mean abnormal 
production costs (0.043, and 0.108, respectively) are significantly higher than the rest of the 
sample (-0.003, and -0.008, respectively). In addition, similar to abnormal cash flows from 
operations, 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years have lower abnormal accruals (-0.046) than the other firms (0.004). 
The mean net income scaled by total assets, for 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years, similar to return-on-asset, is 
negative, at around -0.111, and significantly less than the mean value of the rest of the sample, 
0.124. This indicates that suspect 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years with lower profitability compared to non-
suspect firm-years are more likely to engage in real earnings managemet. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years have 
a smaller mean market to book a value ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵) compared with the mean market to book a 
value ratio of the rest of the sample (3.4, and 3.5, respectively). The difference in 𝑀𝑇𝐵 between 
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the two groups is not statistically significant. The log value of market capitalisation for negative 
earnings firm-years, expressed as a deviation from the corresponding industry-year mean, on 
average, is not smaller than the rest of the sample, at a significant level of 1% (7.27, and 6.96, 
respectively). This means that the sample size of 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  firm-years may be greater than the 
sample of 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠  firm years, on average. Scaling 𝐶𝐹𝑂  by total assets is similar to 
abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂, as abnormal value is measured as deviations from the predicted values from the 
corresponding industry-year regression, with a positive correlation coefficient of 65% between 
them. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years have a lower mean 𝐶𝐹𝑂 as a percentage of assets: mean scaled 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is -
0.007 for 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years, versus 0.131 for the whole sample. Mean discretionary expenses 
scaled by total assets are similar for 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years and 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years (42.8% and 
43%, respectively), and are not significantly different. The mean scaled production costs of the 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years (48.5% of total assets) are significantly lower than the mean for the full sample 
(65.7% of total assets). Similar to scaled 𝐶𝐹𝑂, accruals as a percentage of total assets are 
negative, because they are measured by income, thus, 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years have lower mean scaled 
accruals compared with 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years (-8.5% and -1.4%, respectively). In addition, 
total sales scaled by total assets of 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years are around 0.79, less than the rest of the 
sample (1.14), on average, with a statistically significant difference of 1%.  
To examine whether the findings in the previous section also extend to negative earnings, this 
study commenced the analysis by repeating the original tests, however, suspect firm-years were 
identified as firms with earnings less than zero level. Specifically, the test was run by the 
following regression (Equation 7 in section 3.5.2):  
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡, 
where 𝑌𝑡  are the earnings management proxies (e.g. 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 , 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠); and indicator variable ‘𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠’ is equal to one when the net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets is negative, and is equal to zero otherwise.   
The coefficients of the above regression are estimated in the cross-section every year. Panel B 
of Table 4.6 shows the time-series means of the coefficients from the seven annual cross-
sectional regressions over the period 2009-2015, along with the corresponding t-statistics from 
Fama and MacBeth approach (1973). The results for suspect firm-years show negative earnings 
from the model estimation when five measures of earnings managements as dependent variables 
are used. The second column in Panel B provide evidence that abnormal discretionary expenses 
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are unusually low for 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years. When the dependent variable in estimation regression is 
abnormal discretionary expenses, the coefficient on Loss on average is negative (-0.0436) and 
statistically significant at a 5% level (t=-2.76879). 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years have abnormal discretion 
which is lower on average by 4.4% of assets compared to the rest of the sample. UK firm-years 
thus aim to create better future performances and so decrease current period earnings and 
engage more in real earnings management activities through discretional expenses-based 
manipulation. The coefficient on Loss when abnormal production costs is the dependent 
variable is 0.07347 and significant at a 5 percent level (t-=3.25726). The coefficient indicates 
that the mean abnormal production costs of suspect firm-years are greater by 7.3% of assets 
than the mean across the rest of the sample. The results for production costs suggest that firm-
years engage in real activities manipulation of over producing goods to use the effects of 
managerial turnover. Therefore, it appears that firms are likely to engage in two types of real 
earnings management activities, that of reducing discretionary expenses and overproduction, in 
order to achieve a better future operating performance. In addition, when 𝑌𝑡  is set equal to 
abnormal accruals in the above regression and the coefficient on Loss is negative (-0.04483) 
and statistically significant at the 1% level (t=-8.22045). It indicates that suspect firm-years 
have abnormal accruals which are lower by 4.5% of assets on average compared with the rest 
of the sample, thus the higher the residuals, the lower the amount of discretionary accruals. The 
results imply that firm-years are likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management 
activities by adjusting the discretionary accruals to negative for an incentive to reduce income 
in the current period and to improve future performance.    
To summarise, a large number of studies have focused on firms using earnings management 
methods to increase earnings, whilst some firms engage in earnings management activities 
which aim to decrease earnings in order to present a future better performance. This section 
examines whether firms use different earnings management methods to decrease earnings or 
shift positive earnings to negative levels. The results in Table 4.6 suggest that some UK firms 
in order to achieve future better performance are likely to decrease their earnings or shift 
positive earnings to negative earnings to engage in earnings management activities through 
discretionary expenses based manipulation, production costs based manipulation, and accrual-







Table 4.6: Firm characteristics and earnings management proxies for 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firms compared to 
all other firms 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm-years versus the rest of sample 
 
Variable 
𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 Firm-years All Other Firm-years Differences 
N Mean St. Dev N Mean St. Dev Means t statistic 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎  119 -0.048 0.063 1,692 0.003 0.101 -0.051 -6.130*** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏  145 0.043 0.327 1,968 -0.003 0.397 0.046 -8.110*** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃  108 0.108 0.265 1,513 -0.008 0.363 0.115 1.605* 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬  132 -0.046 0.092 1,698 0.004 0.061 -0.050 4.250*** 
𝐍𝐞𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞  169 -0.111 0.193 1,981 0.124 0.156 -0.234 -15.357*** 
𝐌𝐓𝐁  116 3.398 5.087 1,619 3.470 4.900 -0.072 -0.148 
𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄  117 7.268 0.668 1,618 6.962 0.586 0.306 4.829*** 
𝐂𝐅𝐎  161 -0.007 0.200 1,974 0.131 0.145 -0.138 -8.552*** 
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏  169 0.434 0.520 1,968 0.428 0.523 0.005 0.129 
𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃  135 0.485 0.746 1,826 0.657 0.866 -0.172 -2.552*** 
𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬  169 -0.085 0.155 1,981 -0.014 0.075 -0.070 -5.846*** 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬   145 0.790 0.868 1,981 1.140 0.984 -0.350 -4.649*** 
 
Panel B: Comparison of 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firms with other firms 
Variable 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃 𝐑𝐀𝐌 𝐀𝐌 
𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭  0.0011 -0.0024** -0.0055* -0.0010 0.0022**  
(0.861) (-3.352) (-1.888) (-0.179) (2.978)       
𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄  -0.0069*** -0.0104* -0.0112** -0.0252** 0.0015***  
(-3.595) (-2.002) (-2.128) (-2.258) (3.455)       
𝐌𝐓𝐁  0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001  
(0.157) (0.328) (0.030) (0.125) (0.967)       
𝐑𝐎𝐀  -0.4726*** -0.1015* -0.5387*** -1.0991*** 0.0451**  
(-6.515) (-1.949) (-5.623) (-5.467) (2.937)       
𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬  -0.0087 -0.0436** 0.0735** 0.0504 -0.0448**  
(-1.194) (-2.769) (3.257) (1.071) (-8.220)       
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝐍𝐨. 𝐨𝐟 𝐎𝐛𝐬.   2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 
𝐀𝐝𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐑𝟐  0.40051 -0.00712 0.02434 0.01727 0.05366 
 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Note to Table 4.6: 1. The sample period spans 2009-2015 and includes 2,513 firm-years. Loss 
making firms are firm-years with reported net income before extraordinary items of total assets 
of less than 0%, 169 suspect firm-years. Other firms in Panel A include all firm-years which 
are not loss making firms.   
2. The Test statistic in Panel A is based on a difference in means across the sample (𝑡-test) with 
𝑝-value reported in the column next to it. Specifically, the test statistic is calculated as follows:  






⁄ , where ?̅?𝑖  is the mean of sample group 𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖
2  is the 
variance of sample group 𝑖, 𝑁𝑖 is the number of observations in group 𝑖. Degree of freedom of 
t-statistics = 𝑁1+ 𝑁2-2.  
3. Panel B reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions, the regressions being estimated are 
the same as the previous section of the form:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
Each column presents the results of the above regression for a different variable, whose name 
appears at the top of the respective column. T-statistics were calculated using the standard errors 
of the mean across seven years. They have been reported in parentheses. The table also reports 
the average number of annual observations and mean adjusted R square. 
4. Variable definitions: Abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is measured as deviations from the predicted values 
from the corresponding industry-year regression
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1







) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; abnormal discretionary expenses are measured as deviations from the 
corresponding industry-year regression 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
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) + 𝛽 (
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) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ;  
abnormal production costs are measured as deviations from the predicted values from the 
corresponding industry-year regression  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
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) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑀 is the sum of 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 multiply by (-1), 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 multiply by (-
1), and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 ; abnormal discretionary accruals are measured as deviations from the 







) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 is income before extraordinary items 
scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, 
expressed as deviation from the corresponding industry-year mean; 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸 is the log value of 
market value of equity, and is the deviation from the corresponding industry-year. 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is the 
cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets; 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the discretionary expenses 
scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 is the production costs, the sum cost of goods sold and 
change in inventory scaled by lagged total assets; Accruals is the net income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus the operating cash flows and scaled by 
lagged by total assets; total sales is scaled by the total assets. Please see Appendix A for all 






This chapter has presented the empirical results of the investigation of whether UK firms engage 
in earnings management activities through manipulating discretionary accruals, sales-based 
manipulation, cutting discretionary expenses, and overproduction to just meet or beat a ‘zero’ 
level of earnings and last year’s earnings. The findings complement the existing literature on 
earnings management in the following ways. Firstly, the chapter has provided evidence that UK 
suspect firm-years are likely to engage more in real activities manipulation to boost earnings 
by cutting discretionary expenses and producing more goods when just beating or meeting the 
earnings benchmark around the ‘zero’ level. They seek to attempt to make earnings upwards 
through reductions in discretionary expenses and overproduction simultaneously. However, it 
was not possible to find evidence that suspect firm-years use sales-based manipulation and 
accrual-based earnings management to beat or meet the ‘zero’ level of earnings management. 
Secondly, this chapter offered evidence that UK suspect firm-years have unusually lower 
discretionary expenses, suggesting they are likely to engage more in real activities manipulation 
only through reducing or cutting discretionary expenses to boost earnings when just beating or 
meeting last year’s earnings benchmark. It was also ascertained that suspect firm-years are not 
involved in managing earnings upwards by using sales-based manipulation or overproduction 
and accrual-based earnings management when comparing earnings with that of the previous 
year. In addition, this chapter found new evidence that UK firms with negative earnings have 
incentives to further decrease their earnings or shift positive earnings to negative through 
accrual-based earnings management, manipulating discretionary expenses, or manipulating 
production costs, in order to report a future better performance.   
In conclusion, the findings presented in this chapter contribute to literature on earnings 
management, suggesting that firms would like to engage in accrual-based and real earnings 
management to achieve their targets, and that some are engaged in earnings management 
activities to manage earnings upwards, whilst others are likely to use the earnings management 












Chapter 5 Directors’ Remuneration and Earnings 
Management 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the empirical results of second part of the thesis. The aim of this chapter 
has been to investigate whether firm directors achieve any abnormal remunerations by engaging 
in accrual-based and/or real earnings management activities. The study introduces a new 
regression model to measure the abnormal level of directors’ remuneration and conducts 
analysis of the relationship between abnormal directors’ remunerations and abnormal earnings 
management. The empirical results, using both univariate and multivariate analysis, have been 
organised as follows. Firstly, in section 5.2, characteristics of directors’ remunerations for the 
whole sample are presented. Secondly, descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of 
variables are given, and the normal level of directors’ remunerations estimated. Section 5.4 
shows the summary statistics abnormal level of directors’ remunerations, accrual-based 
earnings management, and real activities manipulation. Correlation coefficients of abnormal 
directors’ remunerations, accrual-based and real earnings management are provided in section 
5.5. Moreover, test results of the association between abnormal directors’ remunerations and 
abnormal earnings management are also presented in section 5.6. In addition, section 5.7 takes 
account of ‘highest paid director’ and ‘other emoluments’ to undertake additional analysis to 
explore whether they are associated with earnings management. Finally, an overview of the 
results is given.            
5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Directors’ Remuneration  
Previous researchers have provided substantial evidence that executive directors are able to 
increase their remuneration by using accounting earnings management (e.g., Holthausen, 
Lareker, and Sloan, 1995; Balsam, 1998; Guidry, Leone, and Rock, 1999; Healy, 1985; Shuto, 
2007). Firm directors in the UK market may have incentives to manipulate earnings in order to 
present a better future performance and achieve a higher level of compensation. In the UK 
market, directors’ remuneration is defined as the process by which directors of a firm received 
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payment or compensation for services or employment, either through fees, base salary, any 
bonuses and any other economic benefits such as use of firm property, children’s vouchers, 
firm car scheme, additional holidays which an employee or executive receives during 
employment with the approval of the shareholders and board of directors. The process of 
directors’ remuneration arose when shareholders were able to agree to or reject fees paid to firm 
directors as shareholders had become concerned that directors were rewarding themselves large 
salaries in spite of presenting a poor performance (e.g. low profit or revenue). The shareholders 
set an upper limit to be paid to the board of directors, in order to reduce the risk of abnormal 
large amounts being paid to directors. In turn the board of directors determine the allocation of 
these payments and benefits to the directors. Directors’ remuneration is part of the employment 
contract between directors and firms, thus the board of directors decides the amount of salaries 
and relevant bonuses paid to directors, including the general directors, resulting in the 
remuneration agreement being directly controlled by the board of directors. Meanwhile, in order 
to prevent the board of directors paying abnormal excessive amounts which exceed the agreed 
payment to directors or pay a disproportionately large amount of profits instead of distributing 
it to stockholders as dividends to directors, shareholders reserve the right to sue directors.       
Firms wish to determine a directors’ remuneration package, which is essential to ensure that the 
directors have a stake in achieving a good performance for the shareholders, and each 
component of a director’s remuneration package is designed to ensure that the director 
concentrates on the firm and is motivated to improve firm performance. The design of the 
remuneration package should ensure that the package is provided to attract, retain and motivate 
executive directors of the quality required, but avoids paying more than is necessary. It is judged 
where the position of the remuneration package is relative to other firms clearly taking into 
account how much comparable firms are paying and relative performance whilst taking note of 
the wider firm sensitivity (such as conditions of pay and employment elsewhere in the firm, 
especially when the increase of annual pay has been confirmed).  
The directors’ remuneration package has four main components: basic salary, performance-
related elements of remuneration, pension contributions and benefits in kind. Basic salary for 
directors, is subject to the content of the job, the skills of the director delivering the job, the 
performance during the job, overall contribution to firm strategy, and average market rates for 
such type of work, set at basic level by firms. As firm directors are paid upper quartile salaries, 
the peer groups generally may offer indications of expectation of directors’ performance when 
setting basic salary, in order to ensure directors deliver a premium effort in the future. A 
performance-related element is a significant part of the total directors’ remuneration package 
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which is defined as being dependant on the achievement of some form of performance-based 
measurement criteria. Some directors are entitled to receive a performance-related short-term 
bonus at the end of the financial year and this performance-related bonus could be based on 
measures of accounting numbers or ratios. Stock options are the most common and popular 
performance-related directors’ remuneration as a long-term market-orientated incentive scheme. 
Stock option contracts allow executive directors to buy firm stocks at a fixed price or exercise 
price, whilst permitting them to sell the stocks at a profit if the stock price rises above the 
exercise price. Most executive directors will exercise the stock option when they generate a 
profit, as stock options are part of executive directors’ remuneration. Performance related 
remuneration is usually given as stock options, offering executive directors the incentive to 
manage the firm in such a manner that stock prices rise. Thus, stock options are deemed to align 
executive directors’ goals with those of the shareholders. Pension contributions are a fixed 
amount and associated only with basic salary. The pension contributions are important to 
directors especially those close to retirement, because the relevant pension consequences, 
relevant costs to the firms’ basic salary increases, and any relevant changes in pensionable 
remuneration may impact on directors’ remuneration when they no long work for the firm. The 
other element of the remuneration package is that of benefits in kind (also known as ‘perks). 
This contains all the other non-wage compensations given to directors in addition to their 
normal salaries, such as health insurance, firm car scheme, free car parking space, additional 
holidays etc. These additional ancillary benefits help to improve the expectation of the position 
of executive directors and increase directors loyalty and motivation to contribute successfully 
to the firm.    
Table 5.1 presents the basic characteristics of directors’ remuneration packages. The full sample 
covers the period from 2009 through 2015, including 2,513 firm-year observations, from 359 
firms, is listed on the FTSE All-share excluding the financial and real estate sectors. Directors’ 
remuneration (𝐷𝑆𝐵) is the sum of directors’ fees, pension contribution, and other emoluments. 
There are 2,207 firm-year observations for disclosure of total directors’ compensation, where 
the mean of total directors’ remuneration is £4.3 million, with a median of about £2.8 million, 
and a standard deviation of £5.5 million. The first and third quartiles of total directors’ 
remuneration range from £1.8 million to £4.9 million. Both skewness and kurtosis of directors’ 
compensation are positive, about 10 and 201, respectively. Directors’ fees are the basic salary 
level of directors, set by firms. The mean of directors’ fees for the sample is about £1.5 million 
with a median of about £1.2 million, and standard deviation is £3.3 million. The lower and 
upper quartile of directors’ fees has ranged from £0.9 million to £1.7 million. The skewness 
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and kurtosis are 35 and 1,444, respectively. As can be seen, the mean level of directors’ fees is 
36% of total directors’ remuneration, because directors are generally paid a higher amount for 
greater effort in the future and accordingly the setting of directors’ fee may give some indication 
of expectation of directors’ future performance. The mean of the pension contribution is 
relatively low as it is pensioned on basic salary, around £264 thousand, the median of pension 
contribution is about £264 thousand, and with a standard deviation is £457 thousand. The lower 
and upper quartiles of pension contributions are £87 thousand and £306 thousand, respectively. 
The skewness of pension contribution is 13, and Kurtosis is 263. The nature of the pension 
contribution is mainly linked to change in basic salary and some other changes in pensionable 
remuneration and the mean pension contribution is only 6% of total directors’ remuneration. 
Other emoluments represent all the other compensations directors receive in addition to the 
basic salary and pension contribution, which consist of two main elements: performance-related 
remunerations (e.g., bonus, share options, etc.), and benefits in kind (e.g., health insurance, firm 
property scheme, firm car scheme, children’s voucher, additional holiday, etc.). The other 
emoluments entail a significant component of directors’ remuneration, the mean other 
emoluments for the firm-years is £2.6 million, which is around 62% of mean total directors’ 
remuneration, and which account for a high proportion of total directors’ remuneration. 
Changes to other emoluments may have a great impact on directors’ compensation. The median 
of other emoluments is about £1.4 million and the standard deviation is £3.9 million. The first 
and third quartile of other emoluments range from £0.7 million to £2.9 million. The skewness 
and kurtosis of other emoluments are 5 and 44, respectively.      
In addition, total assets and sales, from a certain perspective, both indicate the operating 
performance of a firm, because total assets as economic value are expended over time to yield 
a benefit for the firm, and sales are a reflection of the total amount of revenue business can 
bring to the firm. In Table 5.1, scaling directors’ remuneration (𝐷𝑆𝐵) by total assets is similar 
to measuring directors’ remuneration relative to sales, as total assets and sales are highly 
positively correlated as discussed in the previous chapter. The mean-scaled total directors’ 
remuneration accounted for a small proportion of total assets, only 0.0061. Total directors’ 
remuneration contains all remuneration elements, thereby each element of the remuneration 
package is a smaller part of total assets compared with total directors’ compensation. The mean 
scaled directors’ fees, mean scaled pension contribution, mean scaled other emoluments of total 
assets are 0.0028, 0.0004, and 0.0031, respectively. The ratios of directors’ remuneration and 
its elements to total assets are as low as expected, however this does not indicate whether 
directors’ remuneration is associated with total assets and sales. Details of the highest paid 
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director are also reported, meaning that details of the amount the director receiving the highest 
level of compensation from the firm is given. The mean of the highest paid director is about 
£1.7 million, with a median of £1.1 million and standard deviation is £2.3 million. The lower 
and upper quartiles of highest paid directors are £0.7 million and £2 million, respectively. The 
mean percentage of highest directors pay to total directors’ remuneration is 42%, with a median 
of about 41% and standard deviation is 13%. The first and third quartiles of highest directors 
pay to directors’ remuneration range from 32% to 50%. This indicates that the highest paid 
directors (usually executive directors) earn a high proportion of the total of directors’ 
remuneration paid by the firm. It also can be seen that the highest paid directors may have a 
greater incentive to engage in earnings management as they want to present a better 




Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of Directors compensations 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Deviation 25% 75% Skewness Kurtosis 
𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬′𝐑𝐞𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 £th  2,207 4,237.2532 2,793 5,451.9126 1,786 4,868 10.0361 201.0381 
𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬′ 𝐅𝐞𝐞𝐬 £th  2,183 1,515.2988 1,188 3,347.9346 860 1,741 35.4183 1444.2788 
𝐏𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 £th  1,714 263.7167 169.5 456.6271 87 306 13.1426 263.0870 
𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐄𝐦𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬 £th 2,130 2,618.0432 1,412 3,876.1166 695 2,916.75 5.1300 43.9214 
𝐇𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫 £th 2,173 1,728.0704 1,095 2,341.0788 690.5 1967 8.8971 132.1976 
𝐃𝐒𝐁/𝐓𝐀  2,134 0.0061 0.0029 0.0128 0.0012 0.0064 11.9712 250.6095 
𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬 𝐅𝐞𝐞𝐬/𝐓𝐀  2,114 0.0028 0.0011 0.0089 0.0005 0.0029 27.4869 1019.5238 
𝐏𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧/𝐓𝐀  1,666 0.0004 0.0002 0.0009 0.0001 0.0004 15.4257 310.5926 
𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐄𝐦𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬/𝐓𝐀  2,068 0.0031 0.0013 0.0072 0.0005 0.0030 8.4849 99.9047 
𝐇𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬 𝐏𝐚𝐲/𝐃𝐒𝐁  2,173 41.82% 40.855 12.61% 32.36% 50.23% 0.5160 0.6631 
 
Note to Table 5.1: This table presents the descriptive statistics for components of the directors’ remuneration package for the full sample of all 
firms listed on FTSE All-share. The sample covers the period between 2009 and 2015, and includes 2,513 firm-year observations from 359 firms. 
Directors’ remuneration (𝐷𝑆𝐵) is the sum of directors’ fees, pension contribution, and other emoluments. Directors’ fees represent the basic salary 
level of directors, usually set by firms; pension contribution is pensioned on basic salary; other emoluments include all the other compensations of 
directors in addition to the basic salary and pension contribution. There are two main elements: performance-related remunerations (e.g., bonus 
and share options), and benefits in kind (e.g., health insurance, children’s vouchers, additional holidays, firm car scheme, firm property, etc.). The 
relevant number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, skewness, and kurtosis are reported. The 




5.3 Measurement of Abnormal Level of Directors’ Remunerations   
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients of Variables 
Table 5.2 (Panel A) shows descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables for the 
empirical test as to whether directors have achieved an excessive level of compensations in all 
firms in the FTSE in each industry over a period from 2009 to 2015, with 2,513 firm-year 
observations from 359 firms. Panel B presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of variables 
to the full sample.    
In Table 5.2 (Panel A), as the dependent variable, total directors’ remuneration includes basic 
salary, pension contribution, and other bonuses, at the mean level of around £4,237 thousand, 
the median being about £2,793 thousand, with a standard deviation of £5,452 thousand.  The 
lower and upper quartiles of total directors’ remuneration range from £1,786 thousand to £4,868 
thousand and measure the variability around the median value of directors’ remuneration. Sales 
revenue, as a crucial measure of firm performance, is the amount of income brought into the 
firm by its business activities, usually from the sale of goods and services to customers. The 
sample mean of total sales revenue is about £4,922.3 million, with the median at about £767.3 
million. The relevant standard deviation is high, at £20,492.6 million. The first quartile and 
third quartile of total sales revenue is £278.9 million, and £2,286.9 million, respectively. Total 
assets represent the economic resources of a firm and indicate the capacity to create or increase 
the firm’s value and benefit to the firm’s operations, therefore, the total directors’ remuneration 
after scaled by total assets is at a mean level of 0.006, the median is about 0.003 and the standard 
deviation is around 0.013. The lower and upper quartiles range from 0.001 to 0.006. The mean 
scaling total sales revenue by total assets is around 1.116, with a median of about 0.918 and the 
standard deviation of scaled total sales is 0.981. The 25% and 75% quartiles are 0.519 and 1.39, 
respectively.              
In addition, profit margin is the percentage of sales turned into profits, and is a common 
indicator of a firm’s profitability by gauging the degree to which a firm’s business activities 
generate profits. UK firms achieve a 10% profit margin at the mean level, meaning that firms 
had a net profit of £0.1 for each pound of sales generated during the sample period between 
2009 and 2015. The median of profit margin is about 8%, with the standard deviation at about 
17%, and the lower and upper quartiles range from 3% to 15%. Altman’s (1967) z-score helps 
to measure the financial health of a firm by the use of multiple corporate income and balance 
sheet values to predict the status of a firm’s financial distress in the next two years. The mean 
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of z-score is about 10.9, with the median at about 2.6 and the standard deviation of z-score is 
198.5. There are 192,967 mean number of employees for firm-year observations, with 4,451 of 
employees per the median number, and the standard deviation of the number of employees is 
about 544,24. The 25% and 75% quartiles of number of employees are 1,194 and 14,688, 
respectively.      
Table 5.2 (Panel B) provides information about the Pearson correlation coefficients of all 
variables in the estimation model (Equation (8)) of abnormal directors’ remuneration for the 
entire sample of 2,512 firm-year observations. Total directors’ remuneration is significantly 
positively correlated with total sales (32.7%), thus indicating that directors tend to present a 
higher amount of sales revenue as better firm performance for the purpose of gaining extra 
compensation. A higher level of sales revenue is an indicator of a firm’s performance 
improvement and can be seen from two perspectives: in one the bigger number of total sales 
revenue implies a larger firm size, and so larger sized firms pay directors more; in the other 
total sales may be relatively large compared with that of the previous year and an increase of 
sales indicates an improvement in firm operating performance. The correlation coefficient 
between total directors’ remuneration and profit margin is significantly positive (11.1%). This 
positive correlation provides additional evidence that directors’ remuneration is linked to firm 
profit performance as profit margin measures the degree to which a firm’s business activities 
generate profits. The higher percentage of sales revenue indicates better firm performance, as a 
result, the firm directors may have the opportunity to achieve more rewards. The independent 
variable, z-score, measures the financial health of a firm, only negligibly associated with total 
directors’ remuneration (0.2%), which suggests that the amount of remuneration received by 
firm directors has no significant impact on the firm’s status or financial distress. A significantly 
positive correlation exists between total directors’ remuneration and number of employees, at 
25.4%, meaning a greater number of employees and higher level of directors’ remuneration. 
This is due to both firm performance and firm size and is indicated by the number of employees, 
improvement in firm performance and the growth of the firm size implying that increasing 
production capacity, requires a larger number of employees.  
Moreover, under the relationship between each independent variable, sales have no, or only a 
slightly correlation with profit margin (-2.7%), whilst the sales after being scaled by total assets 
is significantly negative when associated with profit margin (-12.8%). The correlation 
coefficient between sales and z-score is significantly negative (-5.7%), indicating that sales 
revenue is affected by the financial health of firms, and sales will be reduced by the higher 
probability of a firm’s bankruptcy.  Total sales have a significantly positive correlation with the 
137 
 
number of employees (2.839%), as a higher level of sales requires a larger number of employees. 
Similar to total sales, profit margin is significantly positively associated with z-score (22%), 
indicating that the firm’s status of financial distress will influence firm profitability: in other 
words, a certain level of profitability gained through firm business activities also depends on 
the status of the firm’s financial health. The correlation coefficient between profit margin and 
number of employees is significantly negative (-5.7%), the negative correlation probably 
indicating that too many employees increase the cost of production and operation, and less net 
income is generated from firm sales, although at the same time the number of employees implies 
production capacity and business vitality. Z-score and number of employees have a negative 
correlation, at significant level (-9.3%), also implying that a firm will cut the number of 
employees where there is a risk of bankruptcy.     
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of variable 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev 25% 75% 
𝐃𝐒𝐁 £ th  2,207 4,237.253 2,793 5,451.913 1,786 4,868 
𝐃𝐒𝐁/𝐓𝐀  2,134 0.006 0.003 0.013 0.001 0.006 
𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬 th GBP 2,202 4,922,305 767,350 20,492,603 278,920 2,286,900 
𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬/𝐓𝐀  2,126 1.116 0.918 0.981 0.519 1.390 
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧 % 2,127 10.079 7.920 17.275 2.920 15.450 
𝐳 − 𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞  2,230 10.893 2.567 198.486 1.717 3.827 










Panel B: Correlation coefficients of variables 
Variable 𝐃𝐒𝐁 𝐃𝐒𝐁/𝐓𝐀 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬/𝐓𝐀 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧 𝐳 − 𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐍𝐨. 𝐨𝐟 𝐞𝐦𝐩𝐥 
𝐃𝐒𝐁  1 
      
𝐃𝐒𝐁/𝐓𝐀  0.265*** 1 
     
𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬  0.327*** -0.120*** 1 
    
𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬/𝐓𝐀  -0.118*** 0.245*** 0.015 1 
   
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧  0.111*** 0.070*** -0.027 -0.128*** 1 
  
𝐳 − 𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞  0.002 0.020 -0.057*** 0.161*** 0.220*** 1 
 
𝐍𝐨. 𝐨𝐟 𝐞𝐦𝐩𝐥  0.254*** -0.150*** 0.289*** 0.037 -0.057*** -0.093*** 1 
 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 5.2: Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and some other variables of the full sample. Panel B 
presents correlations coefficients between variables and the full sample. This full sample of firm-year observations over the period from 2009-
2015, consists of 2,513 firm-year observations, for 359 firms. 𝐷𝑆𝐵  is the total directors’ remuneration aggregating directors’ fees, pension 
contribution and other emolument; 𝐷𝑆𝐵/𝑇𝐴  is total directors’ remuneration scaled by previous year’s total assets; 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  is sale revenues; 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝑇𝐴 is sales scaled by previous year’s total assets; 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 is a ratio for measuring profitability looking at net incomes as a percentage 
of total sales; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 measures the financial health of firms, designed by Altman (1968); 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 is the number of employees in 
firms. Within Panel A are the number of valid firm-year observations, the mean, median, standard deviations, and 25% and 75% quartile for every 
variables. In Panel B are Pearson correlation coefficients. Please see Appendix A for all variables descriptions.   
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5.3.2 Measurement of Abnormal Directors’ Remuneration  
This section examines the magnitude of abnormal directors’ remuneration, as firm directors 
have incentives to adopt some accounting choices to present a better operating performance in 
order to achieve an excessive level of compensation. As discussed in section 3.2.1, this study 
built a new regression model to estimate the normal level of directors’ remuneration, the 
independent variables including total sales revenue, profit margin, Altman’s (1968) z-score, 
and number of employees, where abnormal directors’ remuneration is estimated as deviation 
from the predicted values from the regression model. In order to capture the different effects of 
abnormal directors’ remuneration, based on different definition of variables, a second model 
was run, based on model 1 (Equation (8)). In Model 1, the total directors’ remuneration as the 
dependent variable, sales revenue, profit margin, z-score and No. of employees are set as 
independent variables. However, in Model 2, the dependent variable, directors’ remuneration 
is lagged by total assets for the year 𝑡 − 1, one independent variable, sales revenue, is also 
lagged by total assets for the year 𝑡 − 1, and the definition of all other variables’ is the same as 
Model 1. The signs and the absolute value of the error terms (also referred to as residuals) for 
both Model 1 and Model 2 can be used to evaluate the abnormal level of directors’ remuneration. 
A positive sign of the error term indicates that directors probably have utilised any accounting 
choices to gain abnormally high compensation from their firms, and a negative sign, otherwise, 
indicates that firms’ directors gained abnormally low rewards as they were likely to engage in 
accounting strategy activities.   
Table 5.3 reports the estimation results of the regression models to estimate the normal levels 
of directors’ remuneration through Model 1 and Model 2 (Based on Equation (8)) to measure 
the abnormal level of directors’ remunerations. The estimation models are estimated across-
sectionally for every industry and every year in the period between 2009 and 2015. Both models 
had a sample of 2,513 firm-years observations, and the sample defines 11 major industries 
according to five-digit UK SIC codes (2007). The reported coefficients in table 6.3 are the mean 
value of the coefficients across all industry-years (77 industry-years). The parametric test, t-
statistics (in parentheses), using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach, have been calculated 
using the standard error of the mean coefficients across industry-years. The adjust 𝑅 square is 
also computed as the mean adjust 𝑅 square across industry-years.     
Directors’ remuneration is now initiated by shareholders aiming to establish a balance between 
salary and firms’ performance, as shareholders are concerned about the large salaries’ directors 
awarded themselves whilst presenting a poor operating performance. Therefore, each 
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component of a directors’ remuneration package is designed to ensure that the directors focus 
on the firm and are motivated to improve performance. Given that firms reporting a good 
performance generally guarantees directors receive a higher amount of compensation, the 
coefficients in the model of abnormal directors’ remuneration on performance related variables, 
such as turnover, profit margin, should be positive. In Model 1, all the mean coefficients of this 
regression are significantly different from zero with one exception. The mean coefficient on 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is statistically significant and positive (0.0006), because a higher sales revenue means 
a higher amount realized by a firm from the sale of goods or services, which implies that a 
larger sized firm is able to pay more to directors. The mean coefficient on Model 1 of abnormal 
directors’ remuneration on profit margin is, like sales revenues, significantly positive at 1% 
level (67.43153). Profit margin measures the profitability performance of a firm, and the 
positive sign of mean coefficient on profit margin implies that directors have the opportunity 
to gain additional rewards as they help the firm meet better profits target. However, the mean 
coefficient of the regression model on z-score is statistically significant with a negative sign (-
126.998). The mean coefficients on a number of employees is insignificant with a positive sign 
(0.00188).  
On the other hand, estimated coefficients in the Model 2 of abnormal directors’ remuneration 
are mostly consistent with those reported in Model 1. The mean coefficients on sales revenue 
scaled by the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 is significant with positive sign (0.00132). 
The mean coefficient of the Model 2 on the number of employees is significantly positive (0). 
However, the mean coefficient on profit margin is significantly slightly negative (-0.00004), 
because the impact of both the dependent variable directors’ remuneration and independent 
variable sales revenue are scaled by the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡. The mean 
coefficient of the Model 2 on z-score is significantly positive (0.00119), inconsistent with the 
result in Model 1. The z-score is a prediction of a firm’s’ distress and turnaround, the higher 
the score indicating a healthier firm finance and good sales value in the eyes of those interested 
in buying the firm. (e.g., z-score above 2.99 recommends buying the stock), thus directors’ 
remuneration is positive associated to z-score.   
Finally, the mean adjusted 𝑅 squares across industry- year is 42 percent of abnormal directors’ 
remuneration for Model 1 and 32 percent for Model 2. Therefore, it indicates that both models 





Table 5.3: Measurement of abnormal directors’ remuneration 
Estimation of the normal level of directors’ remuneration 
 
 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 5.3: The following (ordinary least squares) regressions are estimated across-
sectionally for each industry and each year for the period from 2009 and 2015. UK five-digit 
SIC codes (2007) are used to define industries. There are 77 separate industry-years over the 
sample period. The reported coefficients are the mean value of the coefficients across the 
industry-years. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using the standard errors of the 
coefficients across industry-years (Fama and Macbeth, 1973). The table also reports the mean 
adjusted 𝑅 square across each industry and each year for each of the following regressions. All 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to avoid the impact of 
outliers.  
Model 1 
Abnormal directors’ remunerations are the difference between the actual level of directors’ 
remuneration and the normal level of directors’ remuneration, estimated as being deviations 
from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression from a sample of UK 
firms:  
 𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where the dependent variable, 𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡, is total directors’ remuneration including director’s fees, 
pension contribution, and other emoluments in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖. Independent variables: 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is total sales revenue in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖; 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is profit margin which 
measures the profitability and performance, equal to the net income as a percentage of total 
sales in year 𝑡 for fthe firm 𝑖;  𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a measurement of the financial health of the firm 
and calculated by using multiple corporate income and balance sheet values in year 𝑡 for the 
firm 𝑖; 𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is the number of employees in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is the error term. 
Model 1: 𝐃𝐒𝐁 Model 2: 𝐃𝐒𝐁/𝐓𝐀 
𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭  2297.4064*** 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭  0.0013***  
(14.304) 
 
(3.206)     
𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬  0.0006*** 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬/𝐓𝐀  0.0013***  
(5.368) 
 
(2.464)     
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧  67.4315*** 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧  -0.0000*  
(7.174) 
 
(-1.365)     
𝐳 − 𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞  -126.9984*** 𝐳 − 𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞  0.0012***  
(-2.787) 
 
(4.666)     
𝐍𝐨. 𝐨𝐟 𝐞𝐦𝐩𝐥  0.0019 𝐍𝐨. 𝐨𝐟 𝐞𝐦𝐩𝐥  0.0000***  
(0.172) 
 
(-7.381)     




Similar to Model 1, abnormal directors’ remunerations are the difference between actual 
directors’ remunerations and normal directors’ remuneration, estimated as the deviation from 
the predicted values from the following industry-year regression for a sample of UK firms:  
𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where the dependent variable, 
𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
, defined as total directors’ remunerations divided by 




the total sales revenue during the year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖; 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the net income as a 
percentage of total sales in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖;  𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a use of multiple corporate income 
and balance sheet values in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖 to measure the status of the firm’s financial 
distress; 𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is the number of employees in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is the error term. 
Please see Appendix A for all variables descriptions.    
  
5.4 Summary Statistics Abnormal Level of Directors’ Remuneration, 
Accrual-based Earnings Management, and Real Activities 
Manipulation  
Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics of the abnormal level of directors’ remuneration, 
accrual-based earnings management, and real activities manipulation including mean, median, 
25th percentile, 75th percentile, skewness and kurtosis for each relevant model separately. 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1 is abnormal directors’ remuneration, the estimated residuals (error term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡) from 
the regression model 1 of normal level of directors’ remuneration, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2 is also the 
abnormal directors’ remuneration, but calculated as deviations from estimation model 2 of 
normal level of directors’ remuneration so that higher abnormal directors’ remuneration implies 
an excessive amount of compensation gained by directors. 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  represents the 
abnormal level of discretionary accruals, calculated as the residuals from the proxy of accrual-
based earnings management, higher abnormal level of accruals indicates more accrual-based 
earnings management. 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 , and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷  are abnormal cash flows 
from operating, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs, respectively 
the three measures of real activities manipulation. Both 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 require 
the need to multiply -1, so that the higher value of them indicates a greater extent of real 
earnings management by sales-based manipulation and the cutting of discretionary expenses 
respectively, whereas higher values of abnormal production costs directly indicate more real 
earnings management through overproduction. 𝑅𝐴𝑀  aggregates the three real activities 
manipulation measures into one proxy, so that higher values indicate greater use of real earnings 
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management; 𝐸𝑀 captures the total effects of accrual-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation, so that a higher amount of 𝐸𝑀 indicates higher engagement in earnings 
management (further details in Chapter 4).  
The mean of abnormal directors’ remuneration from Model 1 and Model 2 are both equal to 
zero, as they are estimated based on the 𝑂𝐿𝑆 regression model in that the sum of all differences 
between the fitted values (which are on the regression line) and the actual values of 
remunerations which are above the fitted line is exactly equal to the sum of all differences 
between the regression line and all values below the line. The median of directors’ remuneration 
from Model 1 is -385.4 with the standard deviation is about 3,203.2, and the lower and upper 
quartiles range from -1,259.2 to 742.8; whereas as regards Model 2, the median directors’ 
remuneration is around -0.001 and the standard deviation is 0.006, the 25% and 75% quartiles 
are -0.003 and 0.001, respectively. The difference of median standard deviation values between 
Model 1 and Model 2 are due in Model 2 to total directors’ remuneration and sales revenue in 
Model 2 with both scaled by the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡, while Model 1 adopts 
the raw data without any scaling. Standard skewness and standard kurtosis are similar between 
Model 1 and Model 2 with regard to abnormal directors’ remuneration, in that standard 
skewness in both models is around 3.7, and standard kurtosis in both models is around 36. The 
skewness data for the distributions of abnormal directors’ remuneration are relatively and 
slightly above zero (positive), suggesting the tail on the right side of the distribution of abnormal 
values is longer or fatter than the tail on the left side. The relatively large positive kurtosis data 
for the distribution of abnormal directors’ remuneration from Model 1 and Model 2 exhibits 
that tail data exceeds the tails of the normal distribution, suggesting that directors in UK firms 
will gain an excessive level of compensations at some stages.   
In addition, as with abnormal directors’ remuneration, the means of abnormal accruals, 
abnormal cash flows from operating, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
production costs are equal to zero, as they are estimated from the 𝑂𝐿𝑆 regressions and the best 
fitting lines from those regressions  are those which make the means residuals equal to zero. 
However, the means of 𝑅𝐴𝑀 and 𝐸𝑀 equal to 0.01 and 0.009, respectively, are not around zero, 
because they are directly estimated from the regression models. The median of abnormal 
accruals, abnormal cash flows from operating, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal 
production costs, 𝑅𝐴𝑀, and 𝐸𝑀 are 0.001, -0.007, -0.036, 0.02, 0.064, and 0.59, respectively, 
consistent with previous research studies (e.g., Rochowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 
2010; Zang, 2012). They implied that firms are engaged in earnings management to varying 
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degrees and by different methods, such as accrual-based earning management, real activities 
manipulation, or the use of accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation 
together (more detailed discussion in section 4.4). Moreover, the skewness and kurtosis for 
these abnormal values about earnings management are at a relatively low level, as compared to 
abnormal directors’ remuneration, skewness data being close to zero, kurtosis all between 7 and 
13.       
Table 5.4: Summary statistics of abnormal directors’ remuneration and earnings management 
 
N Mean Median Std. Dev 25% 75% Skew Kurt 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟏  2,041 0.00 -385.41 3,203.23 -1,259.17 742.81 3.75 35.51 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟐  1,987 0.00 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.001 3.74 35.86 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬  1,830 0.00 0.001 0.07 -0.03 0.033 -0.98 7.20 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎  1,811 0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.036 0.75 13.27 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏  2,113 0.00 -0.04 0.39 -0.18 0.15 1.95 13.32 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃  1,621 0.00 0.02 0.36 -0.15 0.17 -1.20 9.18 
𝐑𝐀𝐌  1,608 0.01 0.06 0.74 -0.29 0.38 -1.45 10.82 
𝐄𝐌  1,603 0.01 0.06 0.75 -0.31 0.38 -1.42 10.42 
 
Note to Table 5.4: This table reports characteristics of the abnormal level of directors’ 
remuneration, accrual-based earnings management, real activities manipulation for 2,513 firm-
year over the period between 2009 and 2015. 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1  is the abnormal directors’ 
remuneration estimated from Model 1; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2 is the abnormal directors’ remuneration 
estimated from Model 2; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 is abnormal discretionary accruals and represents the 
proxy of accrual-based earnings management; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂  is the abnormal cash flows from 
operating and a measure of real activities manipulation; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃  is the abnormal 
discretionary expenditure and a measure of real activities manipulation; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷  is the 
abnormal production costs and a measure of real activities manipulation; 𝑅𝐴𝑀 is the total real 
activities manipulations and aggregate of the three measures, calculated as following, 
𝑅𝐴𝑀 = 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ∗ (−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ∗ (−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂; 
EM represents the total earnings management, sum of accrual-based earnings management and 
real activities manipulation. Reported are the mean, median, standard deviation, the lower and 






5.5 Correlation Coefficients among Abnormal Directors’ Remuneration, 
Accrual-based Earnings Management, and Real Activities 
Manipulation 
Table 5.5 provides information about the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients 
(Upper Triangle) and the Spearman rank correlation coefficients (Lower Triangle) between the 
abnormal directors’ remunerations and different earnings management measures (e.g., accrual-
based earing management, real activities manipulation) for the entire sample of 2,513 firm-year 
observations covering the period 2009 to 2015. Abnormal directors’ remuneration 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2), is estimated residuals using regression model 2, which is modified based on 
Model 1 in section 6.3.2, therefore it is strongly positive correlated with abnormal directors’ 
remuneration (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1) from Model 1 (Pearson correlation of 15.4%, and Spearman 
correlation of 14.8%, respectively).  
In table 5.5, the main correlations of interest for hypothesis are the correlations between the 
magnitudes of abnormal directors’ remunerations (e.g., 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2 ) and 
different measures of earnings management (e.g., 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷, 𝑅𝐴𝑀, 𝐸𝑀). The abnormal directors’ remuneration estimated from Model 1 is 
significantly negatively associated with the measure of accrual-based earnings management, 
abnormal discretionary accruals (Pearson -3.7%, and Spearman -4.6%), indicating accrual-
based earnings management has a reverse impact on the amount of compensation directors 
received in that abnormally low discretionary accruals on the firm may cause directors to 
acquire additional rewards. This is because directors’ remuneration is determined by firm size 
and performance and directors, especially executive directors, in order to receive abnormally 
high remuneration, may embark on a strategy of manipulating firm earnings to make poor 
results look even worse so that future results look better. This is usually implemented in a bad 
year so that the directors can enhance next year’s earnings and present a better future profit 
performance through management of discretionary accruals to reduce earnings in the current 
year. Section 4.7 provides supporting evidence that those firms with negative earnings are likely 
to adopt the accrual-based earnings management method to manage earnings downwards and 
produce a poor current year profitability, to be replaced by better profit performance in the 
future, which consistent with the findings from Buchholze, et al. (2019). However, the 
correlation coefficient between abnormal directors’ remuneration, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2 , and sales-
based real earnings management, abnormal cash flows from operations ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ), is 
significantly positive (Pearson 9.3% and Spearman 11.6%, respectively). Sales-based 
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manipulation is one measure of real earnings management as firms seek to temporarily boost 
sales through offering price discounts or more lenient credit facilities, and the current-year 
operating cash flows are expected to be lower. Hence, the positive correlation coefficient 
between abnormal directors’ remunerations and abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 means that firms may tend to 
hold back boosting sales and report a loose profit performance, so that directors have the 
opportunity to present improving future profit to shareholders. Similar to abnormal cash flows 
from operations, there is a significantly positive correlation coefficient between abnormal 
directors’ remunerations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1) and abnormal discretionary expenses (Pearson 4.3% 
and Spearman 7.9%, respectively). Higher value of abnormal discretionary expenses indicates 
a greater degree of a cut in discretionary expenses (e.g., advertising, R&D, etc.), to achieve a 
reduction in firm earnings. Therefore, the positive correlation implies that directors engage in 
making abnormal discretionary expense activities and provide poor results to ensure future 
results look better, for the purpose of gaining abnormally high remunerations. Otherwise, 
abnormal production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) and abnormal directors’ remunerations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1) 
have a significantly negative association (Pearson -7% and Spearman -12.4%, respectively), 
similar to abnormal accruals, indicating that directors may, through production costs-based 
manipulation report a worse profit margin, aiming to show a greater growth in profit margin in 
a subsequent period.     
In addition, the aggregate proxy of the three real activities manipulation measures, 𝑅𝐴𝑀, is 
negatively correlated with abnormal directors’ remunerations, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1 (Pearson -8.1% and 
Spearman -12.9%, respectively), consistent with the meaning of abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs. Directors, 
especially from negative earnings firms, are likely to use real earnings management activities 
to achieve a worse earnings performance in order to show greater profits in the future as 
directors’ compensation is determined by firm performance. 𝐸𝑀, takes the total effects of both 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation, and has a negative 
association with abnormal directors remunerations, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1 (Pearson -8.4% and Spearman 
-13.1%, respectively). This shows that directors tend to accept additional gains so that they 
utilise both accrual-based earnings management and three methods of real earnings 
management simultaneously.      
Alternatively, abnormal directors’ remunerations, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2, are estimated residuals of the 
modified model, which concerns variables scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
similar to abnormal directors’ remunerations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1), the correlation coefficient between 
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abnormal directors remunerations ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2 ) and abnormal discretionary accruals are 
significantly negative (Pearson -7.7% and Spearman -5.1%, respectively). This supports the 
assumption that the higher value of abnormal directors’ pay indicates a greater amount of 
earnings reduced through accrual-based earnings management activities. The abnormal 
directors’ remunerations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2) are significantly negatively correlated with abnormal 
cash flows from operations (Pearson -4.4%), and inconsistent with the result of 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1,which means, in turn, that firms temporarily boost their sales to enhance higher 
earnings and, as a result, directors may receive excessive rewards. Abnormal directors’ 
remunerations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2) are negatively associated with abnormal discretionary expenses 
as well (Pearson -5.4%), because directors may tend to cut discretionary expenses to achieve a 
higher level of earnings, report a better performance so they can potentially create some 
additional benefits for themselves. Abnormal production costs, 𝑅𝐴𝑀, and 𝐸𝑀 are positively 
associated with abnormal directors’ remunerations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2) but are not significant, which 
suggests that there is no major problem of muticollinearity between them . 
Finally, the correlation coefficients among accrual-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation have been explained in detail in section 4.5. 𝑅𝐴𝑀 as the aggregate 
proxy of real activities manipulation, are mechanically and highly correlated with abnormal 
cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs 
(Pearson correlation: -22.7%, -95.3%, and 96.5%, respectively). Abnormal cash flows from 
operations are positively related to abnormal discretionary expenses, but are negatively related 
to abnormal production costs. Abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs 
are negatively correlated suggesting that firms may utilise the three measures of real activities 
manipulation at the same time. Abnormal discretionary accruals are significantly negatively 
associated with both abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(Pearson -18.3%, and -4.1%, respectively); the 𝑅𝐴𝑀 and abnormal discretionary accruals are, 
therefore, positively correlated (Pearson 6.4%); indicating firms engage in accrual-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation can take place simultaneously.       
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Table 5.5: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) correlations coefficients among all abnormal directors’ remunerations and 
earnings management 
 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟏 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟐 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟏/𝐓𝐀 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃 𝐑𝐀𝐌 𝐄𝐌 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟏  1 0.154*** 0.335*** -0.037* 0.093*** 0.043** -0.070*** -0.081*** -0.084*** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟐  0.148*** 1 -0.022 -0.077*** -0.044** -0.054*** 0.000 0.017 0.009 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟏/𝐓𝐀  0.829*** 0.068*** 1 0.016 0.108*** 0.065*** -0.030 -0.058** -0.056** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬  -0.046** -0.051** -0.042* 1 -0.183*** -0.041** 0.021 0.064*** 0.148*** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎  0.116** 0.019 0.096*** -0.283*** 1 0.034* -0.172*** -0.227*** -0.245*** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏  0.079*** -0.005 0.077*** -0.062*** 0.076*** 1 -0.862*** -0.953*** -0.948*** 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃  -0.124*** -0.038* -0.100*** 0.014 -0.236*** -0.792*** 1 0.963** 0.956** 
𝐑𝐀𝐌  -0.129*** -0.016 -0.116*** 0.081*** -0.280*** -0.932*** 0.930*** 1 0.996*** 
𝐄𝐌  -0.131*** -0.021 -0.117*** 0.175*** -0.298*** -0.925*** 0.917*** 0.993*** 1 
 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 5.5: This table reports Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) correlations for the sample of 2,513 firm-years 
observations of all residuals variables over the period between 2009 and 2013 as follows: Abnormal directors’ remunerations (e.g., 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1, 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2), are estimated deviations from Model 1 and Model 2, respectively (Detailed discussion in Section 5.3); Abnormal discretionary 
accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠), the proxy of accrual-based earnings management, is estimated residuals using modified Jones’s (1991) model; abnormal 
cash flows from operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂), abnormal discretionary expenses (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ), abnormal production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 ), three 
measures of real activities manipulation, are estimated residuals from Roychowdhury’s (2006) model; 𝑅𝐴𝑀 aggregates 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 
and 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 into one proxy of real activities manipulation, where 𝑅𝐴𝑀 = 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 ∗ (−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 ∗ (−1) + 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂; 𝐸𝑀 takes 
the sum of accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation to capture the total effects of earnings management activities, 
where 𝐸𝑀 = 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝑅𝐴𝑀. Please see Appendix A for all variables descriptions.   
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5.6 Empirical Results of the Relation between Abnormal Directors’ 
Remuneration and Accrual-based Earnings Management/Real 
Activities Manipulation  
Previous research studies have provided evidence that firms tend to beat or meet earnings 
benchmarks (e.g., avoiding loss, avoiding earnings decrease) to utilise different types of 
earnings management activities to manage earnings upwards: expanding earnings by using 
discretionary accruals,  boosting the time of sales through increasing price discounts or more 
lenient credit facilities: cutting or reducing discretionary expenses including research and 
development: advertising expenses: selling, general and administrative spending: and finally 
reducing the reported cost of goods sold through overproduction (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 
2010; Zang, 2012; Al-Shattarat, et al., 2018). From the perspective of firm directors, they are 
working hard to present a better future firm performance as they are seeking to achieve more 
compensation. Directors, especially executive directors, have incentives to employ different 
methods of earnings management (accrual-based earning management and/or real activities 
manipulation) to hit their specific targets. 
This chapter examines the relationship between directors’ compensations and different types of 
earnings management (e.g., abnormal discretionary accruals, abnormal cash flow from 
operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production costs), to explore whether 
directors receive any abnormal high remunerations through achieving the benefits of earnings 
management to manipulate accounting earnings. Therefore, the estimation model is run with 
the ordinary least squares regression linked to abnormal directors’ remunerations as the 
dependent variable; abnormal discretionary accruals, abnormal cash flows from operations, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs as independent variables. The 
regression results are presented in Table 5.6, which reports mean coefficients and Fama-
MacBeth 𝑡 statistics from the cross-sectional regression throughout the sample period of 2009-
2015 include 2,513 firm-year observations. In order to capture a comprehensive analysis of the 
association between abnormal directors’ remunerations and earnings management, the results 
in Table 5.6  not only report the dependent variable and abnormal directors’ remunerations as 
residuals estimated by Model 1 and Model 2, respectively, and also abnormal directors’ 
remunerations from Model 1 scaled by total assets for the current year 𝑡. Each column in Table 
5.6 presents the results of the regression for different dependent variables, whose name appears 
at the top of the respective column. T-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using standard 
errors corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure.   
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The abnormal levels of earnings management (accrual-based and real earnings management) 
are estimated residuals from the relevant estimation models, including abnormal discretionary 
accruals, abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
production costs. Higher value of abnormal discretionary accruals ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 ) and 
production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) indicate more accrual-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation through overproduction, respectively. Abnormal cash flows from 
operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂) and abnormal discretionary expenses should have a negative impact on 
current period earnings, both of which being multiplied by -1, so that higher values of them 
indicate a greater extent of real activities manipulation by means of sales manipulation and the 
cutting of expenses, respectively. The abnormal level of directors’ remunerations is similar, 
higher values indicating a greater amount of rewards received by directors When the dependent 
variable and abnormal directors’ remunerations in the regression model are estimated as 
residuals of Model 1 (first column), this provides evidence that the abnormal directors’ 
remunerations are unusually low for abnormal cash flows from operations, because the 
coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂  is positive (3911) and significant at the 1% level (t=4.10). Firm 
directors, especially executive directors, are under pressure to improve earnings growth and 
performance as their compensations are determined by the firm’s profitability and performance, 
and they have incentives to move earnings from the current year to a future year because their 
compensations do not change if they miss the earnings target by a little or a lot. Directors can 
shift firm earnings forwards by using the earnings management method, so that they increase 
the chances of gaining larger rewards in the following year. The significantly positive 
coefficient on abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 implies that directors may employ sales-based manipulation by 
temporarily delaying the realisation of sales to achieve poor profit results in a current year to 
achieve a large rise in earnings in future. This is consistent with the result in section 5.4, that 
abnormal directors’ remunerations are significantly positively associated with abnormal cash 
flows from operations (9.3%).    
When the dependent variable is set equal to abnormal directors’ remunerations scaled by total 
assets in the estimation model (third column), 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1/𝑇𝐴  the coefficient on 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 is positive (0.00718) and significant at the 5% level (t=2.10). However, the 
coefficient correlation between abnormal directors’ remunerations and abnormal accruals in 
Table 5.5 is insignificantly positive. In the strict sense, strong evidence was not found to show 
that directors achieve abnormal rewards by engaging in accrual-based earnings management. 
As with the first column, the coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 is positive (0.01232) and significant at 
the 1% level (t=5.2), which means directors engage sales-based manipulation in order to help 
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them achieve abnormal remunerations which are higher on average by 1.23% of the normal 
level. This indicates that directors gain more compensation because they use real activities 
manipulation through sales-based earnings management to delay or limit boosting sales to 
decrease current period earnings. The impact of abnormal discretionary expenses is negative to 
earnings, the coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 is positive (0.0034) and significant at the 1% level 
(t=3.2). The coefficient means that directors use real activities manipulation by cutting or 
reducing large amounts of discretionary expenses to present lower earnings to achieve greater 
improvements in future and directors gain the opportunity to obtain more bonuses. The 
coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 is positive (0.00298) and significant at the 5% level (t=2.6), whereas 
Table 5.5 reports that the coefficient correlation between abnormal directors’ remunerations 
and abnormal production costs is insignificant. This provides poor evidence that directors may 
use real activities manipulation by overproduction to increase their compensation.     
When dependent variable is equal to abnormal directors’ remuneration, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2  is 
estimated as residuals from Model 2 (second column), the coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 is 
negative (-0.01085) and significant at the 1% level, with a different direction of relevant 
coefficients in the third column. It appears that directors attempt to manage discretionary 
accruals to make downward earnings look worse to take credit when reporting an improvement 
in future earnings performance the following year  in order to gain abnormally high 
remunerations, consistent with the results in chapter 4.8 that directors of  UK firms with 
negative earnings have more incentives to engage in accrual-based earnings management to 
manipulate firms’ earnings downwards in order to produce an income statement showing a loss 
and help directors  report a big rise in future earnings. The coefficients in 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂  and 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 are both negative (-0.00517 and -0.00211, respectively) and significant at the 1% 
level (t=-2.93 and t=-2.67, respectively), indicating that directors receive additional rewards by 
using real activities manipulation through sales-based manipulation and by cutting 
discretionary expenses to boost earnings. This conflicts with previous evidence that directors 
adopt accrual-based earnings management to lower earnings, which may be due to there being 
no strong correlations for abnormal accruals and abnormal 𝐶𝐹𝑂 and for abnormal accruals and 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and they are not in the same group of firms, thereby the results 
between them are inconsistent. The coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 is negative (-0.00217) and at the 
5% significant level (t=-2.5), which indicates that the extent of real activities manipulation 
through overproduction is low when directors’ remunerations are abnormally high as directors 
shift previous earnings to the current period to make the performance look better.              
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Table 5.6: Regression analysis of abnormal directors’ remuneration impacted by accrual-
based and real earnings management 
 
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟏 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟐 𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐒𝐁_𝟏/𝐓𝐀 
𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭  74.2035 -0.0001 -0.0014***  
(0.89760 (-0.4083) (-6.5769)     
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬  -658.8840 -0.0109*** 0.0072**  
(-0.4775) (-4.2555) (2.0967)     
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐂𝐅𝐎  3911.1805*** -0.0052*** 0.0123***  
(4.0951) (-2.9274) (5.2010)     
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗𝐏  295.5993 -0.0021*** 0.0034***  
(0.6933) (-2.6739) (3.2116)     
𝐀𝐛𝐧_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃  -195.7478 -0.0022** 0.0030**  
(-0.4166) (-2.5005) (2.5549)     
𝐀𝐝𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐑𝟐   0.0150 0.0137 0.0189 
 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 5.6: This table reports the results of Fama-Macbeth regression, the entire sample 
consists of 2,513 firm-year observations (359 firms listed on FTSE All-share) for the period 
between 2009 and 2015. The table contains the results of the following regressions: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. 
Each column presents the results of the above regression for a different variable definition, 
whose name appears in the first respective column. 𝑇-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
calculated using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. 
The adjusted 𝑅 squares are also reported on the above table.  
The dependent variable, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 refers to the measure of the abnormal level of directors’ 
remuneration, estimated as the difference between actual level of directors’ remuneration and 
normal level of directors’ remuneration. Abnormal directors’ remuneration, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1, is 
estimated as the residuals from the predicted values from industry-year regression Model 
1: 𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; 
abnormal directors’ remuneration, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_2 is estimated as the residual from the predicted 







+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where  𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡  and 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  are scaled by total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵_1/𝑇𝐴 is 
defined as the abnormal directors’ remuneration from Model 1 scaled by total assets.  
The independent variables: 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  refers to the abnormal level of discretionary 
accruals in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, as the proxy of accrual-based earnings management, is measured 





= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡  is the abnormal 
level of cash flows from operations in year 𝑡  for firm 𝑖 , as one proxy of real earnings 




= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is the abnormal level of discretionary expenses of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, as one 
measure of real earnings management, is estimated as residuals from the predicted values from 
the corresponding industry-year regression:  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 measures the abnormal level of production costs in year 𝑡 ffirm 𝑖, as one proxy 
of real earnings management, is calculated as deviations from the predicted values from the  
corresponding industry-year regression:  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1







) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Please see Appendix A for all variables descriptions.    
 
5.7 Additional Analysis 
This Chapter uses a new model to estimate the degree of abnormal directors’ remuneration 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵), reports the empirical results of whether directors receive any abnormally high level 
of directors’ remuneration by adopting accounting choices, and finds that directors utilise 
different type of earnings management (accrual-based earnings management, real activities 
manipulation) to manipulate earnings downwards or upwards, for the purpose of gaining 
excessive level of compensation. According to the analysis of prior studies in Chapter 2, the 
level of compensation received by directors can be determined by firm performance (i.e., 
improved performance firms, indicated by such as profit growth, production capacity expending, 
would pay an extra reward to directors). However, directors’ remuneration is used to undertake 
the main analysis in this chapter that includes the performance-related compensation and non-
performance-related payment which is the total value of each element of directors’ 
remuneration package (the sum of directors’ fee, pension contribution, and other emoluments) 
in order to capture the total effects of compensation, and in fact, directors have more incentives 
to gain more performance-related remuneration (i.e., stock options, bonus, etc.) through 
engaging in earnings management to manipulate reported earnings because those other 
emoluments in addition to non-performance-related compensation (i.e., basic fees, pension 
contribution) are determined by firm performance. Therefore, ‘other emoluments’, and ‘highest 
paid directors’, respectively, are employed in the current section to conduct additional analysis 
to extend the results of whether directors have received any excessive level of compensation by 
using earnings management methods.   
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As discussed in Chapter 5.2, other emoluments (𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀) represent all the other compensation 
directors receive in addition to the basic salary and pension contribution, which mainly consist 
of performance-related compensation. The other emoluments entail a significant component of 
directors’ remuneration, the mean other emoluments for the firm-years is £2.6 million, which 
is around 62% of mean total directors’ remuneration, and which account for a high proportion 
of total directors’ remuneration (shown in Table 5.1). This indicates that changes to other 
emoluments may have a great impact on directors’ compensation. In addition, highest paid 
director (𝐻𝑃𝐷) is meaning that details of the amount the director receiving the highest level of 
remuneration from the firm is given. As seen from Table 5.1, the mean of the highest paid 
director is about £1.7 million, with a median of £1.1 million and standard deviation is £2.3 
million, and the mean percentage of highest directors pay to total directors’ remuneration is 
42%, with a median of about 41% and standard deviation is 13%. This implies that the highest 
paid directors (usually those directors at a top position) earn a high proportion of the total of 
directors’ remuneration paid by the firm, which means the highest paid director may have a 
greater incentive to engage in earnings management as they want to present a better 
performance in order to receive the highest amount of remuneration. 
Following the method used in main analysis, the normal levels of both other emoluments 
(𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀) and highest paid directors (𝐻𝑃𝐷) are estimated by using the same regression model 
(equation 8 in section 3.6.1) to measure abnormal directors’ remuneration, where the variables 
include sales revenue, profit margins, z-score and number of employees. Table 5.7 reports the 
magnitude of abnormal other emoluments (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀) and abnormal highest paid director 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝐷), as firm directors have incentives to adopt different type of earnings management 
to manipulate earnings to gain an excessive level of payment. Panel A displays the estimation 
results of the regression model to estimate the normal level of highest paid director to measure 
the abnormal level of highest paid director. Consistent with the estimation results of abnormal 
directors’ remuneration (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵 , see in section 5.3), the mean coefficient on 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  is 
positively significant at 1% level (0.0002, t=4.033), which means that director at a top position 
is able to receive more payment as higher sales revenue implies a higher amount realised by the 
firm from the sale of goods sold. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 as an indicator of a firm’s profitability 
performance, and its mean coefficient on the estimation model of 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝐷 is also statistically 
significant and positive (29.7767, t=6.544), it implies that the highest paid director performs a 
good job as he/she reports an improvement of firm’s profit performance and he/she may achieve 
abnormally high remuneration. Panel B shows the measurement of abnormal other emoluments 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀). Same as the results reported in Table 5.3, the mean coefficients both on 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
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and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 are significantly positive (0.005 and 58.419, respectively) at the 1% level, 
and the mean coefficient of the estimation model on 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is statistically significant with 
a negative sign (-93.2782), which indicates that firms whose the highest paid director gains an 
abnormal remuneration have a lower risk of bankruptcy.   
Following section 5.6, this section adopts the same model (equation (10) in section 3.6.2) to 
examine the relationship between highest paid director/other emoluments between different 
types of earnings management (accrual-based earnings management, real activities 
manipulation), where the estimation is run with the OLS regression related to abnormal highest 
paid director (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝐷) or abnormal other emoluments (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀 ), as the dependent 
variable; abnormal accruals (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠), abnormal cash flow from operations (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂), 
abnormal discretionary expenses (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃), and abnormal production costs (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷), 
as independent variables. Panel C presents the results of the regression to evidence whether 
directors receive any excessive level of remuneration by utilising accounting choices to 
manipulate earnings. Each column in Panel C displays the estimation results for different 
dependent variables, whose name presents at the top of the respective column.  
The results shown in the first two-column are the dependent variables that relevant to abnormal 
highest paid director, and they are consistent with the regression results of when dependent 
variable is equal to abnormal directors’ remuneration (see in Table 5.6). When dependent 
variable is equal to 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝐷, the coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 is significantly positive (1,336.03) 
at the 5% level (t=2.984), and it means abnormal highest paid director are unusually low for 
abnormal cash flow from operations. This implies that highest paid director has incentive to 
present a decline in firm performance through engaging in sales-based manipulation to manage 
earnings downwards, in order to gain abnormally high payment.    
The second two-column in Panel C displays the estimation results where the dependent 
variables are related to abnormal other emoluments, and similar to abnormal highest paid 
director, the results of abnormal other emoluments as the dependent variable are consistent with 
the report on Table 5.6. When the dependent variable is set equal to 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀 (the third 
column) the coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 is negative (-1658.92) and significant at the 10% 
level (t=-1.43), and the coefficient on 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 is positive (2390.51) and significant at the 5% 
level (t=2.515). These indicate that directors deliberately cut reported earnings by managing 
discretionary accruals and manipulating sales revenue for gaining abnormally high other 
emoluments in addition to basic fees and pension.    
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To summarise, the results of the conducted additional analysis are consistent with the results of 
main analysis, they provide the supporting evidence that directors have incentive to engage in 
different type of earnings management to manipulate earnings downwards and report a decline 
in performance, in order to achieve more remuneration.  
Table 5.7: Measurement of abnormal other emoluments, abnormal highest paid directors, and 
the relation between abnormal directors remuneration and earnings management 
Panel A: Estimation of the normal level of highest paid director 
𝑯𝑷𝑫 𝑯𝑷𝑫/𝑻𝑨 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕  898.1853*** 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕  0.0005***  
(11.469) 
 
(2.657)     
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔  0.0002*** 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔/𝑻𝑨  0.0005**  
(4.033) 
 
(2.170)     
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏  29.7768*** 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏  0.0000  
(6.544) 
 
(-0.146)     
𝒛_𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  -0.0271 𝒛_𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  0.0005***  
(-0.001) 
 
(4.656)     
𝑵𝒐. 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍.  0.0014 𝑵𝒐. 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍.  0.0000***  
(0.256) 
 
(-7.720)     
𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝟐  0.328 𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝟐   0.295 
Panel B: Estimation of the normal level of other emolument 
𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑴 𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑴/𝑻𝑨 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕  1172.1149*** 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕  0.0006*  
(8.337) 
 
(1.828)     
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔  0.0005*** 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔/𝑻𝑨  0.0002  
(4.660) 
 
(0.487)     
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏  58.4190*** 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏  0.0000  
(6.410) 
 
(-0.110)     
𝒛_𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  -93.2782** 𝒛_𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  0.0008***  
(-2.187) 
 
(4.883)     
𝑵𝒐. 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍  -0.0027 𝑵𝒐. 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍  0.0000***  
(-0.284) 
 
(-5.888)     
𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝟐  0.319 𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝟐  0.262 
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Panel C: Regression analysis of abnormal highest paid director and abnormal other emolument 
impacted by accrual-based and real earnings management  
 
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑯𝑷𝑫 𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑯𝑷𝑫/𝑻𝑨 𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑴 𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑴/𝑻𝑨 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕  34.0287*** -0.0001** 61.8374** 0.0000  
(4.0100 (-2.701) (2.643) (-1.3400)      
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  -89.6227 -0.0064*** -1658.9249* -0.0087***  
(-0.152) (-3.338) (-1.483) (-5.180)      
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑪𝑭𝑶   1336.0344** -0.0036* 2392.5060** -0.0029  
(2.984) (-1.513) (2.515) (-1.078)      
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑬𝑿𝑷  209.8464 -0.0013*** 136.6600 0.0007  
(1.278) (-4.234) (0.483) (0.644)      
𝑨𝒃𝒏_𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫  -11.5284 -0.0012*** -206.9420 0.0007  
(-0.058) (-4.261) (-0.693) (0.663)      
𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝟐  0.001 0.031 0.002 0.023 
 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 5.7: This table (Panel C) reports the results of Fama-Macbeth regression, the 
entire sample consists of 2,513 firm-year observations (359 firms listed on FTSE All-share) for 
the period between 2009 and 2015. The table contains the results of the following regressions: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 .  
Each column presents the results of the above regression for a different variable definition, 
whose name appears in the first respective column. 𝑇-statistics (in parentheses) are reported in 
parentheses and calculated using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-
West procedure. The adjusted 𝑅 squares are also reported on the above table.  
The dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡, refers to the measure of the abnormal level of highest paid director 
(results reported in Panel A) and other emolument (results reported in Panel B), respectively, 
estimated as the difference between their actual level and normal level. Abnormal highest paid 
director, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝐷, is estimated as the residuals from the predicted values from industry-year 
regression : 𝐻𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; abnormal highest paid director, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝐷/𝑇𝐴  is estimated as the 







+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where  𝐻𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are scaled by total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝐷/𝑇𝐴 is 
defined as the abnormal highest paid director scaled by total assets (shown in Panel A). 
Abnormal other emolument, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀 , is estimated as the residuals from the predicted 
values from industry-year regression : 𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; abnormal other emolument, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀/𝑇𝐴 is estimated 





= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where  
𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  are scaled by total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡  for firm 𝑖 ; 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀/𝑇𝐴 is defined as the abnormal other emolument scaled by total assets (shown in 
Panel B);  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is profit margin which measures the profitability and performance, 
equal to the net income as a percentage of total sales in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖;  𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a 
measurement of the financial health of the firm and calculated by using multiple corporate 
income and balance sheet values in year 𝑡  for the firm 𝑖 ;  𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡  is the number of 
employees in year 𝑡 for the firm 𝑖; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is the error term. 
The independent variables: 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  refers to the abnormal level of discretionary 
accruals in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, as the proxy of accrual-based earnings management, is measured 
as deviations from the predicted values from the corresponding industry-year regression: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡  is the abnormal 
level of cash flows from operations in year 𝑡  for firm 𝑖 , as one proxy of real earnings 




= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
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) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is the abnormal level of discretionary expenses of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, as one 
measure of real earnings management, is estimated as residuals from the predicted values from 
the corresponding industry-year regression:  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
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) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 measures the abnormal level of production costs in year 𝑡 ffirm 𝑖, as one proxy 
of real earnings management, is calculated as deviations from the predicted values from the  
corresponding industry-year regression:  
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𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
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∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Please see Appendix A for all variables descriptions.    
 
5.8 Summary  
To summarise, accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation are key 
strategies or methods that directors’ especially executive directors adopt to manage earnings 
upwards or downwards to hit their specific targets. This chapter used both univariate and 
multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between abnormal directors’ remuneration and 
abnormal accrual-based earnings management or abnormal real activities manipulation. The 
findings complement the existing literature on earnings management in the following ways. 
First, abnormal directors’ remunerations are positively correlated to abnormal cash flows from 
operations, evidence that directors use sales-based manipulation through temporarily delaying 
the realisation of sales to report a poor profit performance to manage earnings downwards to 
achieve a large rise in earnings in the future. Moreover, it provides evidence that directors, in 
order to present a great improvement of performance shift previous period earnings to the 
current period by using production costs-based manipulation as the magnitudes of real activities 
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manipulation through overproduction are low when directors receive abnormally high 
remuneration. Furthermore, it suggests that directors utilise accrual-based earnings 
management to lower earnings making earnings performance look worse at current and to 
present a better earnings performance in the future in order to acquire additional rewards for 
themselves, where consistent with the findings of  Meo, et al. (2017), Buchholze, et al.’s (2018), 
and Tahir, et al. (2019). There is supporting evidence that directors in negative earning firms 
have incentives to manage discretionary accruals to report income-decreasing earnings as they 
want to present a higher level of growth of earnings in the future. In addition, this study 
undertakes additional analysis to explore (a). the relationship between highest paid director and 
earnings management, and (b). the relationship between directors’ other emoluments and their 
earnings management; and finds that directors deliberately report a decline in performance 
through utilising earnings management methods to manipulate earnings downwards as they 


































Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
Earnings management in accounting is the behaviour by some firms or organisations to 
intentionally affect the process of financial reporting in order to achieve specific targets, which 
involves alteration of financial reports to misrepresent stakeholders about the firms’ underlying 
performance, or to change contractual results that depend on reported accounting figures. It has 
been the focus of many studies as exploring the issue of earnings management has a significant 
meaning, both for accounting research and practitioners. Three different types of earnings 
management can be adopted by firms to manage reported earnings: accrual-based earnings 
management, real activities manipulation, and classification shifting.   
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine the quality of earnings reported by UK markets 
and explore whether firms manipulate reported earnings figures to hit specific target. The 
analysis of this thesis is commencing by detecting earnings management using accrual-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation which both involve within GAAP and 
have been relatively widely researched on literature. Also, much research evidence that firms 
engage in earnings management motivated by meeting or beating different earnings benchmark. 
Thus, the first empirical study of the thesis aims to investigate whether firms manage reported 
earnings by utilising accrual-based and real earnings management which just meets or beats 
important earnings benchmarks (zero earnings and last year’s earnings). In addition, directors 
have the incentive to use earnings management to gain additional compensation for themselves. 
Therefore, the second part of this thesis is to examine the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and their earnings management.    
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. At first is presented the summary of the 
research question, hypotheses development, and key findings for each empirical study. 
Secondly, the chapter summarises its contribution to knowledge, then discusses the implications 
of this research from theoretical and academic, and policy and practical perspectives. Moreover, 
it explains the potential limitations of this study, and gives some recommendations for future 
research.    
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6.2 Summary of Research Questions, Hypotheses, Key Findings 
As derived from the formulated conclusion of previous chapters, this section restates the aims 
of the study, answers the main research questions, and presents the empirical results of testing 
hypotheses for each study set.  
6.2.1 Earnings Management just Meeting or Beating Earnings Benchmarks 
This section of the thesis is aimed at examining whether firms in the UK market manage 
reported earnings by utilising accrual-based earnings management and real activities 
manipulation which just meet or beat important earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings, 
last year’s earnings). The research questions in this study are stated as follows, based on a 
defined aim:  
• Do firms engage in real activities manipulation which just meet/beat the earnings 
benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last years’ earnings)? 
• Do firms use sales-based manipulation which just meet/beat the earnings benchmarks 
(‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings)? 
• Do firms cut or reduce discretionary expenses, which just meet/beat the earnings 
benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings)? 
• Do firms overproduce goods which just meet/beat the earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level 
of earnings and last year’s earnings)?   
• Do firms engage in accrual-based earnings management which just meet/beat the 
earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings and last year’s earnings)? 
Table 6.1 presents a list of hypotheses which have been developed in Chapter 3 and the 
summary of empirical findings related to the hypotheses. According to Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
study, firms can focus on three real activities manipulation methods to boost earnings by means 
of sales-based manipulation which accelerates the timing of sales or generates additional 
unsustainable sales through increased price discounts and more lenient credit terms; 
discretionary expenses-based manipulation which cuts or reduces discretionary expenses 
including that of advertising, R&D, sales and general and administrative expenses; production-
based manipulation which overproduces or increases production to report lower costs of goods 
sold. The first four research questions in this study are about whether firms engage in real 
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activities manipulation (𝑅𝐴𝑀, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷) to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks (zero earnings, last year’s earnings). The first hypothesis set (H1, H1a, H1b and 
H1c) tests whether firms in the UK market which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks around 
zero level of earnings and last’s year’s earnings are more likely to engage in real activities 
manipulation. The tests comprised a sample of firms contained in the FTSE All-share cover the 
period of 2009-2015, and employed the Fama-Macbeth approach. It found that UK suspect 
firm-years just beat or meet the zero level of earnings benchmark and engage more in real 
activities manipulation through reducing/cutting discretionary expenses to boost current period 
earnings and produce more goods than necessary to meet expected demand with a reduced fixed 
cost, thereby increasing the operating margin (supported both H1b and H1c). Furthermore, 
suspect firm-years tend to use sales-based manipulation, reduction in discretionary expenses, 
and overproduction at the same time to manage earnings upwards when meeting the earnings 
benchmark at around zero level (supported H1). However, the results show that suspect firm-
years that just meet the zero earnings benchmarks are not associated with abnormal cash flow 
from operations (unsupported H1a). In addition, the results reveal that firms in the UK market 
are not involved in managing earnings upwards by using real activities manipulation via sales-
based earnings management and overproduction, and are more involved in real activities 
manipulation through reduction or cutting of discretionary expenses when just meeting last 
year’s earnings benchmark.    
The final research question related to the second hypothesis (H2) shown in Table 6.1. As noted 
in Chapter 3, discretionary accruals are used to measure whether firms engage in accrual-based 
earnings management in this study. The amount of abnormal discretionary accruals 
(𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) indicated the extent of accrual-based earnings management. Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
predicted that firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last 
year’s earnings exhibit unusually high discretionary accruals. However, this hypothesis is not 
supported as empirical results suggest that UK firms which just meet or beat earnings around 
zero level and last year’s earnings are not using an accrual-based earnings management tool 
(unsupported H2).  
Finally, in addition to test the identified hypotheses, this study undertook additional analysis to 
extend the results of firms which meet earnings benchmarks by using accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation, this analysis provided some distinguished 
evidence from other previous studies. The majority of prior literature focused on firms using 
earnings management methods to manipulate earnings upwards, whilst some firms have an 
incentive to engage in earnings management to make earnings downwards for a better further 
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performance as it found that the Loss-making firm are more likely to using accrual-based 
earnings management to manipulate earnings downwards (‘Big Bath’ action). The empirical 
results of whether firms use earnings management to decrease earnings further or shift positive 
earnings to a negative level show that, in order to achieve future better performance, some UK 
firms are likely to decrease their earnings or shift positive earnings to negative earnings to 
engage in earnings management activities through discretionary expenses based manipulation, 
production costs based manipulation, and accrual-based earnings management.    
164 
 




Hypothesis  Earnings 
management tool  
Results:  
zero earnings  
Results: 
last year’s earnings  
H1:   Firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings 







Not supported, no 
significant relation 
H1a:  Firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of 
earnings and last year’s earnings) exhibit unusually low cash flows from 
operations. 
Sales manipulation Not supported,  
no significant 
relation 
Not supported, no 
significant relation 
H1b:  Firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of 
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Not Supported, no 
significant relation 
H2:  Firms which just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (‘zero’ level of earnings 





Not supported, no 
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6.2.2 The Relation between Directors’ Remuneration and their Earnings Management 
The aim of second part of the thesis was to investigate whether and how the relationship 
between earnings management and directors’ remuneration varied with the extent of earnings 
management, the methods of earnings management, and the level of directors’ remuneration. 
Based on the objective, the study focused on the following related question:  
• Whether there is a relationship between firms which engage in accrual-based or real 
earnings management and directors’ remuneration?  
Prior literature in earnings management predicted that directors have incentives to engage in 
earnings management by using accrual-based and real earnings management methods, in order 
to achieve an improvement of performance. However, only a few studies found that directors 
have an incentive to present a decline in performance by utilising different types of earnings 
management to manage earnings downwards for the purpose of gaining personal benefits 
themselves. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) found that the post-SEO operating performance decline 
is driven not only by accrual reversal (accrual-based earnings management), but also reflects 
the real consequences of operational decisions (real activities manipulation) made to manage 
earnings in the time of the SEO. Kothari et al. (2016) also found a decline in firms’ performance, 
showing that earnings management is most closely and predictably linked with post-SEO stock 
market under-performance when it is driven by real activities manipulation. Tahir, et al. (2019) 
also evidence that less income-increasing earnings management through discretionary expenses 
and accruals take places when directors’ remuneration measured by firm performance. These 
ideas offer an insight into this research as to whether directors tend to engage in earnings 
management activities to manipulate earnings downward for the purpose of maximising their 
personal gains. Therefore, further to the research question, one hypothesis (H3) of this study 
was developed and predicted that there is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
earnings management (accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation). 
In order to conduct a test of this hypothesis, this study employed abnormal directors’ 
remuneration 21 ( 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵 ) to measure whether directors gain an excessive level of 
compensation by engaging in earnings management. A new model was created to estimate the 
degree of abnormal directors’ remuneration, whereby the variables included sales revenue, 
profit margin, z_score, and the number of employees used to estimate the normal level of 
 
21 Abnormal directors’ remuneration (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵) is calculated as the actual level of directors’ remuneration 
minus the normal level of directors’ remuneration.  
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directors’ remuneration. The empirical results found that abnormal directors’ remuneration 
positively correlated to abnormal cash flow from operations, suggesting that directors use sales-
based earnings management such as by means of temporarily delaying the realisation of sales 
to manipulate earnings downwards in order to provide a decline in performance and so gain a 
greater improvement in performance in future. The results have revealed that directors present 
overstated earnings in the current period by using production costs-based manipulation as the 
magnitude of real activities manipulation through overproduction is at a lower level when 
directors receive abnormally high remuneration. Moreover, the results have found that directors 
utilise accrual-based earnings management to manage earnings downwards to pursue additional 
rewards for themselves. In addition, this study employs ‘highest paid director’ and ‘other 
emoluments’ to conduct additional analysis, and provides supporting evidence that directors 
have the incentive to report a decline in performance by using a different type of earnings 
management to manipulate earnings downwards to achieve abnormally high remuneration for 
themselves. Thus, the hypothesis has been supported by these empirical results, as there is a 
negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and their earnings management through 
discretionary accruals, and directors have incentives to use different earnings management 
methods to manipulate earnings upwards and downwards.     
6.3  Summary of Contributions 
As noted in Chapter 1, the following presents a brief summary of this thesis’s contributions to 
the existing literature in earnings management from different aspects.  
The first contribution of this study is that it has examined earnings management by using the 
two most common tools: accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation. 
This study provides empirical results showing that, on the one hand firms in the UK market are 
more likely to engage in real activities management than accrual-based earnings management 
when meeting or beating the earnings benchmarks at around zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings; on the other hand, firm directors have the incentive to use accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation to manage earnings upwards and downwards. 
Thus, this thesis extended the existing literature which has been carried out into the earnings 
quality, and provides a greater comprehension of detecting earnings management.  
Secondly, numerous researchers in earnings management focused on accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation, whereas few studies confirm that each earnings 
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management tool or their results are reliable. This study utilised a modified Jones’ (1995) model 
to measure accrual-based earnings management, and especially followed Roychowdhury’s 
(2006) three proxies to detect real activities manipulation, Similar results were ascertained, thus, 
it provides supporting evidence to confirm the validity of estimation.  
Thirdly, adoption of the earnings benchmark has a different impact on the ability to detect 
earnings management. This study has examined whether firms engage in accrual-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation which meet or beat the earnings 
benchmark at around zero level or last year’s earnings. Empirical results have indicated that 
UK firms are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation through using reduction in 
discretionary expenses and overproduction to manage earnings in order to avoid losses (zero 
level of earnings benchmark). However, firms are engaging in real activities manipulation only 
by reducing discretionary expenses to manipulate earnings when just meeting last year’s 
earning benchmark, thus the different levels of earnings produces a different conclusion as 
regards earnings management detection. This study enhances extant literature and is 
recommended for subsequent research studies into the measuring of earnings management 
which meets or beats different earnings benchmarks.     
Most prior literature on earnings management shows that firms use different types of earnings 
management to manipulate earnings upwards to hit their specific targets, however fewer studies 
examine whether firms use earnings management to manipulate earnings downwards. This 
study has creatively grouped a sample of firms with negative earnings, and determined that 
firms in the UK with negative earnings have greater incentives to manipulate discretionary 
accruals, manipulate discretionary expenses, and manipulate production costs to manage their 
earnings downwards or shift positive earnings to a negative level to report a better future 
performance. These new findings complement the existing literature which states that firms use 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation not only to increase their 
earnings but also to decrease earnings for their specific purposes in the UK market.  
In addition, previous literature pays less attention to examining whether earnings management 
incentives arise from directors’ remuneration, although the study of earnings management has 
been highly investigated. This study conducted an investigation into the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and their earnings management in the UK market and found that there 
is a decline in firm performance when directors utilise accrual-based earnings management and 
real activities manipulation to manage earnings downwards. It presents new evidence and 
enhances the literature which is relevant to earnings management and directors’ remuneration.  
168 
 
Finally, in order to examine whether directors have received an excessive level of remuneration 
through using different earnings management tools, this study built a new model for measuring 
the amount of abnormal directors’ remuneration. The abnormal directors’ remuneration 
measured the degree of additional rewards received by directors, and linked it to the abnormal 
level of earnings management to produce relevant results. Therefore, to the best of my 
knowledge, it is the first study which builds a new model to measure abnormal directors’ 
remuneration in order to investigate the relationship between abnormal directors’ remuneration 
and abnormal earnings management.    
6.4 Policy and Practical Implications  
This study primarily aimed at examining the quality of reported earnings and explored whether 
firms manipulate reported earnings figures to achieve specific targets therefore, as indicated in 
empirical findings, this study presents several important policy and practical implications. First, 
earnings quality as defined by Dechow et al. (2010b), indicated that higher quality earnings 
provide more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance, which are 
relevant to a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker. However, earnings 
management has a negative effect on earnings quality, and may weaken the credibility of 
financial reporting, as it functions in some firms or organisations to obtain specific targets and 
misrepresent or disguise their true economic performance. Thus, it is a significant accounting 
issue for both researchers, regulators, and other practitioners.  Firms have incentives to engage 
in accrual-based earnings and real activities manipulation to manage earnings in order to avoid 
earnings loss or avoid earnings decrease, whilst directors have incentives to acquire personal 
benefits for themselves by utilising earnings management. In the opinion of this research, these 
results suggest that focusing on one single method of earnings management does not fully 
reflect earnings management activities, that firms are more likely to use different type of 
earnings management simultaneously, and earnings management is not only used to increase 
earnings but also to decrease earnings. With regard to regulators, the implication is that there is 
a greater need for increasing scrutiny or constraints on accounting discretions in order to 
eliminate earnings management activities and to ensure firms disclose quality earnings 
information.    
Second, the ability to understand the extent to which earnings are manipulated by managers has 
significant implications for analysts, regulators, researchers, and other professionals. With 
regard to analysts and investors, understanding the extent to which managers manipulate 
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discretion in earnings offers support to the idea of examination of earnings quality. It is 
important and helpful for regulators, policy makers or standard-setters, to understand whether 
firms engage in earnings management and how they undertake this, as the impact of earnings 
management draws the attention of regulators or standard-setters to the limitations of 
accounting regulations and standards, and encourages them to implement improvements. 
Third, higher audit quality should provide greater credibility to the financial statement. The 
highly critical assertion of the auditing profession that managers seek to deceive the public has 
acted as a spur for researchers to carry out research into the impact of earnings management on 
auditors’ incentives. This study has investigated earnings management which meets important 
earnings benchmarks, and the relationship between directors’ remuneration and earnings 
management, therefore it potentially suggests the necessity for a closer scrutiny by auditors and 
regulators, so that financial reports are more reliable. 
Finally, this study has identified important implications for boards of directors, remuneration 
committees, investors, shareholders, and other practitioners who are involved in directors’ 
remuneration practices. Directors who work with the Board of Directors, are responding 
directly to the board and carrying out the board’s decisions, and are responsible for everything 
that happens in the firm, such as strategic planning and operating within a budget. Directors’ 
remuneration set by the remuneration committee can be affected by many factors, according to 
the principal-agent theory, directors’ pay is positively related to firm performance in order to 
provide directors financial incentives as it is linked to the interests of directors and shareholders 
and alleviates a conflict of interests. This study provides the opposite result that directors’ 
remuneration is negatively related to firm performance, as they act in the best interests of 
themselves when engaging in earnings management. It motivates the board and remuneration 
committee to improve the ability to design a remuneration plan to ensure that directors have a 
stake in performing well to maximise the interests of their shareholders.  
6.5 Limitations 
Nothing is perfect and this thesis has many limitations. It has, however identified several 
research gaps through reviewing a wide range of literature, and intended to fill research gaps 
by developing a series of hypotheses based on various empirical studies. An attempt was made 
to design the most appropriate research methods, and provide some significant and informative 
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empirical results and important implications for policy and market practitioners This section 
has identified some limitations from the different perspectives in this study. 
One of the limitations of this study is that it has detected earnings management by only selecting 
the most two commonly types: accrual-based earnings management and real earnings 
management, both of which are relatively extensively researched. In order to detect earnings 
management the third method referred to as classification shifting can be used, performed by 
the deliberate misclassification of items within the income statement without changing bottom 
line earnings and is less costly than engaging in accrual-based and real earnings management, 
although it has been largely ignored to date. 
Secondly, this study investigated whether firms engage in earnings management to gain specific 
targets which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks around zero level of earnings and last 
year’s earnings. However, earnings benchmarks in reality apply to earnings management which 
not only avoids loss and avoids an earnings decrease, and many other factors also offer 
incentives to earnings management, such as aligning with the management’s forecast earnings, 
hitting the analysts’ forecasts consensus.   
The third limitation in this study relates to the estimation models used to detect earnings 
management. It has examined accrual-based earnings management by adopting the modified 
Jones’(991) model, using abnormal discretionary accruals to measure the extent of accrual 
earnings management, whilst a range of accrual models has been developed and is widely used 
in literature, such as the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach,  performance-matched models, 
and discretionary estimation errors. This study followed Roychowdhury’s (2006) three proxies 
to detect real activities manipulation via sales-based manipulation, reducing discretionary 
expenses, and overproduction, but real earnings management can also be measured through 
other less common operating activities such as stock repurchases.           
This study used the abnormal level of directors’ remuneration to measure the number of 
directors who gain an excessive level of compensation, estimated by a newly designed model. 
The amount of abnormal directors’ remuneration was examined as the estimated residual from 
the creative regression for normal level of directors’ remuneration, where variables only 
included sales revenue, profit margin, z-score, and the number of employees. A limitation is 
that the estimation model is too simple, directors’ remuneration can be affected by many factors 
not only limited to these four variables, but also may include a return on assets, market to book 
value, leverage, etc. In addition, this study has been based on the UK market and the sample of 
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firms was drawn from firms within FTSE All-share in order to detect whether firms engage in 
earnings management, and does not include those firms quoted on the Alternative Investment 
Market.  
6.6 Future Studies 
This study also provided the following recommendations for future research.  
First, the study focused on two major tools of earnings management: accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation, whilst the third tool detected earnings 
management using classification shifting, which has been largely ignored to date. Future studies 
may wish to explore earnings management by means of these three methods together, in order 
that it will have a comprehensive overview of how firms manage their earnings as different 
types of earnings management result in different conclusions.  
Second, it suggests future research take account of another important earnings benchmark 
which is that of meeting the analysts’ forecast consensus, as it is observed by many investors 
and plays an important role in measuring the appropriate valuation of a stock. Unlike earnings 
benchmarks around zero earnings level and last year’s earnings, earnings forecasts are based 
on analysts’ expectations of firm growth and profitability, and most analysts build financial 
models to predict earnings which estimate prospective revenues and costs. Thus, firms have 
strong incentives to engage in earnings management by using different types of it, for example, 
classification shifting tends to be more pervasive when it allows the manager to meet the analyst 
forecast.     
Third, this study included executive directors in order to investigate the relationship between 
earnings management and directors’ remuneration. Some executive directors, who in a top 
position and have more power of decision-making in firms, such as the CEO or CFO, may have 
more incentives to engage in earnings management. Thus, an interesting topic for future 
researchers could be to examine the relationship between top directors and their earnings 
management.  
Fourth, in recent decades, equity-based compensation became popular and relatively more 
prevalent, thus directors’ compensation may be more relevant to market-based firm 
performance, in that directors’ wealth varies with market performance, as indicated by stock 
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prices. Therefore, in future studies, it may be of value to investigate whether directors engage 
in earnings management are motivated by equity-based compensation. 
Fifth, according to Zang’s (2012) study, managers engage in a trade-off between real activities 
manipulation and accrual-based earnings management based on their relative costs and adjust 
the level of accrual-based earnings management by means of the level of realized real activities 
manipulation. Thus future researchers may also wish to explore the existence of a trade-off 
relationship between accrual-based earnings management, real activities manipulation, and 






















Appendix A Variables Used for my Analysis and Corresponding Definitions 
Variable Definition 
𝑆  Total sales revenue. 
∆𝑆, 𝛥𝑅𝑣𝑒  Change in sales, difference between sales revenue at the end of year 
and the sales revenue at the beginning of year. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸  The gross property, plant and equipment. 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑐  Change in receivables. 
∆𝑊𝐶  Change in working capital. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  Firm’s size, calculated as log of total assets. 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒  Operating cycle. 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛  Incidence of negative earnings over the past 10 years. 
𝐴,  𝑇𝐴, 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶  Total assets.  
𝑁𝐼  Net income 
𝐻𝑃𝐷  Highest paid director 
𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑀  Other emolument 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴  Earnings before interests, tax, depreciation and amortization, a 
measure of a firm’s operating performance.    
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  Discretionary accruals, earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus the operating cash flows reported in 
the statement of cash flows. 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠    Normal level of discretionary accruals, is estimated for every 
industry and year by the model:  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1







) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Abn_Accruals        Abnormal level of discretionary accruals, is equal to actual level of 
discretionary accruals (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) minus normal level of 
discretionary accruals (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡),  
𝐶𝐹𝑂  Cash flows from operations. 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂     Normal level of cash flows from operations, is calculated by using 
estimated industry-level coefficients and the firm-year’s sales and 
lagged assets from the model: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1







) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂     Abnormal level of cash flows from operations, is equal to actual cash 
flows from operations (CFO𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) minus the normal level of cash 
flows from operations (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡). 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃  Actual discretionary expenses; the sum of research and development 
(R&D), advertising, selling, general and administrative expenses 
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(SD&A); R&D and advertising are set to zero if they are missing or 
not available.  
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃     Normal level of discretionary expenses, is estimated for each industry 
and year by the model: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃     Abnormal level of discretionary expenses, is equal to actual 
discretionary expenses (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) minus normal level of 
discretionary expenses (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡). 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷   Actual production costs, the sum of cost of goods sold and change in 
inventory.  
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷      Normal level of production costs, is estimated for every industry and 
year by the model: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1







) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷     Abnormal level of production costs, is equal to actual production 
costs (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) minus normal level of production costs 
(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡). 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆  Costs of goods sold. 
𝐼𝑁𝑉  Inventories. 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉  Change in inventory of Firm 𝑖 from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟     
An indicator variable for suspect firm-years just beating/meeting 
important earnings benchmarks. 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜     An indicator variable that is set equal to one if firm 𝑖’s net income 
before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 
and 0.005, and is set equal to zero otherwise, based on 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) criteria to identify suspect firm-years. 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡       An indicator variable that is set equal to one if firm 𝑖’s change in net 
income before extraordinary items from the last year is between 0 
and 0.01, and is set equal to zero otherwise, based on Gunny’s (2006) 
criteria to identify suspect firm-years. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴  Rate of return on assets, calculated as net income divided by lagged 
total assets. 
𝑀𝑇𝐵  Market value to book value ratio, indicates the firms’ growth 
opportunities. 
𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸  Logarithm of the market value of equity of firm 𝑖, measured at the 
beginning of year 𝑡, indicates the potential impact of the relative firm 
size effect in the industry.  
Loss An indicator variable that is set equal to one if firm with negative 
earning, and is set equal to zero otherwise. 
𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙   Number of employee. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛     Profit margin, calculated by net income divide sales revenue in year 𝑡 
for firm 𝑖. 
𝐷𝑆𝐵  Total directors’ remuneration, sum of salary, pension contribution, 
and other emoluments.   
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𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑆𝐵      Normal level of directors’ remuneration, is estimated for every 
industry and year by the model: 𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝑆𝐵       Abnormal level of directors’ remuneration, is equal to actual 
directors’ remuneration (𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡) minus normal level of directors’ 
remuneration (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡). 
𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  Altman’s z-score, the prediction of distress and turnaround; calculated 
by the model: 𝑍 = 1.2𝑋1 + 1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 + 0.6𝑋4 + 1.0𝑋5 , where 
𝑋1 = net working capital / total assets (measure of liquidity), 𝑋2 = 
retained earnings/ total assets (measures of cumulative profitability), 
𝑋3= EBIT/ total assets (measure of return on assets), 𝑋4= market value 
of equity / boot value of total liabilities (measure of market leverage), 
𝑋5= sales / total assets (measure of sales generating potential of assets).  
The formula may be used to predict the probability that a firm will go 
into bankruptcy within two years. z-score is used to predict corporate 
defaults and an easy-to-calculate control measure for the financial 
distress status of companies in academic studies. The z-score uses 
multiple corporate income and balance sheet values to measure the 
financial health of a company. This method is successful in predicting 
the status of financial distress in any firm. Altman z-score can help in 
measuring the financial health of a business organization by the use of 
multiple balance sheet values and corporate income. The value of the 
Altman z-score is generally around – 0.25 for firms that have the 
highest probability of going bankrupt. On the other hand, for firms 
having the least probability of facing a bankruptcy, the value of 
Altman z-score value is as high as + 4.48. The Altman z-score formula 
is helpful for investors to determine if they should consider buying a 
stock or sell some of the stocks they have. Generally, the Altman z-
score below 1.8 denotes that the firm is under the chance of getting 
into bankruptcy. On the other hand, the firms with Altman z-score 
above 3 are deemed to be less likely to go bankrupt. So an investor can 
decide to buy a stock if the Altman z-score is closer to value 3 and 











Appendix B List of Sample Firms 





4imprint Group PLC 46760 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
A.G. Barr PLC 11070 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
AA PLC 94990 17 Other service activities 
Acacia Mining PLC 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Acal PLC 27900 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
Aggreko PLC 28140 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Amec Foster Wheeler PLC 70100 15 Business service 
Anglo American PLC 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Antofagasta PLC 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
AO World PLC 47540 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Ascential PLC 82301 15 Business service 
Ashmore Group PLC 70229 15 Business service 
Ashtead Group PLC 77390 15 Business service 
Associated British Foods 
PLC 
46390 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Assura PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Astrazeneca PLC 21100 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Auto Trader Group PLC 58142 14 Information and Communication 
Aveva Group PLC 62020 14 Information and Communication 
Avon Rubber PLC 22190 9 All other Manufacturing 
B&M European Value 
Retail SA 
47190 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Babcock International 
Group PLC 
84220 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
BAE Systems PLC 30300 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Balfour Beatty PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Barratt Developments PLC 41201 11 Construction  
BBA Aviation PLC 52230 13 Transportation and storage 
Bellway PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Berendsen PLC 96010 17 Other service activities 
Bgeo Group PLC 64205 15 Business service 
BHP Billiton PLC 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
BIG Yellow Group PLC 52103 13 Transportation and storage 
Bloomsbury Publishing 
PLC 
58110 14 Information and Communication 
Bodycote PLC 71129 15 Business service 
Booker Group PLC 46390 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Bovis Homes Group PLC 41202 11 Construction  
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BP PLC 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Braemar Shipping Services 
PLC 
50200 13 Transportation and storage 
Brewin Dolphin Holdings 
PLC 
66120 15 Business service 
British American Tobacco 
PLC 
12000 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
British Land Company PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Britvic PLC 11070 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
BT Group PLC 61900 14 Information and Communication 
BTG PLC 72190 15 Business service 
Bunzl PLC 52243 13 Transportation and storage 
Burberry Group PLC 14132 9 Manufacture textiles, leather 
Cairn Energy PLC 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Cambian Group PLC 85310 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
Cape PLC 43999 11 Construction  
Capita PLC 70229 15 Business service 
Capital & Counties 
Properties PLC 
41100 11 Construction  
Carclo PLC 22290 9 All other Manufacturing 
Card Factory PLC 47190 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Carillion PLC 41201 11 Construction  
Carnival PLC 50100 13 Transportation and storage 
Carpetright PLC 47530 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Carr's Group PLC 10611 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
Centamin PLC 07290 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Centrica PLC 35220 16 Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 
Charles Taylor PLC 70221 15 Business service 
Chemring Group PLC 20510 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Cineworld Group PLC 59140 14 Information and Communication 
Circassia Pharmaceuticals 
PLC 
72110 15 Business service 
Clarkson PLC 52290 13 Transportation and storage 
CLS Holdings PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Cobham PLC 61900 14 Information and Communication 
Communisis PLC 18129 9 All other Manufacturing 
Compass Group PLC 56210 17 Other service activities 
Computacenter PLC 62020 14 Information and Communication 
Connect Group PLC 46499 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Consort Medical PLC 32500 9 All other Manufacturing 
Costain Group PLC 42990 11 Construction  
Cranswick PLC 46390 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Crest Nicholson Holdings 
PLC 
41201 11 Construction  
CRH PLC 70100 15 Business service 
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Croda International PLC 20590 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Cybg PLC 66110 15 Business service 
Daejan Holdings PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Dairy Crest Group PLC 10511 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
DCC PLC 70100 15 Business service 
De LA Rue PLC 18129 9 All other Manufacturing 
Debenhams PLC 47190 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Dechra Pharmaceuticals 
PLC 
75000 15 Business service 
Derwent London PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Devro PLC 10110 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
DFS Furniture PLC 47599 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Diageo PLC 11010 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
Dialight PLC 26110 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
Dignity PLC 96030 17 Other service activities 
Diploma PLC 46690 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Direct Line Insurance 
Group PLC 
66220 15 Business service 
Dixons Carphone PLC 47421 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Domino's Pizza Group PLC 56101 17 Other service activities 
Drax Group PLC 35110 16 Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 
DS Smith PLC 47789 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Dunelm Group PLC 47599 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Easyjet PLC 51102 13 Transportation and storage 
EI Group PLC 56302 17 Other service activities 
Electrocomponents PLC 46520 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Elementis PLC 20140 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Enquest PLC 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Entertainment One Ltd 59131 14 Information and Communication 
Equiniti Group PLC 82990 15 Business service 
Essentra PLC 22210 9 All other Manufacturing 
Euromoney Institutional 
Investor PLC 
58142 14 Information and Communication 
Evraz PLC 24100 9 All other Manufacturing 
Exova Group PLC 74909 15 Business service 
Experian PLC 82990 15 Business service 
FDM Group (Holdings) 
PLC 
78200 15 Business service 
Fenner PLC 25620 9 All other Manufacturing 
Ferrexpo PLC 07100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Fidessa Group PLC 82990 15 Business service 
Findel P.L.C. 47910 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
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Firstgroup PLC 49319 13 Transportation and storage 
Flybe Group PLC 51101 13 Transportation and storage 
Fresnillo PLC 07290 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Fuller Smith & Turner PLC 56302 17 Other service activities 
G4S PLC 80100 15 Business service 
Galliford Try PLC 41201 11 Construction  
Game Digital PLC 47540 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Gem Diamonds Ltd 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Genus PLC 72110 15 Business service 
GKN PLC 29320 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Glaxosmithkline PLC 21100 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Glencore PLC 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Goodwin PLC 28290 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Grafton Group PLC 70100 15 Business service 
Grainger PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Great Portland Estates PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Greencoat UK Wind PLC 35110 16 Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 
Greencore Group PLC 82990 15 Business service 
Greene King PLC 56302 17 Other service activities 
Greggs PLC 10710 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
Gulf Marine Services PLC 50200 13 Transportation and storage 
GVC Holdings PLC 92000 17 Other service activities 
Halfords Group PLC 30920 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Halma PLC 32990 9 All other Manufacturing 
Hammerson PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Hays PLC 78109 15 Business service 
Headlam Group PLC 47530 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Helical PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Henry Boot PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Hikma Pharmaceuticals 
PLC 
21100 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Hill & Smith Holdings PLC 47520 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Hochschild Mining PLC 07290 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Hogg Robinson Group PLC 79110 15 Business service 
Homeserve PLC 43220 11 Construction  
Howden Joinery Group PLC 47599 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
HSS Hire Group PLC 46740 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Hunting PLC 25620 9 All other Manufacturing 
Ibstock PLC 23320 9 All other Manufacturing 
Imagination Technologies 
Group PLC 
63990 14 Information and Communication 
IMI PLC 28120 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Imperial Brands PLC 12000 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
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Inchcape PLC 45111 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Indivior PLC 21100 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Informa PLC 73200 15 Business service 
Inmarsat PLC 61300 14 Information and Communication 
Intercontinental Hotels 
Group PLC 
55100 17 Other service activities 
International Consolidated 
Airlines Group 
51101 13 Transportation and storage 
Interserve PLC 70229 15 Business service 
Intertek Group PLC 71200 15 Business service 
ITE Group PLC 82301 15 Business service 
ITV PLC 60200 14 Information and Communication 
J D Wetherspoon PLC 56302 17 Other service activities 
J Sainsbury PLC 47110 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
James Fisher And Sons PLC 50200 13 Transportation and storage 
JD Sports Fashion PLC 47640 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Jimmy Choo PLC 47721 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
John Laing Group PLC 70229 15 Business service 
John Menzies PLC 47620 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
John Wood Group PLC 70100 15 Business service 
Johnson Matthey PLC 24410 9 All other Manufacturing 
JRP Group PLC 66290 15 Business service 
Just Eat PLC 56103 17 Other service activities 
Kainos Group PLC 62020 14 Information and Communication 
KAZ Minerals PLC 46720 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Kcom Group PLC 62020 14 Information and Communication 
Keller Group PLC 71129 15 Business service 
Kier Group PLC 41201 11 Construction  
Kingfisher PLC 47520 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Ladbrokes Coral Group 
PLC 
92000 17 Other service activities 
Laird PLC 82990 15 Business service 
Lamprell PLC 09100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Land Securities Group PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Laura Ashley Holdings PLC 47190 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
London Stock Exchange 
Group PLC 
66110 15 Business service 
Lonmin PLC 07290 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Lookers PLC 45111 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
LOW & Bonar PLC 32990 9 All other Manufacturing 
Macau Property 
Opportunities Fund Ltd 
41100 11 Construction  
Man Group PLC 66190 15 Business service 
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Marks And Spencer Group 
PLC. 
47190 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Marshalls PLC 23610 9 All other Manufacturing 
Marston's PLC 56302 17 Other service activities 
Mcbride PLC 20411 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Mccarthy & Stone PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Mccoll's Retail Group PLC 47260 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Mears Group PLC 43390 11 Construction  
Mediclinic International 
PLC 
86101 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
Meggitt PLC 30300 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Merlin Entertainments PLC 93210 17 Other service activities 
Micro Focus International 
PLC 
62090 14 Information and Communication 
Millennium & Copthorne 
Hotels PLC 
55100 17 Other service activities 
Mitchells & Butlers PLC 56302 17 Other service activities 
Mitie Group PLC 86900 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
MJ Gleeson PLC 41201 11 Construction  
Mondi PLC 17211 9 All other Manufacturing 
Moneysupermarket.Com 
Group PLC 
47910 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Morgan Advanced Materials 
PLC 
20130 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Morgan Sindall Group PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Moss Bros Group PLC 47710 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Mothercare PLC 47789 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
N Brown Group PLC 47910 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Nanoco Group PLC 72110 15 Business service 
National Express Group 
PLC 
49319 13 Transportation and storage 
National Grid PLC 46719 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
NCC Group PLC 74909 15 Business service 
Next PLC 47190 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
NMC Health PLC 84120 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
Norcros PLC 23310 9 All other Manufacturing 
Northgate PLC 77110 15 Business service 
Nostrum Oil & GAS PLC 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Novae Group PLC 66220 15 Business service 
Ocado Group PLC 47110 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
On The Beach Group PLC 79110 15 Business service 
Ophir Energy PLC 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Oxford Biomedica PLC 21200 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Oxford Instruments PLC 25730 9 All other Manufacturing 
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Pagegroup PLC 78109 15 Business service 
Paypoint PLC 62090 14 Information and Communication 
Pearson PLC 58190 14 Information and Communication 
Pendragon PLC 45111 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Pennon Group PLC 36000 16 Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 
Persimmon PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Petra Diamonds Ltd 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Petrofac Ltd 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Petropavlovsk PLC 07290 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Pets At Home Group PLC 47760 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Photo - ME International 
PLC 
77210 15 Business service 
Picton Property Income Ltd 41100 11 Construction  
Playtech Ltd 62011 14 Information and Communication 
Polymetal International PLC 07290 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Polypipe Group PLC 20160 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Porvair PLC 23440 9 All other Manufacturing 
Premier Foods PLC 10890 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
Premier Oil PLC 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Prudential PLC 66190 15 Business service 
Puretech Health PLC 72110 15 Business service 
PZ Cussons PLC 20420 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Qinetiq Group PLC 84220 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
R P S Group PLC 82990 15 Business service 
Randgold Resources Ltd 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Raven Russia Ltd 41100 11 Construction  
Reckitt Benckiser Group 
PLC 
17220 9 All other Manufacturing 
Redrow PLC 41202 11 Construction  
Relx PLC 58142 14 Information and Communication 
Renewi PLC 96090 17 Other service activities 
Renishaw P L C 26511 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
Renold PLC 28150 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Rentokil Initial PLC 82990 15 Business service 
Ricardo PLC 71122 15 Business service 
Rightmove PLC 62090 14 Information and Communication 
RIO Tinto PLC 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Robert Walters PLC 78109 15 Business service 
Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC 30300 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Rotork P.L.C. 28150 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 




Royal Mail PLC 53100 13 Transportation and storage 
RPC Group PLC 22220 9 All other Manufacturing 
RSA Insurance Group PLC 66220 15 Business service 
Safestore Holdings PLC 52103 13 Transportation and storage 
Saga PLC 86210 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
Schroders PLC 66300 15 Business service 
SDL PLC 62012 14 Information and Communication 
Segro PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Senior PLC 30300 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Sepura PLC 26110 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
Serco Group PLC 70229 15 Business service 
Servelec Group PLC 62020 14 Information and Communication 
Severfield PLC 25110 9 All other Manufacturing 
Severn Trent PLC 37000 16 Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 
Shire PLC 21200 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
SIG PLC 43290 11 Construction  
SKY PLC 60200 14 Information and Communication 
Smith & Nephew PLC 21100 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Smiths Group PLC 26511 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
Smurfit Kappa Group PLC 70100 15 Business service 
Soco International PLC 06100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Softcat PLC 62090 14 Information and Communication 
Sophos Group PLC 62012 14 Information and Communication 
Spectris PLC 26511 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
Speedy Hire PLC 77390 15 Business service 
Spirax-Sarco Engineering 
PLC 
28131 7 Manufacture machinery, vehicle transport 
Spire Healthcare Group 
PLC 




61900 14 Information and Communication 
Sports Direct International 
PLC 
47640 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
SSE PLC 84130 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
SSP Group PLC 56103 17 Other service activities 
ST Ives PLC 18110 9 All other Manufacturing 
ST. James's Place PLC 84110 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
Stagecoach Group PLC 49319 13 Transportation and storage 
Standard Life PLC 66220 15 Business service 
Sthree PLC 78200 15 Business service 
Stobart Group Ltd 49410 13 Transportation and storage 
Stock Spirits Group PLC 11010 5 Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 
STV Group PLC 60200 14 Information and Communication 
Supergroup PLC 47710 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
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Synthomer PLC 20130 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Talktalk Telecom Group 
PLC 
61900 14 Information and Communication 
Target Healthcare Reit Ltd 41100 11 Construction  
Tarsus Group PLC 73110 15 Business service 
Tate & Lyle PLC 46390 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Taylor Wimpey PLC 41202 11 Construction  
Ted Baker PLC 47710 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Telecom Plus PLC 61900 14 Information and Communication 
Tesco PLC 47110 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
The Berkeley Group 
Holdings PLC 
41100 11 Construction  
The Go-Ahead Group PLC 49100 13 Transportation and storage 
The Gym Group PLC 93130 17 Other service activities 
The Rank Group PLC 92000 17 Other service activities 
The Restaurant Group PLC 56302 17 Other service activities 
The Sage Group Plc. 70229 15 Business service 
Thomas Cook Group PLC 79110 15 Business service 
Topps Tiles PLC 46730 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Travis Perkins PLC 47789 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Trifast PLC 46180 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Trinity Mirror PLC 58130 14 Information and Communication 
TT Electronics PLC 61900 14 Information and Communication 
Tullow Oil PLC 09100 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Tyman PLC 25720 9 All other Manufacturing 
U And I Group PLC 41100 11 Construction  
UBM PLC 58190 14 Information and Communication 
UDG Healthcare PLC 46460 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
UK Commercial Property 
Trust Ltd 
41100 11 Construction  
Ultra Electronics Holdings 
PLC 
84220 16 Government administrative functions, 
Education, Health 
Unilever PLC 46900 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
United Utilities Group PLC 36000 16 Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 
Vectura Group PLC 72190 15 Business service 
Vedanta Resources PLC 08990 2 Mining, Quarry (inc extraction of petroleum 
and gas 
Vesuvius PLC 24540 9 All other Manufacturing 
Victrex PLC 20160 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
Vodafone Group PLC 61200 14 Information and Communication 
Volution Group PLC 27900 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
VP PLC 77390 15 Business service 
Weir Group PLC 71129 15 Business service 
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WH Smith PLC 46499 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Whitbread PLC 55100 17 Other service activities 
William Hill PLC 92000 17 Other service activities 
Wincanton PLC 49410 13 Transportation and storage 
Wizz Air Holdings PLC 51102 13 Transportation and storage 
WM Morrison 
Supermarkets PLC 
47110 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Wolseley PLC 46740 12 Wholesale and retail, motor vehicle repair, 
sale of fuel 
Workspace Group PLC 41100 11 Construction  
Worldpay Group PLC 82990 15 Business service 
WPP PLC 73110 15 Business service 
WS Atkins PLC 71129 15 Business service 
Xaar PLC 26110 7 Manufacture computer, electronic, light 
electrical 
XP Power Ltd 35120 16 Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 
Zotefoams PLC 20160 5 Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 






















Appendix C Main Industry  
 
Main Industry Identified code No. of Firms 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Veterinary 1 0 
Mining, Quarrying (inc extraction of petroleum and gas) 2 28 
Manufacture food, drink, tobacco 3 11 
Manufacture textiles, leather 4 1 
Manufacture coke, petroleum, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals 
5 17 
Manufacture computer, electronic, light electrical 6 8 
Manufacture machinery, vehicle, transport 7 12 
Machinery repair excluding motor vehicles 8 0 
All other Manufacturing 9 25 
Utilities, sewerage, waste and recycling 10 7 
Construction (including development of real estate) 11 40 
Wholesale and retail,motor vehicle repair,sale of fuel 12 55 
Transportation and Storage 13 20 
Information and Communication 14 34 
Business services 15 67 
Government administrative functions, Education, Health 16 11 



















Appendix D Other of Estimation Models of Discretionary Accruals 
Chapter 3.4.1.1 The Normal Level of Discretionary Accruals 
Alternatively, there is another widely used estimation model that is identified by Kothari, et al. 
(2005), discretionary accruals follow a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones (1991) 
model after controlling for previous performance, thus the ‘normal’ level of accruals can be 












+ 𝜋3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1,                                      
where 
 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = is the total accruals in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = is equal to the change in accounts receivables from year 𝑡 to year 𝑡 − 1 for firm 𝑖; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = measures the rate of return on assets in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = is 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, the change in sales, is the difference between sales revenue at the end of 
year for firm 𝑖 and the sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 = is the gross property, plant, and equipment in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 















Appendix E Other of Estimation Models of the Relationship between 
Directors’ Remuneration and Earnings Management 
 
Early versions of models to estimate the relation between directors’ remuneration and earnings 
management  
Model 1:  
The following regression of directors’ remuneration is on the abnormal level of earnings 
management and a set of control variables including return on asset, market value of equity, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage, and sales growth.   
𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,                     
where 
the dependant variable, 𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 equals to directors remuneration which is sum of directors’ fees, 
pension contribution, and other emolument, for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 lagged by total asset;  
the independent variable, 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡, indicates the six measures of earnings management, including 
one proxy of accrual-based earnings management, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 , four measures of real 
activities manipulation (𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃 , 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 , 𝑅𝐴𝑀 ) and sum of accrual 
based earnings management (𝐴𝑀) and real activities manipulation (𝑅𝐴𝑀). 
control variables are related to firms performance, which may affect the level of directors’ 
compensation, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on assets for current-period firm performance, calculated as net 
income divided by lagged assets for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 
𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm value of market value of equity for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, indicates 
the potential impact of the relative firm size effect in the industry; 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is market to book ratio for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 to control measurement errors which may be 
caused by firm’s growth opportunities, calculated by market value of equity divided by book 
value of equity; 
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𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is leverage for firm 𝑖  in year𝑡  to control the risk of bankrupcy, calculated as total 
liabilities divided by the value of total equity; 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is growth rate of sales for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 for growth opportunities, calculated 
by (𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)/ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1.  
Model 2:  
The following regression of directors’ compensations is on the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals and a set of control variables including the non-discretionary accruals, net cash flows 
from operations, market-to-book ratio as a proxy of growth opportunities, leverage, and sales 
growth.   
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡        , 
where  
the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡, can be a proxy for earnings management for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, such 
as 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷, 𝑅𝐴𝑀, 𝐸𝑀;  
The independent variable, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡, is a proxy for directors remuneration, sum of directors’ fees, 
pension contribution, and other emoluments lagged by total asset for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡;  




















Appendix F Coefficients from Many Separate Regressions  
Table 5.5: Panel A Comparison of suspect firm-years just beating/meeting zero level of 
earnings with the rest of the sample 
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 
2010 -0.00164 0.00095 0.00035 0.00003 0.04285 
2011 -0.00112 0.00185 0.00046 0.07716 -0.02940 
2012 0.00138 0.00196 -0.00039 0.07828 -0.04000 
2013 0.00077 0.00048 0.00020 0.06032 0.00361 
2014 -0.00134 0.00133 -0.00041 0.12472 -0.00117 
2015 -0.00117 0.00351 -0.00005 0.08598 -0.01765 
 
𝐴𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡.  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 
2010 0.00433 -0.00355 0.00118 -0.67691 0.08632 
2011 0.00164 0.00014 -0.00028 -0.65436 -0.03370 
2012 0.00151 -0.00665 -0.00118 -0.32949 -0.01366 
2013 -0.00257 -0.00730 -0.00052 -0.33172 0.04364 
2014 -0.00081 -0.01268 0.00041 -0.31276 0.01897 
2015 0.00000 -0.01175 0.00073 -0.50217 -0.02395 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡.  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 
2010 -0.00681 0.00229 0.00110 -0.02072 0.10655 
2011 -0.00589 -0.00591 -0.00195 -0.20035 0.13584 
2012 -0.00956 -0.00124 0.00045 -0.09169 0.07179 
2013 -0.00550 -0.00438 0.00094 -0.14778 -0.06242 
2014 -0.00121 -0.02550 0.00047 -0.11873 -0.01508 
2015 -0.00436 -0.02697 -0.00029 0.13544 0.07105 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡.  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 
2010 -0.00575 -0.00415 0.00163 -0.67935 0.21292 
2011 0.00765 -0.00863 -0.00285 -0.86991 
 
2012 -0.00924 0.00479 -0.00267 -0.73019 0.06137 
2013 -0.00228 -0.00814 0.00224 -0.51704 0.09162 
2014 -0.00422 -0.02364 -0.00038 -0.53731 0.02424 
191 
 
2015 0.00017 -0.02874 0.00312 -0.21959 0.10319 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 
2010 0.00200 -0.00103 0.00411 -1.34876 0.48833 
2011 0.02122 -0.01516 -0.00566 -1.74683 
 
2012 -0.01065 0.00126 -0.00618 -1.19279 0.04677 
2013 -0.00050 -0.02495 0.00561 -0.89325 0.24065 
2014 -0.00482 -0.05695 -0.00072 -1.01611 0.03505 
2015 -0.00484 -0.05795 0.00451 -0.47429 0.16543 
 
𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 
2010 -0.00051 0.00044 0.00465 -1.28189 0.53601 
2011 0.02134 -0.01250 -0.00510 -1.73864 
 
2012 -0.00839 0.00249 -0.00625 -1.06911 -0.01265 
2013 -0.00025 -0.02497 0.00599 -0.83192 0.22343 
2014 -0.00754 -0.05543 -0.00114 -0.96152 0.03587 
2015 -0.00838 -0.05514 0.00449 -0.36155 0.15717 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Comparison of suspect firm-years just beating/meeting last year’s earnings level 
with the rest of the sample 
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭 
2010 -0.00154 0.00113 0.00035 -0.00208 0.00761 
2011 -0.00074 0.00197 0.00045 0.07830 -0.00997 
2012 0.00118 0.00209 -0.00039 0.07973 -0.00320 
2013 0.00046 0.00045 0.00021 0.05974 0.00842 
2014 -0.00121 0.00131 -0.00042 0.12509 -0.01001 
2015 -0.00125 0.00364 -0.00005 0.08831 -0.01139 
 
𝐴𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭 
2010 0.00515 -0.00294 0.00118 -0.68468 0.00149 
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2011 0.00201 0.00025 -0.00029 -0.65283 -0.01012 
2012 0.00167 -0.00650 -0.00118 -0.32862 -0.00759 
2013 -0.00198 -0.00725 -0.00050 -0.33371 -0.00186 
2014 0.00027 -0.01245 0.00041 -0.31318 -0.04397 
2015 -0.00095 -0.01173 0.00072 -0.49789 0.00585 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭 
2010 -0.00695 0.00234 0.00091 -0.01320 0.05013 
2011 -0.00731 -0.00642 -0.00194 -0.20952 0.05190 
2012 -0.00847 -0.00113 0.00046 -0.09645 -0.00149 
2013 -0.01101 -0.00474 0.00091 -0.14904 0.10711 
2014 -0.00147 -0.02572 0.00045 -0.11696 -0.00732 
2015 -0.00157 -0.02681 -0.00026 0.12338 -0.01788 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭 
2010 -0.00509 -0.00325 0.00162 -0.69471 0.03938 
2011 0.00629 -0.00919 -0.00285 -0.86352 0.02452 
2012 -0.01304 0.00294 -0.00244 -0.74683 0.08732 
2013 -0.00630 -0.00842 0.00206 -0.53794 0.10704 
2014 -0.00266 -0.02337 -0.00040 -0.53415 -0.09365 
2015 0.00473 -0.02924 0.00315 -0.22776 -0.04904 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭 
2010 0.00428 0.00141 0.00409 -1.39052 0.07312 
2011 0.01923 -0.01598 -0.00566 -1.73745 0.03602 
2012 -0.01583 -0.00112 -0.00588 -1.21398 0.11532 
2013 -0.00847 -0.02529 0.00525 -0.93863 0.22175 
2014 -0.00190 -0.05655 -0.00076 -1.00862 -0.18461 
2015 0.00186 -0.05883 0.00455 -0.48692 -0.06539 
 
𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭 
2010 0.00199 0.00311 0.00462 -1.32767 0.08040 
2011 0.02024 -0.01296 -0.00510 -1.73345 0.01993 
2012 -0.01369 0.00027 -0.00596 -1.08809 0.11122 
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2013 -0.00875 -0.02552 0.00562 -0.87769 0.22919 
2014 -0.00442 -0.05501 -0.00119 -0.95327 -0.19780 
2015 -0.00142 -0.05586 0.00453 -0.37401 -0.07444 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +




Table 5.6: Comparison of 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 firms with other firms 
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 
2010 0.00006 0.00069 0.00039 -0.02281 -0.03852 
2011 0.00129 0.00137 0.00054 0.04433 -0.06145 
2012 0.00409 0.00154 -0.00038 0.05908 -0.04248 
2013 0.00354 0.00079 0.00043 0.03469 -0.04376 
2014 0.00385 0.00087 -0.00011 0.08217 -0.05791 
2015 0.00045 0.00343 -0.00001 0.07302 -0.02487 
 
𝐴𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 
2010 0.00635 -0.00343 0.00122 -0.70172 -0.03381 
2011 0.00230 -0.00010 -0.00026 -0.66187 -0.02187 
2012 0.00155 -0.00667 -0.00118 -0.33035 -0.00342 
2013 -0.00246 -0.00731 -0.00053 -0.33040 0.00714 
2014 -0.00151 -0.01233 0.00035 -0.30530 0.01312 
2015 0.00037 -0.01174 0.00074 -0.50602 -0.01314 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 
2010 -0.00279 0.00250 0.00096 -0.05782 -0.06338 
2011 -0.00300 -0.00551 -0.00190 -0.23861 -0.04189 
2012 -0.00132 -0.00217 0.00048 -0.14684 -0.10514 
2013 -0.00458 -0.00431 0.00105 -0.16121 -0.03520 
2014 0.00047 -0.02575 0.00058 -0.13478 -0.02609 
2015 -0.00307 -0.02690 -0.00028 0.13056 0.01008 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −




Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 
2010 -0.00535 -0.00153 0.00159 -0.67157 0.05460 
2011 0.00710 -0.00858 -0.00287 -0.85818 0.01570 
2012 -0.01349 0.00477 -0.00313 -0.62247 0.08153 
2013 -0.01023 -0.00929 0.00200 -0.40580 0.17708 
2014 -0.00755 -0.02310 -0.00049 -0.49454 0.04712 
2015 -0.00343 -0.02918 0.00307 -0.17952 0.06479 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 
2010 0.00500 0.00409 0.00405 -1.37057 0.06840 
2011 0.02406 -0.01541 -0.00558 -1.80782 -0.08167 
2012 -0.00744 0.00112 -0.00587 -1.26629 -0.05412 
2013 -0.01029 -0.02599 0.00531 -0.74895 0.23621 
2014 -0.00667 -0.05635 -0.00078 -0.99032 0.03039 
2015 -0.01058 -0.05868 0.00443 -0.41055 0.10312 
 
𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡. 
  
Year 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐎𝐀 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 
2010 0.00404 0.00552 0.00459 -1.32974 0.04081 
2011 0.02435 -0.01278 -0.00502 -1.80341 -0.08674 
2012 -0.00264 0.00243 -0.00567 -1.20811 -0.10398 
2013 -0.00756 -0.02556 0.00577 -0.72166 0.18332 
2014 -0.00512 -0.05507 -0.00107 -0.98724 -0.02346 
2015 -0.01110 -0.05606 0.00444 -0.32270 0.06768 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
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